SUBJECTS:
Constitutional Rights, Corruption of Authority,
Dismissal of Suit, Equal Protection Under Law, Government,
Habeus Corpus, Judicial Immunity, Jurisdiction, Justice
Department, Peaceful Assembly (Demonstrations), Probable Cause,
Pro Se Rights/Lawyer Incompetence.
NOTE: We are not attorneys. The cases cited herein were
collected through multiple sources such as media, law libraries,
etc., often by pro se litigants, and serve as an educational
resource only. It is suggested that full copies of the cited
cases be obtained and studied. These cases are illustrative of
situations in which parties were fighting for their legal rights
in situations where their rights were being illegally withheld
or attacked.
Redress, Inc.
maintains a file on each case cited. We are currently in
process of "shephardizing" the cases; this means that portions
of some cases are "red-lined" (a lot of it was overturned) or
"yellow-lined" (some of it was over-turned). When this project
is complete, we will notate the information accordingly.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
Boyd v. United, 116 U.S.
616 at 635 (1885)
Justice
Bradley, "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its
mildest form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way; namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the
rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
persons and property should be liberally construed. A close
and literal construction deprives them of half their
efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as
if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the
duty of the Courts to be watchful for the Constitutional
Rights of the Citizens, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Their motto should be Obsta
Principiis."
Downs v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901)
"It will be an
evil day for American Liberty if the theory of a government
outside supreme law finds lodgement in our constitutional
jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this Court than to
exert its full authority to prevent all violations of the
principles of the Constitution."
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 155 (1966), cited also in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649.644
"Constitutional 'rights' would be of little value if they
could be indirectly denied."
Juliard v. Greeman, 110
U.S. 421 (1884)
Supreme Court Justice Field, "There is no such thing as a
power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the
United States... In this country, sovereignty resides in the
people, and Congress can exercise power which they have not,
by their Constitution, entrusted to it. All else is
withheld."
Mallowy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1
"All
rights and safeguards contained in the first eight
amendments to the federal Constitution are equally
applicable."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 426, 491; 86 S. Ct. 1603
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved,
there can be no 'rule making' or legislation which would
abrogate them."
Norton v. Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425 p. 442
"An
unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed."
Perez v. Brownell, 356
U.S. 44, 7; 8 S. Ct. 568, 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958)
"...in our country the people are sovereign and the
government cannot sever its relationship to them by taking
away their citizenship."
Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.
2d 946 (1973)
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one
because of his exercise of constitutional rights."
Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968)
"The
claim and exercise of a Constitution right cannot be
converted into a crime"... "a denial of them would be a
denial of due process of law".
Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas., 88 F3d 341
(5th Cir. 1996)
Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from
claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state
officials acted in violation of federal law.
CORRUPTION OF AUTHORITY:
Burton v. United States,
202 U.S. 344, 26 S. Ct. 688 50 L.Ed 1057
United States
Senator convicted of, among other things, bribery.
Butz v.
Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
at 220, 1 S. Ct. at 261 (1882)
"No man
[or woman] in this country is so high that he is above the
law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance
with impunity. All the officers of the government from the
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are
bound to obey it."
*Cannon
v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 678,
694
Acts
in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct,
particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the
requirements of fairness and due process.
*Geiler
v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270,
286
Society's commitment to institutional justice requires that
judges be solicitous of the rights of persons who come
before the court.
*Gonzalez
v. Commission on Judicial Performance, (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 359,
371, 374
Acts
in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct,
particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the
requirements of fairness and due process.
Olmstad
v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438
"Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Owen v. City of Independence
"The
innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of
governmental authority is assured that he will be
compensated for his injury."
Perry v. United States,
204 U.S. 330, 358
"I
do not understand the government to contend that it is any
less bound by the obligation than a private individual would
be..." "It is not the function of our government to keep
the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of
the citizen to keep the government from falling into error."
*Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, (1988)
45 Cal. 3d 518, 533
Before sending a person to jail for contempt or imposing a
fine, judges are required to provide due process of law,
including strict adherence to the procedural requirements
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Ignorance of
these procedures is not a mitigating but an aggravating
factor.
U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)
"No
man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with
impunity. All the officers of the government, from the
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law are bound to
obey it."
"It
is the only supreme power in our system of government, and
every man who, by accepting office participates in its
functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes
on the exercise of the authority which it gives."
Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir.
1996)
Eleventh
Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for
prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials
acted in violation of federal law.
DISMISSAL OF SUIT:
Note: [Copied
verbiage; we are not lawyers.] It can be argued that to dismiss
a civil rights action or other lawsuit in which a serious
factual pattern or allegation of a cause of action has been made
would itself be violating of procedural due process as it would
deprive a pro se litigant of equal protection of the law vis a
vis a party who is represented by counsel.
