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UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS |
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FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT |
CINCINNATI,
OHIO |
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MICHAEL A. GALLUZZZO, |
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PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, |
REAL PARTY OF INTEREST |
|
vs. |
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CHAMPAIGN COUNTY,
COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS;
ROGER B. WILSON;
TERESA A. COOK,
a/k/a TERESA A. GALLUZZO;
STATE OF OHIO |
|
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES |
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AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF OF
LEGENDS LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC.
IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT Michael
A. Galluzzo
|
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LEGENDS LEGAL
AID SOCIETY
P.O.
BOX 3600
STATELINE, NV. 89449
LEGENDS LEGAL AID
SOCIETY, INC.
CALIFORNIA DIVISION
8837-A SKYWAY
PARADISE, CA. 95969
(530) 872-4477
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TABLE
OF CONTENTS |
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CERTIFICATE
OF COMPLAINCE
3
CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE 3
TABLE
OF AUTHORITIES 4
CASES
4
STATUTES 7
OTHER AUTHORITIES
7
RULES 8
TREATISES 8
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
9
MAXIM’S OF LAW
9
STATEMENT
OF INTEREST 10
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 18
LEGAL POINT 1: OHIO ST. CONST. 1802
ART. VII
18
LEGAL POINT 2: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 38
LEGAL POINT 3: BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILDREN 52
LEGAL POINT 4: PARENS PATRIAE; &
TRUSTS 56
CONCLUSION 63
PRAYER
FOR RELIEF 66
CHARTS
STATE
OF OHIO (1802) PERTINENT CONSTITUTION
§§
CHART
25, 26
BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD TEST CHART
53, 55
ATTACHMENTS
2005 Father’s
Rights Fact Sheet 1
Copy
|
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLAINCE
|
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I hereby certify to the best
of my knowledge that the Amicus Brief
complies with the type-volume limitation
under Federal Appellate Rule (32)(a)(7)(B),
pursuant to the computer processing
system used to prepare the brief.
The number of words is
.
________________________________
Robert Lindsay Cheney Jr.
Founder—Legends Legal Aid Society |
|
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE |
|
The undersigned hereby certifies that
on August _____, 2005, that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing
motion has been served upon Jim Petro,
Ohio Attorney General, C/O Elise W.
Portor, 20 East Broad Street, 17th
Floor, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, Stanford
Flack, Attorney for Teresa A. Cook,
1010 North Fountain Avenue, Springfield,
Ohio 45502, and Michael A. Galluzzo,
Plaintiff and the Real Party of Interest,
P.O. Box 710, 307 East Main Street,
St. Paris, Ohio, 43072 on the date
same was filed by first class U.S.
mail postage prepaid.
________________________________
Robert Lindsay Cheney Jr.
Founder—Legends Legal Aid Society |
|
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE |
|
The undersigned hereby certifies that
on August _____, 2005, that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing
Amicus Brief has been served upon
Jim Petro, Ohio Attorney General,
C/O Elise W. Portor, 20 East Broad
Street, 17th Floor, Columbus,
Ohio, 43215, Stanford Flack, Attorney
for Teresa A. Cook, 1010 North Fountain
Avenue, Springfield, Ohio 45502, and
Michael A. Galluzzo, Plaintiff and
the Real Party of Interest, P.O. Box
710, 307 East Main Street, St. Paris,
Ohio, 43072 on the date same was filed
by first class U.S. mail postage prepaid.
________________________________
Robert Lindsay Cheney Jr.
Founder—Legends Legal Aid Society |
|
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES |
|
TOA
\h \c "1" \p Cases
Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10
L.Ed. 844 (1963).
31, 32
Adoption
of Kelsey S.,
(1992).................................................................................................
43
Amos v. Mosley,
74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619.....................................................................
33, 63
Ashcraft
v. State of Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 , 147, 148, 923............................................................
45
Ballard County
v. Kentucky County Debt Commission,
290 Ky. 770, 162 S.W.2d 771, 773
31
Barbour
vs. Connolly,
113 US 27, 31..........................................................................................
37
Bennett
Estate
(1901) 134 C. 320, 66 P. 370......................................................
19, 52
Billings v.
Hall, 71 Cal.App. 15-17......................................................................................
32
Brokaw
v. Ogle,
170 Ill. 115, 48 N.E. 394......................................................................................
19
Burlingame v.
Traeger (1929), 101 C.A. 365,
281 P. 1051....................................................
12
Carter
v. Brett,
42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114......................................................................................
36
Castro
v. Castellanos
(Tex.Com.App.), 294 S.W. 525.......................................................................
41
Cecacci
v. Martelli
(Tex.Civ.App.), 235 S.W. 951............................................................................
41
Cheshire
v. Burlington,
31 Conn. 326..........................................................................................
19
City
of Mexico v. Grey,
203 Mo.App. 547, 219 S.W. 707, 709..............................................................
19
Commonwealth v. Briggs,
33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203..........................................................................
36
Cooke
v. Cooke,
319 A.2d 841 (No. 757 1974)....................................................
53
Darwin v. Ganger
(1959) 344 P.2d 353, 174 C.A2d 63..........................................................
53
Davis
v. Elkins
(Tex.Civ.App.), 249 S.W. 1099...............................................................................
41
Degregory
v. Attorney General of State of N.H,
86 S.Ct. 1148, 383 U.S. 825, 16 L.Ed.2d
202.
64
Delaplane
v. Crenshaaw,
15 Grat. 457.........................................................................................
26
DeManneville
v. DeManneville
(1804).........................................................................................
22
Dodge
v. Boston & P.R. Corp.,
154 Mass. 299, 28 N.E. 243, 13 L.R.A.
318...............................................
19
Downes
v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901)........................................................................................
58
Eddlemon
v. Eddlemon,
27 Cal. App. 2d 343 [80 P.2d 1009].................................................................
44
Elrod
v. Burns,
96 S.Ct. 2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976)...........................................................................
63
Everson
v. Board of Education,
330, U.S. 1, 64....................................................
