Massachusetts Appellate Case Citations by Category
Division of Property Cases
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Baccanti v. Morton:
(2001) Leading
Massachusetts case on the treatment of Stock Options in
Divorce.
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Belsky v. Belsky 9 Mass. App. 852
(1980)-Future inheritance can be taken into account when
dividing assets in divorce.
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Bianco v. Bianco 371 Mass. 420 (1976) Early
case interpreting MGL
Ch. 208 section 34 relating to division of assets.
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Dalessio v. Dalessio 409 Mass. 821(1991)
Case involving division of proceeds of personal injury
claims in divorce.
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Dewan v. Dewan 17 Mass. App. Ct.
97(1983)—leading case on dividing
pensions.
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D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass.App.Ct. 488
(2004). The Huband’s interests in certain trusts were
property excluded from the marital estate subject to
property division pursuant to G.L.c. 208, § 34, and the
Husband’s income from the trusts were treated as streams
of income to establish alimony and child support orders.
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Drapek v. Drapek: 399 Mass. 240 (1987). A
spouse’s professional degree is not considered a marital
asset subject to property division under G.L. c. 208, §
34. However, the spouse’s earning potential is
considered when ordering alimony and property division.
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Early v. State Board of Retirement 420
Mass. 836. Public Employment, Retirement. Retirement.
Divorce and Separation, Division of property.
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Hanify v. Hanify 403 Mass 184(1988) Pending
lawsuits are marital
assets and can be divided by a divorce judgment.
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Kuban v. Kuban: 48 Mass.App.Ct. 387 (1999).
The wife was not entitled to contributions made to the
husband's retirement annuities, which were made by the
husband's employer after the effective date of the
dissolutions of the parties' marriage.
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Moriarty v. Stone: 41 Mass.App.Ct. 151
(1996). The parties co-habited for ten (10) years prior
to their marriage, and it was no error by the judge to
consider their pre-marital contributions when
determining an equitable division under G.L.c. 208, §
34.
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Putnam v. Putnam 5 Mass. App. Ct.
10(1977) Division of assets may not
be justified purely by bad conduct by one of the
parties. All factors
under 208 Section 34 must be considered.
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Rice v. Rice: 372 Mass. 398, 400 (1977). A
party’s estate is defined as “all property to which he
holds title, however, acquired.” This allows a judge to
assign “to one spouse property of the other whenever and
however acquired.”
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Savides v. Savides: 400 Mass. 250 (1987).
After a lengthy separation, it was appropriate for the
Court to value the marital assets at the date of
separation because the spouse made no further financial
contributions to the marriage.
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Williams v. Massa: (2000) Leading
Case on Inherited property.
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Child Custody Cases
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Ardizoni v. Raymond: 40 Mass.App.Ct. 734
(1996). The best interests of the child is the guiding
principle when determining child custody awards.
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Rosenthal v. Maney, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 257
(2001). A parent may remove a child out of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts if he/she has established
a “good, sincere, reason” or a “real advantage” for
moving.
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Bailey v. Bailey 27 Mass. App. Ct.
502(1989) The trial court has the power to decide which
parent gets the child dependency exemptions for federal
tax purposes.
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Child Support Cases
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Brooks v. Piela, 61 Mass.App.Ct.
731(2004). In a modification action for child support
the probate judge did not abuse her discretion by
considering the non-custodial parent’s enhanced income
and the disparity of the standard of living in each
household, where the judge considered the children’s
needs and stipulated evidence that the children’s ages
and their increased expenses justified an increase in
child support.
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Department of Revenue v. Roe, 29
Mass.App.Ct. 967 (1990) In paternity cases, pursuant to
M.G.L.A. c. 209C, § 9, courts have the authority to
order retroactive child support for this period from the
birth of the child to the entry of the order.
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Department of Revenue v. Doe, 31
Mass.App.Ct. 924 (1991) In paternity cases, pursuant to
M.G.L.A. c. 209C, § 9, courts have the authority to
order retroactive child support for this period from the
birth of the child to the entry of the order.
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Department of Revenue v. G.W.A, 412
Mass. 435 (1992) In paternity cases, pursuant to M.G.L.A.
c. 209C, § 9, courts have the authority to order
retroactive child support for this period from the birth
of the child to the entry of the order.
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Donovan v. Donovan 15 Mass. App. Ct
61(1982) Worker’s compensation benefits can be assigned
for payment of alimony and child support.
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O’Meara v. Doherty, 53. Mass.App.Ct. 599
(2002). In paternity cases, pursuant to M.G.L.A. c.
209C, § 9, courts have the authority to order
retroactive child support for this period from the birth
of the child to the entry of the order.
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Passemato v. Passemato: (1998)
Leading Case of Educational Trust for College Expenses.
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Richardson v. Department of Revenue,
423 Mass. 378 (1996). A person who voluntarily
acknowledges his paternity, and agrees to pay child
support is not entitled to recover child support
payments when it was determined that he was not the
father nine (9) years later.
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Schuler v. Schuler: 382 Mass. 366 (1981).
The husband filed a Complaint for Modification to reduce
his support obligations because he had a substantial
reduction in income. The Court refused to reduce his
support payments because he failed to show “a material
change in circumstances” as he still had the ability to
pay his current support obligations.
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Silvia v. Silvia 9 Mass. Appt. Ct
339(1980)—The income or assets of a second spouse can be
considered by the court in awarding child support
because the existence of these assets or income effects
the ability of parents to use their own resources to pay
child support.