Also, see
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 - Relief from Judgment
or Order (a) Clerical Mistakes and (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence;
Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.
Warnock v. Pecos County,
Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)
Eleventh
Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for
prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials
acted in violation of federal law.
Walter Process Equipment v.
Food Machinery, 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
... in a
"motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the
complaint are taken as admitted". From this vantage point,
courts are reluctant to dismiss complaints unless it appears
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief (see Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW
Cochran
v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257-258 (1942)
"However
inept Cochran's choice of words, he has set out allegations
supported by affidavits, and nowhere denied, that Kansas
refused him privileges of appeal which it afforded to
others. *** The State properly concedes that if the alleged
facts pertaining to the suppression of Cochran's appeal were
disclosed as being true, ... there would be no question but
that there was a violation of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
Duncan v.
Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)
Due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws are
secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject
the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government."
Giozza v.
Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893), Citations Omitted
"Undoubtedly it (the Fourteenth Amendment) forbids any
arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and
secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in
the enjoyment of their rights... It is enough that there is
no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the
same class. ...And due process of law within the meaning of
the [Fifth and Fourteenth] amendment is secured if the laws
operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to
an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."
Kentucky
Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 337 (1885)
"The rule
of equality... requires the same means and methods to be
applied impartially to all the constitutents of each class,
so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all
persons in similar circumstances".
Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332
"Our
whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental
principle of equality of application fo the law. 'All men
are equal before the law,' "This is a government of laws and
not of men,' 'No man is above the law,' are all maxims
showing the spirit in which legislatures, executives, and
courts are expected to make, execute and apply laws. But
the framers and adopters of the (Fourtheenth) Amendment were
not content to depend... upon the spirit of equality which
might not be insisted on by local public opinion. They
therefore embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty."
HABEUS CORPUS:
Duncan v.
Bradley, No. 01-55290 (9th Circ., 12-24-02)
A
state trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on an
entrapment defense, in a second trial on drug sale charges,
amounted to prejudicial constitutional error where evidence
presented at a first trial warranted such an instruct. To
read entire text of the opinion, see
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0155290p.pdf
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY:
See
Judicial Immunity page for more citations (links) and news
articles regarding the topic.
See also, 42 USC
1983 - Availability of Equitable Relief Against Judges.
Note: [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.]
Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their
judicial functions. Judges have no judicial immunity for
criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others
who perform a criminal act or for their
administrative/ministerial duties, or for violating a
citizen's constitutional rights. When a judge has a duty to
act, he does not have discretion - he is then not performing
a judicial act; he is performing a ministerial act.
Nowhere was
the judiciary given immunity, particularly nowhere in
Article III; under our Constitution, if judges were to have
immunity, it could only possibly be granted by amendment
(and even less possibly by legislative act), as Art. I,
Sections 9 & 10, respectively, in fact expressly prohibit
such, stating, "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the
United States" and "No state shall... grant any Title of
Nobility." Most of us are certain that Congress itself
doesn't understand the inherent lack of immunity for judges.
Article III, Sec. 1, "The Judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in
such inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good
behavior."
Tort &
Insurance Law Journal, Spring 1986 21 n3, p 509-516,
"Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity
for acts that violate litigants' civil rights." - Robert
Craig Waters.
Ableman v. Booth, 21
Howard 506 (1859)
"No judicial
process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful
authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to
enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than
lawless violence."
Chandler v. Judicial Council
of the 10th Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 26 L. Ed.
2d 100
Justice
Douglas, in his dissenting opinion at page 140 said, "If
(federal judges) break the law, they can be prosecuted."
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion at page 141) said,
"Judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted and
punished for crimes... The judicial power shall extend to
all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution".
Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958)
Note: Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the
Constitution of the United States wars against that
Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme
law of the land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.
The
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "no state legislator or
executive or judicial officer can war against the
Constitution without violating his undertaking to support
it". See also In Re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (188);
U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L.
Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).
Cooper v. O'Conner, 99
F.2d 133
There is a
general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully,
although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil
action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign.
Davis v. Burris, 51
Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)
A judge must
be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and
person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his
acts.
Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. at 227-229, 108 S. Ct. at 544-545 (1987); Westfall
v.Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1987); United States v. Lanier
(March 1997)
Constitutionally and in fact of law and judicial rulings,
state-federal "magistrates-judges" or any government actors,
state or federal, may now be held liable, if they violate
any Citizen's Constitutional rights, privileges, or
immunities, or guarantees; including statutory civil rights.
A
judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely
Administrative, non-judicial capacity.
