|
|
|
|
Here
are some cites from Jones v Gallagher
(2002) on permanent RO's |
|
Permanent order.
In 1990, the Legislature rewrote the
statute, see St. 1990, c. 403,
3, adding language that expressly
grants the judge discretionary authority
to "enter a permanent order"
at the renewal hearing, generally,
the date set in the original order
when "the order is to expire"
and "the matter will again be
heard." G. L. c. 209A,
3. [6]
See Crenshaw v. Macklin, 430 Mass.
633, 634-635 (2000). General Laws
c. 209A, 3, mandates that
initial relief be granted for a fixed
period of time, not to exceed a year,
and that the order state on its face
the date and time that the order is
to "expire" and the matter
will again be "heard." Upon
that date, if the plaintiff appears,
the court is directed to "determine"
whether to extend or make permanent
the order. Without further action
by the court, the Legislature has
directed that the order expire. There
is no presumption that the order be
continued. There is no entitlement
that the order be made permanent.
The order expires unless extended
after a judicial determination, essentially,
a new finding, that the plaintiff
continues to require protection from
"abuse" as explicitly defined
in c. 209A, 1 -- in this
case, requiring a finding that a permanent
order is, in fact, what is reasonably
necessary to protect Jones from being
placed "in fear of imminent serious
physical harm" by Gallagher.
See Commonwealth v. Molloy, 44 Mass.
App. Ct. 306, 309 (1998) ("extension
of an annual order pursuant to 3 . . .
is . . . by no means
automatic"); Pike v. Maguire,
47 Mass. App. Ct. at 929-930.
|
|
There is no burden
on a defendant to testify or present
evidence. "The burden is on the
complainant to establish facts justifying
the . . . continuance
of an abuse prevention order. . . .
The plaintiff must make the case for
the awarding of relief." Frizado
v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596.
"Although it is not expressly
stated in G. L. c. 209A, . . .
[the] plaintiff must make a case for
relief by a preponderance of the evidence."
Id. at 597. See Smith v. Joyce,
421 Mass. at 522. |
|
|
Susan
B. JONES |
v. |
Joseph
W. GALLAGHER. |
|
Argued Jan. 17, 2002. |
Decided May 29, 2002. |
|
On expiration
of original abuse protection order
against ex-boyfriend, ex-girlfriend
sought extension of order. The District
Court Department, Concord Division,
Middlesex County, Paul L. McGill,
J., made order permanent. Ex-boyfriend
appealed. The Appeals Court, Mills,
J., held that ex-girlfriend was not
entitled to extension of order. Vacated. |
|
West
Headnotes |
|
[1] KeyCite Notes
|
|
62
Breach of the Peace 62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect
Family 62k20
k. Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Most Cited Cases |
|
Proceeding for issuance of abuse prevention
order is a civil, and not a criminal,
proceeding. M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 1 et
seq. |
|
[2] KeyCite Notes
|
|
62
Breach of the Peace 62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect
Family 62k16
k. Nature of Remedy. Most Cited Cases
|
|
Issuance of an abuse prevention order
effects entry of that order in the Commonwealth's
criminal records system, and the order
can have an adverse effect upon the
defendant in any future abuse proceeding,
and in certain future bail proceedings.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 1 et seq. |
|
[3] KeyCite Notes
35
Arrest 35II
On Criminal Charges 35k63
Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
Warrant 35k63.4
Probable or Reasonable Cause 35k63.4(5)
k. Nature of Offense; Felony or Misdemeanor.
Most Cited Cases |
|
Abuse prevention order can create
criminal jeopardy specific to the defendant,
and subject him or her to arrest without
a warrant. M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 1 et
seq. |
|
[4] KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k16
k. Nature of Remedy. Most Cited Cases
The judicial imprimatur on an abuse
prevention order lends it significant
weight; this is not just a filing
in court, but a determination by the
court. M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 1 et seq.
[5] KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k17
k. Grounds for Requiring. Most Cited
Cases
In issuing an abuse protection order,
a judge must consider carefully whether
serious physical harm is imminent,
and should not issue an order simply
because it seems to be a good idea,
or because it will not cause the defendant
any real inconvenience. M.G.L.A. c.