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Visitation
Cases
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- Grandparent Visitation
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Blixt v. Blixt: 437 Mass. 649
(2002). In a Complaint for Grandparent
Visitation, the grandparent must show that the
“failure to grant visitation will cause the
child significant harm by adversely affecting
the child’s health, safety, or welfare. The
requirement of significant harm presupposes
proof of a showing of a significant preexisting
relationship between the grandparent and the
child. In the absence of such a relationship,
the grandparent must prove that visitation
between the grandparent and the child is
nevertheless necessary to protect the child from
significant harm.”
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Dearborn v. Deausault: 61
Mass.App.Ct. 234 (2004). A substantial,
meaningful and nurturing relationship between a
grandparent and grandchild is not the kind of
relationship that failure to grant visitation
will cause the child significant harm. If,
however, the grandparent can show through
"expert testimony or otherwise" that visitation
is necessary to protect the children from
significant harm, the grandparent may present
such evidence to the court.
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Prenuptial
Agreement Cases
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Dematteo v. Dematteo:
(2002) Leading Massachusetts Case on Prenuptial
Agreements.
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Knox v. Remick: 371 Mass. 433
(1976). If a judge finds that a parties'
separation agreement "was not a product of fraud
or coercion," fair and reasonable at the time of
entry of the judgment nisi, and the parties
agreed to the finality of their agreement's
provision regarding spousal support, then the
separation agreement should be specifically
enforced 'absent countervailing equities.' An
example of ‘countervailing equities’ may be that
a spouse is or will become a public charge or
where a party has not complied with a provision
of the separation agreement.
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Austin v. Austin: Divorce and
Separation, Antenuptial agreement. Complaint for
divorce filed in the Barnstable Division of the
Probate and Family Court Department on May 31,
2001.
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College Education & Divorce Cases
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Lang v. Koon, 61 Mass.App.Ct.
22 (2004). A judge erred by ordering future
college expenses where there were no special
circumstances to justify the order.
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McCarthy v. McCarthy: 36
Mass.App.Ct. 490 (1994). The parties’
separation agreement survived the judgment
of divorce and had independent legal
significance, and there was no provision
regarding college education. As such, there
was no significant change in circumstances
to justify a modification of the parties’
agreement to order the husband to pay for
college educational expenses.
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Purdy v. Colangelo, 61
Mass.App.Ct. 362 (2004). When a separation
agreement is silent as to college education,
a party may not seek a judicial modification
of the agreement for college contribution
after the child graduates, unless there are
exceptional circumstances.
Alimony Cases
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Cohan v. Feuer 442 Mass.
151, (2004) The general rule is that the payment
of alimony terminates when the obligor spouse
dies or the obligee remarries, “unless either
(1) the original decree on agreement provides
otherwise or the parties legally amend their
agreement to provide otherwise, or (2) in the
case of the obligor’s death, the court makes
written findings establishing that termination
of the award would work a substantial injustice
because of facts not present in most cases.
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Cooper v. Cooper, 62
Mass.App.Ct. 130 (2004). A judge’s finding did
support its order to modify alimony in excess of
the terms of the original divorce judgment.
Thus; its judgment was vacated as to the alimony
order that was in excess of the original divorce
judgment, unless a judge found that “the
husband’s income was of such magnitude as to be
well in excess of adjustments to income
reasonably anticipated by the parties’
separation agreement and that the agreement’s
provisions for support and property were
inadequate to maintain the wife in the standard
of living enjoyed by the parties while married.”
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D.L. v. G.L., 61
Mass.App.Ct. 488 (2004). Based on the
circumstances in this case, it was an error to
limit the duration of the Wife’s alimony award,
as her future income from employment was
uncertain and her expected inheritence was too
indefinite in time.
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Goldman v. Goldman 28 Mass App. Ct.
603 (1990.) Court disapproved a trial court
order of eight years of alimony in a 20 year
marriage.
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Gottsegen v. Gottsegen 397 Mass.
617(1986.) Important case on the issue of
enforceability of co-habitation clauses
terminating alimony.
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Grubert v. Grubert: 20 Mass. App.
Ct. 811, 819 (1985). When awarding alimony to a
spouse, the “need” of a spouse is determined by
“the ‘station’ of the parties --- by what is
required to maintain a standard of living
comparable to the one enjoyed during the
marriage.”
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Lynch v. Lynch 5 Mass. Appt. Ct.
167(1977.) Marital conduct cannot be the primary
determinant of the amount of alimony.
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Rosenberg v. Rosenberg 33 Mass.
App. Ct. 903(1992) In high asset case, involving
a long term marriage, the wife received
$4,000,000 in cash and other assets equivalent
to approximately 30 percent of a marital estate
worth $22,000,000. The court approved a judgment
awarding $2000 per week alimony in addition to
this property settlement.
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Sampson v. Sampson, 62
Mass.App.Ct. 366 (2004). The alimony award was
vacated and the issue of property division was
remanded for reconsideration because the probate
judge’s order left the wife in “economically
strained circumstances while [the husband was]
guaranteed continued enjoyment of the secure,
comfortable marital lifestyle.”
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Thomsen v. Thomsen 12 Mass. Appt.
Ct 1010 (1981)—Alimony award which included cost
of living increase was permissible.
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Jurisdiction Cases
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- Residency Requiremments
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Caffyn v. Caffyn: (2004)
Leading case on residency requirement for filing
for divorce in Massachusetts.
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