Gregory v. Thompson,
F.2d 59 (C.A. Ariz. 1974)
Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts
within or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts
have been done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception
being for acts done in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.
Hoffsomer v. Hayes, 92
Okla 32, 227 F. 417
"The
courts are not bound by an officer's interpretation of the
law under which he presumes to act."
Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)
"... the
particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to
be essential to all written constitutions, that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."
"In declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution
itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United
States generally, but those only which shall be made in
pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank".
"All law
(rules and practices) which are repugnant to the
Constitution are VOID".
Since the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution states "NO State
(Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of
the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law, ... or equal
protection under the law", this renders judicial immunity
unconstitutional.
Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray
120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed.
646 (1872)
"Where there
is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for
discretion is incident to jurisdiction."
Pulliam v. Allen, 466
U.S. 522 (1984); 104 S. Ct. 1781, 1980, 1981, and 1985
In 1996,
Congress passed a law to overcome this ruling which stated
that judicial immunity doesn't exist; citizens can sue
judges for prospective injunctive relief.
"Our own
experience is fully consistent with the common law's
rejection of a rule of judicial immunity. We never have had
a rule of absolute judicial immunity. At least seven
circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no
immunity... to prevent irreparable injury to a citizen's
constitutional rights..."
"Subsequent
interpretations of the Civil Rights Act by this Court
acknowledge Congress' intent to reach unconstitutional
actions by all state and federal actors, including judges...
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state [federal] from
denying any person [citizen] within its jurisdiction the
equal protection under the laws. Since a State [or federal]
acts only by its legislative, executive or judicial
authorities, the constitutional provisions must be addressed
to those authorities, including state and federal judges..."
"We conclude
that judicial immunity is not a bar to relief against a
judicial officer acting in her [his] judicial capacity."
Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 at 288 (1991)
A
judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely
Administrative, non-judicial capacity; however, even in a
case involving a particular attorney not assigned to him, he
may reach out into the hallway, having his deputy use
"excessive force" to haul the attorney into the courtroom
for chastisement or even incarceration. A Superior Court
Judge is broadly vested with "general jurisdiction."
Provided the judge is not divested of all jurisdiction, he
may have his actions excused as per this poor finding.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)
Note: By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then
acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his
person). When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when
a judge does not follow the law, the Judge loses
subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges' orders are not
voidable, but VOID, and of no legal force or effect.
The
U.S. Supreme Court stated that "when a state officer acts
under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal
Constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him
any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of
the United States."
Stump v. Sparkman, id.,
435 U.S. 349
Some
Defendants urge that any act "of a judicial nature" entitles
the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a
jurisdictional vacuum (that is, absence of all jurisdiction)
the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is
missing.
A judge is not
immune for tortious acts committed in a purely
Administrative, non-judicial capacity.
Rankin v. Howard, 633
F.2d 844 (1980)
The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an Arizona District Court
dismissal based upon absolute judicial immunity, finding
that both necessary immunity prongs were absent; later, in
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (1986), the Ninth
Circuit, en banc, criticized the "judicial nature"
analysis it had published in Rankin as
unnecessarily restrictive. But Rankin's ultimate
result was not changed, because Judge Howard had been
independently divested of absolute judicial immunity by his
complete lack of jurisdiction.
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
(State use of), 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697
When
a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or
without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be
held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act
involved a decision made in good faith, that he had
jurisdiction.
U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)
"No
man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with
impunity. All the officers of the government, from the
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are
bound to obey it."
"It
is the only supreme power in our system of government, and
every man who, by accepting office participates in its
functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes
on the exercise of the authority which it gives."
Zeller v. Rankin, 101
S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326
When a judge
knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of
clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of
jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.
JURISDICTION:
NOTE: It is a
fact of law that the person asserting jurisdiction must, when
challenged, prove that jurisdiction exists; mere good faith
assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been
abolished.
Albrecht v. U.S.
Balzac v. People of Puerto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)
"The United
States District Court is not a true United States Court,
established under Article 3 of the Constitution to
administer the judicial power of the United States therein
conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign
congressional faculty, granted under Article 4, 3, of that
instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory belonging to the United States.
The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United
States courts, in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of
resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does
not change its character as a mere territorial court."
Basso v. UPL, 495 F. 2d
906
Brook v. Yawkey, 200 F.
2d 633
Elliot v. Piersol, 1
Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
Under federal
Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that "if a court is without authority, its
judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are
not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery
sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them.
They constitute no justification and all persons concerned
in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in
law, as trespassers."
Griffin v. Mathews, 310
Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272
Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528
Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356 (1990)
Federal Law
and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases.
Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
Mack v. United States,
07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia
"The Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States'
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It
matters not whether policy making is involved, and no
case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is
necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."
Mack v.
United States, 07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia
"Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in
the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all
governmental powers, but only discrete and enumerated ones."
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1
Mookini v. U.S., 303
U.S. 201 (1938)
"The term
'District Courts of the United States' as used in the rules
without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its
historic significance. It describes the constitutional
courts created under Article 3 of the Constitution. Courts
of the Territories are Legislative Courts, properly
speaking, and are not district courts of the United States.
We have often held that vesting a territorial court with
jurisdiction similar to that vested in the district courts
of the United States (98 U.S. 145) does not make it a
'District Court of the United States'.
"Not only did
the promulgating order use the term District Courts of the
United States in its historic and proper sense, but the
omission of provision for the application of the rules the
territorial court and other courts mentioned in the
authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was
intended."
McNutt v. General Motors,
298 U.S. 178
New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992)
"We have held,
however, that state legislatures are not subject to federal
direction."
Owens v. The City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980)
Thomson v. Gaskill, 315
U.S. 442
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:
United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. I at 16 (1976)
"It is deeply
distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is
to protect the constitutional liberties of the people of the
United States, should even appear to be seeking to subvert
them by extreme and dubious legal argument."
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY (DEMONSTRATIONS):
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347; 6 S. Ct. 2673; 49 L. Ed. 2d (1976)
"Loss of First
Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."
Miller v. U.S., 230 F.
2d. 486, 490; 42
"There can be no
sanction or penalty imposed upon one, because of his
exercise of constitutional rights."
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
"No
state shall convert a liberty into a license, and charge a
fee therefore."
Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, Alabama, 373 U.S. 262
"If the State
converts a right (liberty) into a privilege, the citizen can
ignore the license and fee and engage in the right (liberty)
with impunity."
United States Constitution, First Amendment
Right to
Petition; Freedom of Association.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
Brinegar
v. U.S., 388 US 160 (1949)
Probable Cause to Arrest
- Provides details on how to determine if a crime has been
or is being committed.
Carroll
v. U.S., 267 US 132 (1925)
Probable Cause to Search
- Provides details on the belief that seizable property
exists in a particular place or on a particular person.
Draper v.
U.S. (1959)
Probable cause is where
known facts and circumstances, of a reasonably trustworthy
nature, are sufficient to justify a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that a crime has been or is being
committed. Reasonable man definition; common textbook
definition; comes from this case.
PRO SE RIGHTS:
Brotherhood of Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin,
Sheriff 407 U.S. 425
Litigants can
be assisted by unlicensed laymen during judicial
proceedings.
Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)
"Following the
simple guide of rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice"... "The federal
rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill
in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."
The court also cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds that all
pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice.
Davis v. Wechler, 263
U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb v. California, 283 U.S. 359; NAACP v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 449
"The
assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably
made, are not to be defeated under the name of local
practice."
Elmore v. McCammon
(1986) 640 F. Supp. 905
"...
the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most
important rights under the constitution and laws."
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures, Rule 17, 28 USCA "Next Friend"
A next
friend is a person who represents someone who is unable to
tend to his or her own interest.
Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519 (1972)
"Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however
inartfully pleaded, are sufficient"... "which we hold to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers."
Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
Pro
se pleadings are to be considered without regard to
technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held
to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.
Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co.,
303 U.S. 197 (1938)
"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at
fair and just settlements of controversies between
litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the
achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but
its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to
accomplish the end of a just judgment."
NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415); United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715; and Johnson v. Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747
(1969)
Members of groups who are competent nonlawyers can assist
other members of the group achieve the goals of the group in
court without being charged with "unauthorized practice of
law."
Picking v. Pennsylvania
Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals
The
plaintiff's civil rights pleading was 150 pages and
described by a federal judge as "inept". Nevertheless, it
was held "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for
protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to
construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to
technicalities."
Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.
2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)
It
was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent
reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in
Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se
Rights Section).
Roadway Express v. Pipe,
447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982)
"Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize
tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged in dilatory
practices... the glacial pace of much litigation breeds
frustration with the Federal Courts and ultimately,
disrespect for the law."
Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.
2d 946 (1973)
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one
because of his exercise of Constitutional Rights."
Schware v.
Board of Examiners, United State Reports 353 U.S. pages 238,
239.
"The
practice of law cannot be licensed by any state/State."
Sims v.
Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925)
"The
practice of law is an occupation of common right."
TO SEE MORE
CASES ON PRO SE RIGHTS, SEE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AT
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/delunbundcases.html.
WORKING
TOGETHER TO ATTAIN FAIRNESS
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