25
Ex
Parte Milligan,
71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 4 Wall. 2
(1866)..................................................................
47
Ex.
Parte Reed,
19 S.C. 604.................................................................................................
36, 52
Fanning
v. Fanning,
2 Misc N.Y. 97...............................................................................
21
Farnham
v. Pierce,
141 Mass. 203; 55 Am.Rep. 452.............................................
54
Ferguson
v. Ferguson,
et al (1865) 36 Mo. 197.....................................................
52
Finn.
v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen,
163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350
19
Fountain v.
Fountain, 83 A.D.2d 694, 442
N.Y.S.2d 604 (3d Dep't 1981)....................................
53
Franklin
v. Carswell,
29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga. 553.................................................................................
35
Gamble
v. Leva,
212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120, 121................................................................................
19
Gibson,
U.,
in Lyle v. Richards,
9 S. &. R. 323-329..............................................................................
27
Green
v. Campbell,
35 W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St.
Rep. 843.........................................................
35
Grinberger
v. Brotherton,
1933, 173 Wash. 292, 22 p.2D 983.....................................
42
Grove
v. Van Duyn,
44 N.J.L. 654, 660-61, 42 Am. Rep.
648, 654 1882)......................................................
45
Guardianship
of De Ruff,
38 Cal. App. 2d 529 [101 P.2d 521]..................................................................
44
Hall
v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit
Co.,
103 Conn. 226, 130 A. 157, 161.................................................
19
Hanson v. Cushman
490 F.Supp. 109, at 112 (1980).................................................................
59
Harris
v. McRae,
448
U.S. 297, 312 (1980)........................................................................................
48
Heydon's
Case,
3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex.
1584)..............................................................
38, 64
Higgins
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore,
127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322, 323.............................................
19
Horne v. Moody,
Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 505, 509,
510.........................................................
31
House v. Los
Angeles County Flood Control District
(1944), (Id.) 25 C.2d 384,
153 P.2d 950
44
Hurtado
v. California,
110 U.S. 516.............................................................................
................ ...63
Hurtado
v. California,110
U.S. 516..................................................................................................
45
In
Brown v. Leveee com'rs,
50 Miss 479............................................................................................
64
In
J.B. v. A.B.,
242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978)...........................................................
53
In
re Baby Girl M.
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 65 (Baby Girl M.),............................................................................
44
In
re Backes,
16 N.J. 430, 433-34 (1954)........................................................................
21
In
re Campbell,
130 C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900)................................................................................
46
In
re Coons,
20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11 O.C.D. 208..................................................................................
35
In re Guardianship
of Smith, (1954) 265 P.2d
888, 42 C.2d 91, 37 A.L.R.2d 867...........................
53
In
re Jessup,
(1889) 81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742,
1028............................................
19
In
re Jessup,
(1889) 81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742,
1028, 6 LRA 594................
52
In re Riley's
Guardianship (1946) 165 P.2d
555, 72 C.A.2d 742..................................................
44
In
re Roger S.,
569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298............................................................
...59
In re Sloot's
Guardianship (1949) 206 P.2d
862, 92 C.A.2d 296...................................................
44
In
re White,
54 Cal. App. 2d 637 [129 P.2d 706]........................................................
44
In
Re: Johnny Herrera, a minor,
409 S.W.2d 395 (1966).........................................
41
In
re: Marriage of Haines,
39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal.App. 4th
Dist. 1995)................
21
|
In
the Matter of Ronald F. v. Lawrence
G.,
694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624, 181 Misc.2d 760
(Fam.Ct., Kings County 1999)................................................................................
55 |
|
Inglis
v. Trustees Sail. Snug Harb.,
3 Pet., 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo.
3, cap. 21. 22
Jarboe
v. Jarboe,
106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S.W. 1162..................................................
19
Johnson
v. Fall
(1856), 6 C. 359, 65 Am.Dec. 518....................................................
38
Johnson
v. Johnson,
(1946) 165 P. 2d 552, 72 C.A.2d 721....................................................
53
Johnson
v. Zerbst,
supra, 304 U.S. 458.......................................................................
45
Katz
v. U.S.,
88 S.Ct. 507, 387 U.S. 347 (1967).........................................................
64
Keharya v. Axton,
D.C.N.Y., 32 F.Supp. 266, 268...........................................................
31
Kepner
v. Comm.,
40 Pa. 124.....................................................................................................
24
Klienberg
v. Kinealy,
(Mo. App.) 193 S.W. 981, 983.................................................
19
Lawson
v. Lawson,
(1910) 158 C. 446, 111 P. 354]...........................................................................
20
Legate
v. Legate,
87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281...............................................................
41
Lehr
v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985,
2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982)
39
Lisenba
v. People of State of California,
314 U.S. 219 , 237, 238, 290, 291;
[331 U.S. 367 , 374] 45
Mackinley
v. McGregor, Mackinley v. Hewitt
3 Wharton 369....................................
20
Matter
of Dickson v. Lascaris,
153 N.Y.2d 204; 207..................................................
51
May
v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843,
(1952).............................
46
May
v. Dermont,
114 Misc. 106, 186 N.Y.S. 113, 115...............................................
19
McCallen
v. Massachusetts,
27 U.S. 620, 630..........................................................
63
Mehlos
vs. Milwaukee,
146 NW 882............................................................................
37
Milwaukee Industrial
School v. Supervisors, 40
Wis. 328................................................
54
Moore v. City
of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410......................................................................
31
Moran,
et al. v. Liano, et ux.,
No. 13429, (1959 TX. 313) TX. Ct.Civ.App...............
40
Mullins
v. Nordlow,
170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W. 825, 828.................................................
19
Mumma
v. Aguirre,
Tex., 364 S.W.2d 220..................................................................
41
Murdock
v. Penn.,
319 U.S. 105..................................................................................
63
Neff v. George,
364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 338, 390, 391........................................................
31
Newby, v. Newby,
55 C.A. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921)..........................................................
52
Niemes
v. Niemes,
97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503....................................................
19
Norris
v. State of Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 590 , 580.................................................