209A, § 1 et seq.
[6] KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k17
k. Grounds for Requiring. Most Cited
Cases
Ex-girlfriend was not entitled to
extension of abuse prevention order
against ex-boyfriend; ex-girlfriend
failed to showed reasonable fear of
imminent physical harm, and existence
of original order did not provide
grounds for its extension. M.G.L.A.
c. 209A, § 3.
[7] KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k17
k. Grounds for Requiring. Most Cited
Cases
The only criterion for extending an
original abuse prevention order is
a showing of continued need for the
order. M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 3.
[8] KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k20
k. Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Most Cited Cases
There is no presumption that an abuse
prevention order be continued or be
made permanent. M.G.L.A. c. 209A,
§ 3.
[9] KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k16
k. Nature of Remedy. Most Cited Cases
62
Breach of the Peace KeyCite Notes
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k17
k. Grounds for Requiring. Most Cited
Cases
An abuse protection order expires
unless extended after a judicial determination,
essentially a new finding, that the
plaintiff continues to require protection
from abuse. M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 3.
[10] KeyCite
Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k20
k. Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Most Cited Cases
The burden is on the complainant to
establish facts justifying the continuance
of an abuse prevention order. M.G.L.A.
c. 209A, § 3.
[11] KeyCite
Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or
Protect Family
62k20
k. Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Most Cited Cases
Plaintiff must make a case for extension
of abuse protection order by a preponderance
of the evidence. M.G.L.A. c. 209A,
§ 3.
**1089
*883 Charles Allan Hope, Somerville
(John H. Cunha, Jr., with him) for
the defendant.
Aderonke O. Lipede, Boston, for the
plaintiff.
Present: PORADA, DOERFER, & MILLS,
JJ.
|
|
MILLS,
J.
At the time their personal relationship
ended, the complainant Jones and defendant
Gallagher were coworkers in a school
system. After their break-up, Gallagher
authored a *884 poem with some violent
imagery that expressed his emotional
upheaval. [FN1]
The poem (which appears as an appendix
to this opinion) came into Jones's
possession and she, expressing fear
for her safety, requested an ex parte
abuse prevention order pursuant to
G.L. c. 209A against Gallagher on
August 6, 1998. Following a hearing,
a one-year abuse prevention order
was entered by a District Court judge
on September 24, 1998, and upon its
expiration, on September 23, 1999,
a second judge entered a permanent
order against Gallagher, from which
he now appeals. He claims that the
second judge erroneously placed the
burden of proof on him and that the
evidence was insufficient to make
the order permanent.
|
|
FN1.
The poem was apparently written immediately
after Jones and Gallagher broke off
their personal relationship, but was
never sent directly to Jones. It was
however, sent as an attachment to
a letter from Gallagher to a mutual
acquaintance of the parties. |
|
1.
Background. The 1998 order
was published on the standard form
entitled "Abuse Prevention Order."
Findings were recorded by checking
off the boxes that correspond to the
pre-printed text. Gallagher was ordered
"not to abuse the plaintiff,"
"not to contact the plaintiff,"
and to "stay away from the plaintiff's
residence" and workplace. The
box reciting "[t]here is a substantial
likelihood of immediate danger of
abuse" was also checked. The
order notified the defendant that
"[v]iolation of this order is
a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment
or fine or both." The order recites
an expiration date, as well as the
"next hearing date," of
September 23, 1999.
On that date, Gallagher, his counsel,
and Jones were present. The proceeding
was brief and informal.
[FN2] At the proceeding, the judge
remarked that "[t]here have been
extensive hearings apparently on this
matter in which exhibits and testimony
were taken," and then asked,
"How have things been since the
order went into effect?" Jones
replied, "OK," and upon
the judge's inquiry, stated, "I'd
like to have the order made permanent."