45
Parker
v. Wiggins,
86 SW 786......................................................................................
35
Paul
v. Virginia,
8 Wall. 168, 181, 19 L.Ed. 357.........................................................
43
People
v Bigler,
5 Cal. 23..............................................................................................
37
People
v. Coleman,
4 Cal. 46.......................................................................................
37
People v. De
La Guerra, 24 Cal. 76..................................................................................
53
Petrosky
v. Keene,
898 S.W.2d 726, at 728 (Tenn. 1995).......................................................
52
Phillips
v. Phillips,
supra (R.I.) 97 A. 593, 596............................................................
21
Pierre
v. State of Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354, 358 , 538, 539.......................................
45
Pierson,
Et al. v. Ray Et al.
(1967) 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213,
18 L. Ed. 2d 288 38, 64
Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429, 558...............................................
32
Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)............................................................
33
Quilloin
v. Walcott
(1978) 434 U.S. 246, 247-248......................................................
43
Re
Dorsey,
7 Porter (ALA) 293, 377-378 (1883)........................................................
42
Reno
v. ] Flores,
507 U. S. [292,] at 304........................................................................................
39
Rice
v. Rice,
21 Tex. 58.................................................................................................
41
Robert
D. v. Jamie T.,
87 Cal.App.4th 1392, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d
341 (Cal.App. Dist.4 03/27/2001)
44
Robin
v. Hardaway,
1 Jefferson 109. (1772)...............................................................
30
Roche
v. Roche,
25 Cal. 2d 141 [152 P.2d 999]........................................................
44
Sahlender
Estate
(1948), 89 C.A.2d. 329, 339, 201 P.2d
69...................................
38
Santosky
v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Santosky,
102 S. Ct. 1388..................
39
Schlemm
v. Schlemm,
31 N.J. 557, 585 (1960).................................................................................
21
Scott
v. Singleton,
378 So.2d 885................................................................................
51
Scott’s
Case,
117 Me. 436, 104 A. 794, 796...............................................................
19
Shapiro
v. Thompson,
89 S.Ct. 1322, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d
600 (1969)........ 63
Shelf.
Marriage, Ferg.,
397, 398...................................................................................
22
Smith
v. Morse
2 Cal. 524 (1852) (1924)....................................................................
63
Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977) at 862-63.............................................
20
South Carolina
v. United States, 199 U.S.
437 (1905).....................................................
33
St.
Louis v. Dorr,
145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 L.R.A.
686, 68 Am.St.Rep. 575.. 31
Starr v. Gorman,
136 N.J.L. 105, 40 A.2d 564, 565.........................................................
22
State Ex Rel.
Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev.
378, 32 P. 190...................................................
33
State v. Board
of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367;
9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660..........................
33
State
v. Dallas City,
72 Or. 337, 143 P. 1127, 1131, Ann.
Cas. 1916B, 855.............................................
24
State
v. Richardson,
40 N.H. 272, 275...................................................................
41, 52
Story
Confl. L.,
30, 36, 43, 74, 160...............................................................................
22
Troxel
et vir. v. Granville,
530 US 57, 67 (2000).............................................................................
39
Tulare Irr.
Dist. v. Superior Court, 197
Cal. 649, 242 Pac. 725.......................................
42
Turner v. Turner
(1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636...........................................
18, 46
Tyson
v. Reynolds,
52 Iowa 431, 3 N.W. 469.............................................................
19
U.S.
v. Smith,
4 N.J. Law 38.......................................................................................................
24
Vaughan
v. Rhodes,
2 McCord 227.............................................................................
39
Waltham
v. Waltham,
(1857) 1 Lab. 146...............................................................................
53
Warren
v. Graham,
1916, 174 Iowa 162, 156 N.W. 323.....................................................................
42
Warrender
v. Warrender,
2 Cl. & F., 523.....................................................................
22
Weir
v. Marley,
99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798, 6 L.R.A.
672............................................
41
Wilkenson v.
Wilkenson, (1951) 233 P.2d
639, 105 C.A.2d 392.......................................
54
Williams
v. Thompson,
Jan T. 1856.............................................................................
37
Wilson
v. Cochran,
31 Tex. 680, 98 Am.Dec. 553.....................................................
19
Wilson
v. Else,
204 Iowa 857, 216 N.W. 33, 37..........................................................
19
Wilson v. Roach,
4 Cal. 362...............................................................................................
42
Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins,
118 US 356...............................................................................
37
Zummo
v. Zummo,
574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990)...................................
39 |
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TOA
\h \c "2" \p Statutes
1 Cor 11:3-13.....................................................................................................................
23
1
Tim. 3.1-5......................................................................................................................
23
Gen.
3:16..........................................................................................................................
22
St.
25 Edward III., Ch4 (1350)........................................................................................
50
St.
42 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1368)......................................................................................
50
St.
5 Edward III., Cp. 9 (1331)........................................................................................
49 |
|
TOA \h \c "3"
\p Other Authorities |
|
10
Cent. Dig. Com. Law § 4...........................................................................................
25
1906 Decennial Edition
of the American Digest, A Complete
Digest of all Reported Cases from
1897 to 1906, Vol. 4, Carriers
to Contractors, © 1908, West Publishing
Co., St. Paul, Mn. (4
Decen.Dig. ’06), p. 1431
26
2005 Father’s Rights
Fact Sheet..........................................................................................
61
3
Bouv. Inst. u. 3180................................................................................................................
24 |
|
Address to the Commonwealth
Club of California, 1992, Quoted
in FACE, August 1992 14 |
Barry Boyer, Trade Regulation Procedure
of the Federal Trade Commission,
in 1980 Administrative Conference of
the United States Recommendations and
Reports 33, 124-127..............................................
57 |
|
Black
Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, © 1933,
West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.
p. 1625.......... 34
Black’s Law Dictionary,
3rd Edition, ã
1933, West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn. P. 1297. 24
Black’s Law Dictionary,
4th Edition, ã
1968, West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn., p. 1251....... 31
Black’s Law Dictionary,
4th Edition, ã
1968, West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn., p. 1419....... 30
Blacks Law Dictionary,
3rd Edition, ã
1934, West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn. P. 1351......... 35
Black's Law Dictionary,
4th Edition, ã
1891-1957, West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, Minn., p. 1765
22
Bouviers Law Dictionary,
1856; 1 Ld. Ray. 699..................................................................
11
Fiscal Report of
the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure (1941).
57
Frank
J. Hogan, President, American Bar
Assn. (1939)....................................................................
32
Jerold Auerbach, Unequal
Justice, Lawyers & Social Change
in America (1976), Robert Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Perspective,
38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1252-53 (1986)......................................................
57
Marriage, Kinship,
and Sexual Privacy, 81 Mich. L.
Rev. 463, 479-481 (1983)..............
40
Martin Shapiro, APA:
Past, Present & Future, 72 Va.
L. Rev. 447, 453 (1986)...................
57
Paul Verkull, The
Emerging Concept of Administrative
Procedure, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 258,
271 (1978)
57
The Evolved
Matriarchal American Family &
Fatherhood, by Gerald L. Rowles,
Ph.D.. 15
The Garbage Generation,
Dr. Daniel Amneus..................................................................
14
The Nazis - A Warning
From History, by Laurence Rees,
The New Press, N.Y., pg. 159.. 60
Thomas Jefferson,
letter to William Johnson,
June 12, 1823, The Complete Jefferson,
p. 322 32
Tucker's
Blackstone is Copyright
© 1997-2003, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND,.BOOK THE FIRST.,
Part Second, of the Nature of Laws
in General, by Sir William Blackstone...........................
30
Webster’s 1828
Dictionary, ã
1995 Christian Technologies, Inc........................................
26 |
|
TOA \h \c "4"
\p Rules |
|
California Civil
Code, secs. 1389, 1390, 1391, 1392,
1393.................................................
54
California,
the Government Code 11120....................................................................
49
Congressional
Globe, 39th Congress,
1st Session, at page 1757
(1866)................................................
44
Ohio
R.C. §
3409.4.........................................................................................................
12 |
|
TOA
\h \c "5" \p Treatises |
|
1 Bl.Comm...........................................................................................
30 |
16
Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law,
Section 543..................................................
51 |
3
Blackstone,
350.....................................................................................
50 |
Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments §11 1785...............................
25 |
The Judicial Process, Text, Materials
and Cases, Second Edition,
by Ruggero J. Aldisert, ã 1976; West
Publishing Co., 610 Opperman Drive,
P.O. Box 64526, St. Paul, MN 55164-0526,
1-800-328-9352; ISBN 0-314-06776-0,
p.10.................. 48 |
THE
STATUTORY TERM ANALYSIS (STA) METHOD
, by Vincent P. Tassinari...................................
42
The
Theory of Common Law,
by James M. Walker Charleston, S.C.,
Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1852, p. 22
48 |
|
TOA
\h \c "7" \p Constitutional
Provisions |
|
Article
IV, Section 4 Constitution for
the United States (1787-1791).......................
51
Ohio,
Constitution of 1802..............................................................................................
23
U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14;
West's Ann.Const. Art. 1,
§
7(a).............................................................
5 |
|
TOA
\h \c "8" \p Maxim's
of Law |
|
“He who accrues
the benefit, assumes the burden.”..........................................................
11
A traditional legal
principle that has been frozen into
a concise expression.............................
35
Domus sua cuique
est tutissimum refugium. “Every
man's house is his castle.” 5 Rep.
92.. 49 |
|
Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas
inducere. Co. Litt.
379a. “It is perilous to introduce
new and untried things.............................................................................
35 |
|
Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas
inducere. "It is dangerous
to introduce new and dangerous things."
Co.Litt. 379....................................................................
35 |
|
Quae praeter consuetudinem et morem
majorum fiunt, neque placent, necque
recta videntur. “What is done
contrary to the custom of our ancestors,
neither pleases nor appears right.”
4 Co. 78................... 35 |
|
Quea contra ratioonem juris introducta
sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam.
“Things introduced contrary to the reason
of law, ought not to be drawn into precedents.”
12 Co. 75...................................
35 |
|
Radio
est radius divini luminis.
"Reason is a ray of divine light."
Co. Littl. 232.....................
33 |
|
Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis
ratione mutatuer et lex. "Reason
is the soul of the law; the reason of
the law being changed, the law is also
changed."....................................................................................
33 |
|
Se a jure discedas vagus eris,
et erunt ominia omnibus incerta.
"If you depart from the law, you
will wander without a guide, and everything
will be a state of uncertainty to every
one." Co. Litt. 227b...............
34 |
|
Section
152b. [Maxim’s
of Lord Coke]........................................................................
59 |
|
When the common law and the statute
concur, the common law is to be preferred."
4 Co. 71. 34 |
|
Where two rights concur, the more
ancient shall be preferred.....................
34 |
|
STATEMENT
OF INTEREST |
|
Legends Legal Aid Society, Inc., (hereinafter
‘Legends,’ is a non-profit 501(c)(3)
organization based in Stateline, Nevada.
We have offices also in New York, New
Jersey, California as well as Massachusetts
and Michigan. We are an organization
solely dedicated to the rights of Fatherhood
which have been openly denied to men
and fathers on the order of a half-century
now. Legends represents
men, with the knowledge that in doing
so, you in fact, help women and children—as
fatherhood; and not motherhood
is in fact, the basic fulcrum of the
family in all advanced Western Civilized
Societies. |
|
Legends, represents men
and Father’s, and is an organization
aggressively protecting their rights
from outright intrusion, oppression
and maladministration by the state,
as well as other entities.
We are not a gender neutral nor feminized
organization. We believe in the
home, and family, which is the basic
building block of all free
societies. Fatherhood is a
factual requisite of both those institutions.
It is a fact, that you cannot have a
family without a father, and conversely,
you cannot have a free society without
free sovereign families.