There was no other proof or offer
of proof. The judge then invited Gallagher's
attorney to speak,
whereupon counsel recited that the
parties had experienced a personal
relationship that *885 started "when
they both were married," and
lasted for approximately two and one-half
years. The relationship ended one
and one-half years before the initial
order was granted, and the order had
been issued on the basis of a poem
"that Mr. Gallagher had written
about his own pain [using] imagery
that was violent in terms of his own
pain...." Gallagher's attorney
further reported that there had been
no physical contact between the parties
for two and one-half years, that they
no longer worked together, and that
they did not live anywhere near each
other. These representations were
not contradicted. |
|
FN2.
The Legislature intended that domestic
abuse prevention order proceedings be
as expeditious and informal as reasonably
possible. Zullo v. Goguen, 423 Mass.
679, 681, 672 N.E.2d 502 (1996). |
|
The judge appears
then to have examined the original
file; however, the record does not
disclose exactly what he reviewed.
**1090 He subsequently explained his
understanding of the law "in
case there is an appellate issue,"
noting that "if there is a hearing
and the Judge makes a finding that
[the plaintiff] was in need of protection
and there was a sufficient basis for
issuing that order, at the end of
the year, [the plaintiff] has a right
to request that
the order be made permanent and ...
the fact that no abuse occurred during
that period of time is not enough
to dismiss or vacate the order."
The judge made no comment as to the
order of proof or burden of proof.
The judge initiated a theoretical
discussion with Gallagher's attorney
concerning the notions of reconsideration,
reopening the order, and vacating
the expiring order, which counsel
indicated were not appropriate to
the circumstances. The judge then
stated, "I'm suggesting absent
extraordinary conditions, the statute
says [the plaintiff] is entitled to
have [the order] made permanent or
continued." The judge then asked
Jones, "Do you feel you are in
need of protection, and if so, why?"
To this she replied,
"Absolutely ... I feel that I
am in imminent fear. I am in fear
of imminent physical and psychological
harm.... First of all, the decision
that was made last year was made ...
[and] it was the law that came in
and protected me for the last year
in which time I haven't heard from
him. I now face renewal where it's
going to end and I won't have that
protection there. I've been in fear
of this day coming when I don't have
the law there to protect me. I also
have a case at the Mass[achusetts]
Commission *886 Against Discrimination
pending, and we will have contact
again in the future and I need that
protection there for me." |
|
After a brief
comment by Gallagher's attorney concerning
Jones's pending case (apparently
to be litigated in the Superior Court),
he asked the judge, "what is
the reasonableness of her current
statement that she is in fear. Why
is she in fear of imminent bodily
harm?" Gallagher's attorney also
suggested that the order be extended
until the end of the MCAD litigation.
The judge, nevertheless, entered a
permanent order and stated the following,
in part:
|
|
"The basis
for that in case you want to have
something on record to appeal is that
I find that there is ongoing litigation
matters between the two of them that
stem from the original time, apparently
when they were both working at the
same location. That they have now
separated that litigation apparently
it is going into the Superior Court
and she is in reasonable fear based
on what [the issuing judge] apparently
found in the past." |
|
[1] 2.
Statutory background. Chapter 209A
was inserted in the General Laws in
1978. St. 1978, c. 447, § 2. "That
statute, entitled 'Abuse Prevention,'
has been described as a 'statutory
mechanism by which victims of family
or household abuse can enlist the
aid of the State to prevent further
abuse.' " Commonwealth v. Contach,
47 Mass.App.Ct. 247, 253, 712 N.E.2d
100 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth
v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 344, 553
N.E.2d 915 (1990). The statute was
enacted "to address the problem
of domestic violence through the provision
of judicial remedies," Turner
v. Lewis, 434 Mass. 331, 332, 749
N.E.2d 122 (2001), and the "c.
209A proceeding is a civil, and not
a criminal, proceeding." Frizado
v. Frizado,
420 Mass. 592, 596 n. 3, 651 N.E.2d
1206 (1995). Some orders, however,
issued pursuant to the statute contain
criminal penalties. See Commonwealth
v. Finase, 435 Mass. 310, 312-314,
757 N.E.2d 721 (2001). The "[v]iolence
brought on by, or exacerbated by,
familial relationships was the 'mischief
or imperfection to be remedied' by
c. 209A." **1091 Turner v. Lewis,
supra at 334, 749 N.E.2d 122, quoting
from Adoption of Derrick, 415 Mass.