Therefore, the state is legally bound
to support fatherhood, as that in fact,
(as this brief shall prove) supports
the institution of marriage of which
the state is legally bound to support.
|
|
Legends Legal Aid Society, Inc., has
not joined in any of the prior proceedings,
but was asked to by its members who
drew attention to this case and its’
national implications. Mr. Galluzzo
has kindly consented to our Amicus
filing in his matter. We have
reviewed all the prior proceedings
and enter this case in good faith,
with no bad faith against any party.
We stand ready to submit this brief
and proffer it in the true light of
settled law, and we present this document,
ready to defend and we throw ourselves
upon the country seeking relief for
the real party of interest: Michael
A. Galluzzo, the father embroiled
within this controversy, and all father’s
similarly situated thereto.
This case is of interest for us, as
it concerns “Father’s Rights” and
therefore comes under an original
question of law, under organic judicial
powers authority. As this court
is well aware, by statutory practice
and procedure, that there is a modern
Apartheid going on against men and
fathers whom dare to stand up and
defend their rights to home and family,
against the awesome powers of the
state. The courts within the
State of Ohio, as well as of the Federal
venue and jurisdiction, have overtly
and implicitly denied men’s and Fathers’
Rights in order to deny them their
substantive rights to Due Process
of Law and their rights to “Life,
Liberty, and Property.”
There
is in fact, no “Equal Protection of
the Laws,” in this matter, as it is
a fact, that the institution of marriage
and the home and family, are legally
established as an ‘unequal’ institution.
This “unequal” institution, that is
the most successful human invention
ever designed; serves the basis for
all successful institutions which
have followed this model established
by the home and family. Banks,
Governments, Sports Teams, Military
Organizations, and other’s are all
inculcated under the Patriarchal structure
provided by the home and family: One
Head leader or manager, leading other
subordinates, who all owe allegiance
to the basic organization. This
model has been successfully implemented
throughout ALL free Western Civilized
societies for the past 6,000 years—until
the advent of the radical feminized
Family Court theology now implemented
by respondent’s NON-Constitutional
Marxist Jurisprudence and Feminist
Jurisprudence within the “Family Court”
systems.
We
have deconstructed this fraud placed
for the greatest part, against men,
whom are denied basic constitutional
rights through the advocacy of Feminism
as inflected by Legislative promulgation
of “Code” and “Revised Statute” as
seen within Ohio R.C. §
3409.4 TA \l "Ohio
R.C. §
3409.4" \s "Ohio
R.C. § 3409.4" \c 4 .
Along with this document, we are
submitting the 2005 Father’s Rights
Fact Sheet, which documents the abject
failure of the ‘Codes’ and ‘Revised
Codes’, and the draconian application
of “Family Courts” etc., as well as
other Legislative implemented ‘social
engineering schemes.’ These
are not law,
and have no lawful valid governmental
objective, as they are in fact, purely
social engineering and a massive failure
and cancer upon this society. |
|
These failures stem and gestate from
Federal impetus and payment schemes
implemented by and through United States
Code Title 42 U.S.C., §§ 651-666 “Welfare”
scams and/or schemes. There is
massive money attached to destroying
fatherhood—and that payment scheme is
undermining the very basis and substrate
of the home and family: which is the
active implementation and disenfranchisement
of the American male and father.
Legends’ wants it judicially noted
and on the record that all other Amicus
Brief’s, and documentations within
this case, are all premised off the
errant feminist mythology of “shared”
or “equal” parenting. Let it
be known that there are approximately
22 states which have ‘codified’ “shared”
or “equal” parenting plans within
the Family Court systems of their
respective states: and these states
embody virtually the same rates of
Family Court petitioners, Fatherhood
“Failure to Pay” incarceration rates,
and “Child Support” rates as other
states without that “equality” embedded
within their systems. In other
words, these ‘shared’ or ‘equal’ parenting
schemes, which are outside the concise
rule of law, and opprobrious to Father’s
Rights, do not in fact work…and if
they do work—their success is negligible,
at best.
Further, it should be noted, that
a concomitant “Separate but Equal”
Doctrine was miserably applied to
the Black race in this nation, and
failed as a legal institution and
has notably understood as a failed
historical premise. That failure
cannot be survived by and through
its application against Fathers such
as Mr. Galluzzo by Ohio R.C. § 3109.4.
Let it be also be judicially noted
and placed on the record, that this
brief is in fact, ground zero of this
case. This brief is about the
law: well-established and well-settled
fundamental law. This brief
is not fashionable, nor is it ‘politically
correct.’ But it is the law,
and it is in fact true and correct
for both the Union of Several States,
as well as of the United States.
Let it be known, that what we are
hereby going to factually establish
in this brief, is not a throwback,
but an advancement in
human civilization.
It is the recognized and irrefutable
basis for all free and advanced Western
Civilized societies. It is a
fact, that feminism and Marxism, is
in fact, the older and more bases
social environments, and as humankind
and history show us, these are, as
our founding father’s iterated: “the
lowest and rudest state’s of mankind.”
This is irrefutable. One only
has to glance at the advocacy within
the already submitted Amicus Brief’s
in this matter, as well as perusing
the Father’s Rights Fact Sheet (FRFS).
This eight-hundred (800) page FRFS
is but a small preview into the uncontested
fact, of what these courts, as well
as State Legislatures have done to
this society by and through implementation
of such errant and unlawful codes
such as RC § 3109.4, has done to this
nation. It has in fact, irrefutably
created a more-than-a-half-century
of unbridled social destruction within
this nation. It has destroyed
the institution of the family, which
now rages at a 63% (or higher)
divorce rate process.
It is also irrefutable, that each
and every year, that these socialists,
promulgating such bad and unconstitutional
laws of which Mr. Galluzzo points
out to us here, walk up to the State
Legislatures, and Federal Congress,
year-in and year-out, with hat in
hand, and a plethora of social statistics
showing how bad the situation is
and begging those institutions for
more and more public fundings to “administer”
the problem, they themselves created
but can never fix. |
|
Legend’s hereby throws
itself upon the country and is willing
to defend this brief at length, as we
can fix this problem. Fatherhood,
is in fact, the greatest national resource
this nation has to date, yet, it is
unwilling to implement it.
And the laws we establish here within
this case, are in fact, the solution
to this conundrum, and not proffered
to delay or confuse this question—but
rather; we submit this brief coldly,
factually and with great aspirations
that the law contained herein is reviewed
empirically and without prejudice nor
bias. |
|
DATED: August 20, 2005
________________________________ |
|
Robert Lindsay Cheney Jr.
Founder—Legends
Legal Aid Society
8837-A
Skyway
Paradise, CA. 95969
530-872-4477 |
|
UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS |
FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CINCINNATI,
OHIO |
|
MICHAEL
A. GALLUZZZO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
REAL PARTY OF INTEREST
Case No. 04-3527
vs.
CHAMPAIGN
COUNTY, COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS; ROGER B. WILSON;
TERESA A. COOK, a/k/a TERESA A. GALLUZZO;
STATE OF OHIO
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW |
LEGAL
POINT 1:
It is a fact, that the Constitution
for the State of Ohio, dated November
29th 1802, does in fact,
contain the following unalienable right(s)
for Michael A. Galluzzo (hereinafter
Mr. Galluzzo). |
|
ARTICLE
VIII. |
|
BILL OF RIGHTS.
That
the general, great and essential principles
of liberty and free government may
be recognized and forever unalterably
established, we declare: |
|
section 1. That all
men born equally free and independent,
and have certain natural, inherent and
unalienable rights; amongst which are
the enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety; and every free
republican government, being founded
on their sole authority, and organized
for the great purpose of protecting
their rights and liberties, and securing
their independence; to effect these
ends, they have at all times a complete
power to alter, reform or abolish their
government, whenever they may deem it
necessary. |
|
1.01
– It is a fact, that Mr. Michael
A. Galluzzo’s legal status is that of
a white Christian male adult, of the
age of majority, a competent sui juris
Ohio state Citizen with full vested
rights and privileges and not legally
embarrassed by Amendment the Fourteenth
to the Constitution for the United States,
1787-1791. He is in fact, a father,
with full vested rights and privileges,
one of the organic posterity of this
nation, a human being and man-about-the-land
freeborn, who is of a status to legally
question the debt and any and all other
acts and/or omissions of his government(s). |
|
1.02
–Stephen J. Walker,
et als, of Families in Transition,
(hereinafter FIT), makes a fundamental
error in constitutional construction
as it relates to Mr. Galluzzo’s unalienable
rights supported by the constitution.
Mr. Walker, et als states: “Yes,
even the most fundamental rights are
subject to alteration and indeed absolute
loss.” He continues quoting: “Whether
for good or ill, it is still the law
in the United States that a state may
take one’s life itself if one has been
convicted of murder under certain circumstances.
Liberty, which Jefferson also ranked
as fundamental, is [also] subject to
very severe restrictions upon the conviction
of a crime. And the rights of
a parent to custody of his children,
are subject to limitation when he is
divorced from their mother.”
This is gross scholarship without lawful
authority and is eminently in error
to the present case, and is an opprobrium
to a free peoples.. |
|
1.03
–It is a fact, that
Mr. Galluzzo has unqualified rights
to life, liberty and property,
in that of his family, and his children.
Divorce, does not change the status
of these rights under law. Divorce,
also does not enlarge the state authority
of any judge or judicial officer, or
branch of state or federal governments. |
|
1.04
–It is a fact, that
Fatherhood means something other than
being a cash cow to the state.
Divorce has become a ‘transfer of wealth
scheme”
for the state by and through invocation
of Rule 75(N) and RC §
3109.4, and other Title 42 U.S.C. §§
651-666 Welfare scams and/or schemes. |
|
1.05
–Firstly, it is a fact,
that the family is a legal social unit,
that is not equal under law.
It does not come under “equal protection”
clause and/or intrusion of the state.
Quoting legal authority, it is well-settled
and recognized that the home and family
are a viable social unit, run under
one legal head and under one authoritative
family leader: |
|
FAMILY. A
collective body of persons who live
in one house or within the same curtaliage
and under one head or management (thereby
including domestic servants, lodgers,
boarders, guests, etc.) Jarboe
v. Jarboe, 106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S.W.
1162 TA \l "Jarboe v. Jarboe,
106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S.W. 1162"
\s "Jarboe v. Jarboe, 106 Mo.
App. 459, 79 S.W. 1162" \c 1
; Dodge v. Boston & P.R. Corp.,
154 Mass. 299, 28 N.E. 243, 13 L.R.A.
318 TA \l "Dodge v. Boston &
P.R. Corp.,
154 Mass. 299, 28 N.E. 243, 13 L.R.A.
318" \s "Dodge v.
Boston & P.R. Corp., 154 Mass.
299, 28 N.E. 243, 13 L.R.A. 318"
\c 1
; Tyson v. Reynolds, 52 Iowa 431,
3 N.W. 469 TA \l "Tyson
v. Reynolds, 52 Iowa 431, 3 N.W. 469"
\s "Tyson v. Reynolds, 52 Iowa
431, 3 N.W. 469" \c 1 ;
Wilson v. Else, 204 Iowa 857, 216
N.W. 33, 37 TA \l "Wilson
v. Else, 204 Iowa 857, 216 N.W. 33,
37" \s "Wilson v.
Else, 204 Iowa 857, 216 N.W. 33, 37"
\c 1 ;
Klienberg v. Kinealy, (Mo. App.) 193
S.W. 981, 983 TA \l "Klienberg
v. Kinealy, (Mo. App.) 193 S.W. 981,
983" \s "Klienberg
v. Kinealy, (Mo. App.) 193 S.W. 981,
983" \c 1 ;
City of Mexico v. Grey, 203 Mo.App.
547, 219 S.W. 707, 709 TA \l
"City
of Mexico v. Grey, 203 Mo.App. 547,
219 S.W. 707, 709" \s
"City of Mexico v. Grey, 203
Mo.App. 547, 219 S.W. 707, 709"
\c 1 ;
Mullins v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185
S.W. 825, 828 TA \l "Mullins
v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W.