439, 444, 614 N.E.2d 987 (1993). The
statute attempts to balance sensitive
issues, and often brutal aspects,
of fundamental human relationships.
|
|
*887 The person
suffering from abuse may commence
a proceeding by filing a complaint,
G.L. c. 209A, § 3, and those "proceedings
often take place in times of great
turmoil in the parties' lives."
Commentary to guideline 1:01 of the
Guidelines for Judicial Practice:
Abuse Prevention Proceedings (2000).
"They are under considerable
stress because by the very nature
of the process they are required to
reveal to strangers details of intimate
relationships that have disintegrated
into violence and, indeed, even hatred."
Commonwealth v. Contach, supra. Consequences
of the underlying situation, notwithstanding
any order, tragically and too frequently
include the most serious violence
and sometimes death of the complainant.
See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass.
745, 746, 711 N.E.2d 578 (1999) (defendant
convicted of first-degree murder and
violating abuse prevention order under
G.L. c. 209A, § 7); Commonwealth v.
Bianchi, 435
Mass. 316, 317, 757 N.E.2d 1087 (2001)
(same).
|
|
|
|
[FN3]
Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass.App.Ct.
637, 638, 700 N.E.2d 296 (1998). The
order can also create criminal jeopardy
specific to the defendant and subject
him or her to arrest without a warrant.
See Richardson v. Boston, 53 Mass.App.Ct.
201, 203, 758 N.E.2d 629 (2001). "The
judicial imprimatur on the 209A order
lends it significant weight. This
is not just a filing in court but
a determination by the court."
Commonwealth v. Foreman, 52 Mass.App.Ct.
510, 515, 755 N.E.2d 279 (2001). [FN4] |
|
FN3.
General Laws c. 276, § 57, as amended
by St. 1992, c. 201, § 2, limits the
persons authorized to admit to bail
those arrested and charged with a
c. 209A offense, effectively eliminating
bail commissioners and clerk magistrates,
and requiring that any such bail requirement
be determined by a judge. |
|
FN4.
It is also important to note that
the c. 209A process may be used
abusively by litigants for purposes
of discovery and harassment, and that
it may make other family circumstances
(especially involving the parties'
children) and relationships substantially
more complicated. See Commonwealth
v. Silva, 431 Mass. 194, 198, 726
N.E.2d 408 (2000); Fabre v. Walton,
436 Mass. 517, 519, 766 N.E.2d 474
(2002); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass.App.Ct.
at 637, 700 N.E.2d 296; Commonwealth
v. Leger, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 232, 235,
752 N.E.2d 799 (2001); Commonwealth
v. Stewart, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 755, 762,
756 N.E.2d 22 (2001); Uttaro v. Uttaro,
ante, (2002). While such abuses appear
infrequently, they damage a process
which, in the great majority of instances,
performs essential service to victims
of domestic violence. We note that
the motives and interests in c. 209A
proceedings are as diverse as the
human condition of personal relationship |
|
[5]
The
Legislature intended the c. 209A judicial
process to be as *888 "expeditious
and as comfortable as it reasonably
can be for a lay person to pursue."
Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 598,
651 N.E.2d 1206.
[FN5] And, with great respect, we
note that "[j]udges often must
**1092 deal with large numbers of
these emotional matters in busy court
sessions." Ibid. "A judge
must consider carefully whether serious
physical harm is imminent and should
not issue a G.L. c. 209A order simply
because it seems
to be a good idea or because it will
not cause the defendant any real inconvenience."
Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 523
n. 1, 658 N.E.2d 677 (1995). Judges
have been instructed to be especially
sensitive, and to examine such cases
with restraint and compassion, see
Commonwealth v. Contach, 47 Mass.App.Ct.
at 253, 712 N.E.2d 100, "in the
context of the entire history of the
parties' hostile relationship."
Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 929,
930, 716 N.E.2d 686 (1999). In the
light of these ponderous, demanding,
somewhat conflicting, and complicated
circumstances, many of which are beneath
the surface of complex lives, we state
our understanding of the judicial
inquiry and procedure upon a complainant's
request that a c. 209A order be made
permanent. |
|
FN5.
It has been recognized that trial judges
can be sensitive to the difficulties
of pro se litigants, and although some
leniency is appropriate in determining
whether a pro se litigant meets the
requirements of procedural rules, the
rules bind pro se litigants as they
bind other litigants. Mmoe v. Commonwealth,
393 Mass. 617, 620, 473 N.E.2d 169 (1985);
Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30,
35, 739 N.E.2d 1125 (2000). |
|
[6]
[7]
3.
Evidence of abuse. For purposes of
obtaining a protective order
under G.L. c. 209A, abuse is defined
as "(a) attempting to cause or
causing physical harm; (b) placing
another in fear of imminent serious
physical harm; (c) causing another
to engage involuntarily in sexual
relations by force, threat or duress."
G.L. c. 209A, § 1. "Generalized
apprehension, nervousness, feeling
aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological
distress from vexing but nonphysical
intercourse, when there is no threat
of imminent serious physical harm,
does not rise to the level of fear
of imminent serious physical harm....
The judge must focus on whether serious
physical harm is imminent and should
not issue a c. 209A order on the theory
that it will do no harm....RE Mass.App.Ct.
889>>." Wooldridge v. Hickey,
45 Mass.App.Ct. at 639, 700 N.E.2d
296. We have made no distinction in
this regard between an initial (after-notice)
order and a permanent order. "Abuse"
has the same definition in either
context. "The only criterion
for extending the original order is
a showing of continued need for the
order." Pike v. Maguire, supra
at 929, 716 N.E.2d 686. |
|
[8] [9]
4.
Permanent order. In 1990, the Legislature
rewrote the statute, see St. 1990,
c. 403, § 3, adding language that
expressly grants the judge discretionary
authority to "enter a permanent
order" at the renewal hearing,
generally, the date set in the original
order when "the order is to expire"
and "the matter will again be
heard." G.L. c. 209A, § 3.
[FN6] See Crenshaw v. Macklin, 430
Mass. 633, 634-635, 722 N.E.2d 458
(2000). General
Laws c. 209A, § 3, mandates that initial
relief be granted for a fixed period
of time, not to exceed a year, and
that the order state on its face the
date and time that the order is to
"expire" and the matter
will again be "heard." Upon
that date, if the plaintiff appears,
the court is directed to "determine"
whether to extend or make permanent
the order. Without further action
by **1093 the court, the Legislature
has directed that the order expire.
There is no presumption that the order
be continued. There is no entitlement
that the order be made permanent.
The order expires unless extended
after a judicial determination, essentially,
a new finding, that the plaintiff
continues to require protection from
"abuse" as explicitly defined
in c. 209A, § 1--in this case, requiring
a finding that a permanent order is,
in fact, what is reasonably necessary
to protect Jones from being placed
"in fear of imminent serious
physical harm" by Gallagher.
See *890 Commonwealth v. Molloy, 44
Mass.App.Ct. 306, 309, 690 N.E.2d
836 (1998) ( "extension of an
annual order pursuant to § 3 ... is
... by no means automatic");
Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass.App.Ct. at
929-930, 716 N.E.2d 686.
|
|
FN6.
General Laws c. 209A, § 3, provides
the following in relevant part: "Any
relief granted by the court shall
be for a fixed period of time not
to exceed one year. Every order shall
on its face state the time and date
the order is to expire and shall include
the date and time that the
matter
will again be heard. If the plaintiff
appears at the court at the date and
time the order is to expire, the court
shall determine whether or not to
extend the order for any additional
time reasonably necessary to protect
the plaintiff or to enter a permanent
order.... The court may also extend
the order upon motion of the plaintiff,
for such additional time as it deems
necessary to protect from abuse the
plaintiff or any child in the plaintiff's
care or custody. The fact that abuse
has not occurred during the pendency
of an order shall not, in itself,
constitute sufficient ground for denying
or failing to extend the order, of
allowing an order to expire or be
vacated, or for refusing to issue
a new order." |
|
[10]
[11]
There
is no burden on a defendant to testify
or present evidence. "The burden
is on the complainant to establish
facts justifying the ... continuance
of an abuse prevention order.... The
plaintiff must make the case for the
awarding of relief." Frizado
v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596, 651
N.E.2d 1206. "Although it is
not expressly stated in G.L. c. 209A,
... [the] plaintiff must make a case
for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id. at 597, 651 N.E.2d
1206. See Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass.
at 522, 658 N.E.2d 677.