825, 828" \s "Mullins
v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W.
825, 828" \c 1 ;
May v. Dermont, 114 Misc. 106, 186
N.Y.S. 113, 115 TA \l "May
v. Dermont, 114 Misc. 106, 186 N.Y.S.
113, 115" \s "May
v. Dermont, 114 Misc. 106, 186 N.Y.S.
113, 115" \c 1 ;
Wilson v. Cochran, 31 Tex. 680, 98
Am.Dec. 553 TA \l "Wilson
v. Cochran, 31 Tex. 680, 98 Am.Dec.
553" \s "Wilson v.
Cochran, 31 Tex. 680, 98 Am.Dec. 553"
\c 1 .
The immediate members of one’s household,
as wife, children, brothers and sisters
or father and mother. Niemes
v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E.
503 TA \l "Niemes
v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E.
503" \s "Niemes v.
Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E.
503" \c 1 ,
506. Those members of the household
who are dependent on the householder
to whom he owes some duty. Brokaw
v. Ogle, 170 Ill. 115, 48 N.E. 394
TA \l "Brokaw
v. Ogle, 170 Ill. 115, 48 N.E. 394"
\s "Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 Ill.
115, 48 N.E. 394" \c 1 ; Cheshire
v. Burlington, 31 Conn. 326 TA \l
"Cheshire
v. Burlington, 31 Conn. 326"
\s "Cheshire v. Burlington, 31
Conn. 326" \c 1
, see also, Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala.
155, 102 So. 120, 121 TA \l
"Gamble
v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120,
121" \s "Gamble v.
Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120, 121"
\c 1 ;
Hall v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit
Co., 103 Conn. 226, 130 A. 157, 161
TA \l "Hall
v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit
Co., 103 Conn. 226, 130 A. 157, 161"
\s "Hall v. Meriden Trust &
Safe Deposit Co., 103 Conn. 226, 130
A. 157, 161" \c 1 ;
Scott’s Case, 117 Me. 436, 104 A.
794, 796 TA \l "Scott’s
Case, 117 Me. 436, 104 A. 794, 796"
\s "Scott’s Case, 117 Me. 436,
104 A. 794, 796" \c 1 .
Those whom it is the natural or moral
duty of one to support, Finn.
v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen,
163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350
TA \l "Finn.
v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen,
163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350"
\s "Finn. v. Eminent Household
of Columbia Woodmen, 163 Ky. 187,
173 S.W. 349, 350" \c 1 .
In a narrower sense, a father, mother,
and children, whether living together
or not. Higgins v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127
Md. 171, 96 A. 322, 323 TA
\l "Higgins
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore, 127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322,
323" \s "Higgins
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore, 127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322,
323" \c 1 . |
|
In a broader sense, a group of blood-relatives;
all the relations who descended from,
a common ancestor, or who spring from
a common root. See Civil Code
La. Art. 3556, no. 12; 9 Ves. 323.
The genealogical stock from a man and
those related to him by blood have sprung.
Albright v. Albright,
116 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760, 764.. |
|
1.06
–Secondly, within the Family
relation man and woman are legally joined
as one, with the husband as that one.
“Husband
and wife by the common law[10]
are treated as one for the most purposes,
and the husband
as being that one.”
Mackinley v. McGregor, Mackinley
v. Hewitt 3 Wharton 369 TA \l
"Mackinley
v. McGregor, Mackinley v. Hewitt
3 Wharton 369" \s "Mackinley
v. McGregor, Mackinley v. Hewitt 3 Wharton
369" \c 1 .
|
|
1.07
–Thirdly, this clearly established
line of descent and Patriarchal lineage,
is the marriage archetype of which
the state is bound to support.
"...As guardian[s] of the interests
of the public and persons not parties
to the record, it is our imperative
duty to prevent dissolution of the
marriage relation
by means which the law condemns and
expressly forbids.
An
infant child is the issue of this
marriage, and we cannot tolerate that
its character shall be sullied and
its career clouded by a Judicial conviction
of the Father on such evidence of
infidelity to the most sacred obligations.
Since the "common-law marriages,"
so called-another name for concubinage-is
so obtrusively prevalent in the community,
and our calendars are crowded with
applications for divorce, it behooves
us not to relax the stringency of
the rules which, in the interests
of good morals and social security,
have been prescribed by law for the
safeguard of the sanctity and stability
of the marriage relation. Daly
Ch. J., and Bischoff, J. Concur.
See also:
California public policy is to foster
and promote institution of marriage.
In re: Marriage of Haines, 39 Cal.Rptr.
2d 673 (Cal.App. 4th Dist.
1995) TA \l "In re: Marriage
of Haines, 39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal.App.
4th Dist. 1995)" \s
"In re: Marriage of Haines, 39
Cal.Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal.App. 4th Dist.
1995)" \c 1
See also:
"Because it is the policy of
our law to preserve the marriage relation
XE "policy of our law to preserve
the marriage relation" .” Phillips
v. Phillips, supra (R.I.) 97 A. 593,
596 TA \l "Phillips v. Phillips,
supra (R.I.) 97 A. 593, 596"
\s "Phillips v. Phillips, supra
(R.I.) 97 A. 593, 596" \c 1 . |
|
1.08
–Fourthly, that it is a fact,
that Michael A. Galluzzo, is in fact,
a father, (and not a parent) the recognized
Head of His Family with full vested
rights and privileges, and absolute
and perfect rights thereto, which
are in fact, constitutionally protected.
"The only ground upon which
a court of law can interpose [against
a father], is [by] some personal outrage.
But your Lordship exercises the jurisdiction,
belonging to the Sovereign, as Parens
Patriae XE "Parens Patriae"
, delegated to the person holding
the Great Seal. A court of law
can only control abuse of power;
but cannot appoint any other person
in the place of the parent as guardian
to exercise power. The leading
circumstances, influencing your Lordships
discretion are the ability of the
Father to maintain his child, and
his disposition to make right use
of his authority." [pg.