5. Evidentiary use of initial order
and record. The mere fact that a c.
209A order issued in the past, standing
alone, is not enough for a judge to
conclude, on
a request for renewal, that "additional
time [is] reasonably necessary to
protect the plaintiff." G.L.
c. 209A, § 3. From the record in this
case, we are concerned that the judge
may have acted upon a presumption
that a complainant is entitled to
have a one-year, after-notice order
made permanent, absent the defendant
being able to prove "extraordinary
conditions" to persuade the court
otherwise. It appears that in making
the order permanent the judge inappropriately
used the mere existence of the earlier
order, issued by a different judge,
at a different time, as the sole basis
for making the order permanent.
The permanent abuse prevention order
is therefore vacated.
So ordered. |
|
APPENDIX |
|
Sue
Me |
|
To tear out your
own heart with bloody jagged teeth,
you must first bite through the breast
plate, then the breast bone, past
several sore, cracked and bruised
ribs. You seize it between upper and
lower incisors drag it, broken but
still beating into the fresh horrors
of a new day. The sun shines, the
clock ticks, the day stretches and
yawns |
|
*891
before you. You wonder why you just
don't die. What tenuous connection
keeps you still breathing. Everything
you loved and believed lies torn and
twisted. All thorns without the rose,
bleeding and broken another casual
victim, no bandage can resuscitate.
Details at eleven, see obit. section,
page 68. The heart dies, but the body
lives on--
"Miracle of science," reports
the National Enquirer.
Inquiring minds don't want to know
what fucked up fate might befall them.
Instead, pretend that unendurable
pain is sort
of fascinating, like twenty-two pound
twins
delivered by menopausal grandmother, |
|
**1094
or how scientific proof of heaven's
existence or is it hell's, lies just
past the next galaxy. Take it for
granted--pictures on page 63. It's
the way of the world, no thought,
no word, no deed, need apply not necessary,
not applicable. Not to worry, have
a nice day, life goes on don't try
to understand, go with the flow. Life
is a bumper sticker, a buzz word,
life is a cabaret. Life
is a bitch, a bowl of cherries, a
ten second sound bite. Use every available
cliché to arm yourself against any
glimmer of self-awareness, comprehension
or culpability. Everything else is
to blame except you or me. It's them,
they, those, others, always, all ways,
Not us. We did all we could. We did
what we had to do. We played the hand
that was dealt us. We did the best
that we could. We did all that we
could do. We did everything that was
humanly possible. We went above and
beyond what could be expected. We
put ourselves out, extended ourselves
in extraordinary fashion. We coped,
hoped, discussed, dialoged, forgave,
forgot, taught, listened, learned,
lectured helped, hurt, healed, supported,
sacrificed, shared, screamed, dreamed,
danced, denied, delighted, desecrated
and destroyed. What memories, what
stories we'll have to tell. Not to
each other of course, but to ourselves,
not lonely of course, but alone. In
place of love and laughter the light
of eternity or earth. We'll have loss
and regrets, but we'll remain reasonable.
We'll recognize the road too rocky,
the cost too great. And
we're practical people, civilized,
survivors. We'll master the art of
living as if it still mattered. |
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*892
You'll collect original haiku from
the 5 th century Tang dynasty reminding
you of a poet you vaguely remember.
I'll hoard exquisite examples of calligraphy
Pre-Raphaelite period, lovely letters,
like dancer's limbs motionless without
music, evocative, reminding me of
some thing I can't quite place, a
faint silhouette of a familiar face.
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Mass.App.Ct.,2002.
Jones v. Gallagher
54 Mass.App.Ct. 883, 768 N.E.2d 1088
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