55]
"…If he maintains the child, and
does not neglect it, your Lordship cannot
deprive him of custody; nor interfere
with a Father, teaching that mode of
religion which he thinks best.
A husband also has the right to the
society of his wife, and if she deserts
him, no one is justified in harboring
her or supplying her with necessities.
"…the Father; under whose protection
the law places [the child], will full
powers; provided they are used for proper
purposes.
"But
there is no instance, either that court
or this, of taking the child from the
Father, willing to receive [it]; not
under articles of peace an in no suit
in Ecclesiastical, or any other court."
DeManneville v. DeManneville XE
"DeManneville v. DeManneville"
(1804) TA \l "DeManneville
v. DeManneville (1804)" \s "DeManneville
v. DeManneville (1804)" \c 1 ;
please also see Starr v. Gorman discussed
in the footnote.
See also:
"The father being domiciled and
resident within the dominions of her
Britannic Majesty, such is also the
proper and rightful domicil of his wife
and child, and he has a legal right
to remove them thither. The child being
detained from the father, its natural
guardian and protector, without authority
of law, the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum is his appropriate legal
remedy for its restoration to him from
its present illegal detention and restraint;
Constitution United States, art. 3,
2; Judiciary Act, 1789, 11; Inglis v.
Trustees Sail. Snug Harb., 3 Pet., 99;
7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. 3, cap. 21 TA
\l "Inglis v. Trustees Sail. Snug
Harb., 3 Pet., 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4
Geo. 3, cap. 21" \s "Inglis
v. Trustees Sail. Snug Harb., 3 Pet.,
99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. 3, cap. 21"
\c 1 ; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl.
& F., 523 TA \l "Warrender
v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & F., 523"
\s "Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl.
& F., 523" \c 1 ; Story Confl.
L., 30, 36, 43, 74, 160 TA \l "Story
Confl. L., 30, 36, 43, 74, 160"
\s "Story Confl. L., 30, 36, 43,
74, 160" \c 1 ; Shelf. Marriage,
Ferg., 397, 398 TA \l "Shelf. Marriage,
Ferg., 397, 398" \s "Shelf.
Marriage, Ferg., 397, 398" \c 1
." U.S. Supreme Court--Barry
v. Mercein XE "Barry v. Mercein"
, 46 U.S. 103 (How.) (1847)
|
|
1.09
--Fifthly, it
is an unquestioned and absolute premise
at law, that the father owns the children
in this nation and in all free
Western Civilized societies. |
|
1.10
--Biblical Law is concise
and clear upon this subject.
They are an identity and definitive:
The husband is to rule over his wife
or wives and the righteous wife is
to submit to and serve her husband
(Genesis 3:16; I Timothy 2:11-12;
I Corinthians 11:3,9).
a.)
“Unto the woman he said, I
will greatly multiply they sorrow
and thy conception, in sorrow, they
shall bring forth children, and thy
desire shall be to thy husband, and
he shall rule over thee.” [Gen.
3:16 TA \l "Gen.
3:16" \s "Gen. 3:16"
\c 2 ].
b.)
This is a true saying, If a man
desire the office of a bishop, he desireth
a good work.
A bishop
then must be blameless, the husband
of one wife, vigilant, sober, of good
behaviour, given to hospitality, apt
to teach;
Not given
to wine, no striker, not greedy of
filthy lucre; but patient, not a brawler,
not covetous;
One that ruleth well his own house,
having his children in subjection
with all gravity;
(For if a man know not how to rule
his own house, how shall he take care
of the church of God?) [1 Tim.
3.1-5 TA \l "1
Tim. 3.1-5" \s "1
Tim. 3.1-5" \c 2 ]
c.)
But I would have you know,
that the head of every man is Christ;
and the head of the woman is the man;
and the head of Christ is God.
Every man praying or prophesying,
having his head covered, dishonoureth
his head.
But every woman that prayeth or prophesieth
with her head uncovered dishonoureth
her head: for that is even all one
as if she were shaven.
For if the woman be not covered, let
her also be shorn: but if it be a
shame for a woman to be shorn or shaven,
let her be covered.
For a man indeed ought not to cover
his head, forasmuch as he is the image
and glory of God: but the woman is
the glory of the man.
For the man is not of the woman; but
the woman of the man.
Neither was the man created for the
woman; but the woman for the man.
For this cause ought the woman to
have power on her head because of
the angels.
Nevertheless neither is the man without
the woman, neither the woman without
the man, in the Lord.
For as the woman is of the man, even
so is the man also by the woman; but
all things of God.
Judge in yourselves: is it comely that
a woman pray unto God uncovered? [1
Cor 11:3-13 TA \l "1 Cor 11:3-13"
\s "1 Cor 11:3-13" \c 2 ] |
|
1.11
–It is a fact, and incontrovertible,
that this is a Christian nation, with
Christian laws. |
|
a.)
That we want it Judicially noted
and on the record, that the State of
Ohio, Constitution of 1802 TA \l "Ohio,
Constitution of 1802" \s "Ohio,
Constitution of 1802" \c 7 ,
does in fact, invoke, Almighty God: |
|
OHIO
Constitution
of Ohio, March 1, 1803
[17th]
OH
|
PREAMBLE |
CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF OHIO-1802.
We, the people of the eastern
division of the territory of the
United States , northwest of the
river Ohio, having the right of
admission into the general government,
as a member of the Union, consistent
with the constitution of the United
States, the ordinance of Congress
of one thousand seven hundred
and eighty-seven, and of the law
of Congress, entitled, "An
act to enable the people of the
eastern division of the territory
of the United States, northwest
of the river Ohio, to form a constitution
and State government, for the
admission of such State into the
Union, on an equal footing
with the original States,
and for other purposes,"
in order to establish justice,
promote the welfare and secure
the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain
and establish the following constitution
or form of government, and do
mutually agree with each other
to form ourselves into a free
and independent State, by the
name of the State of Ohio: |
|
ARTICLE VIII.
BILL OF RIGHTS. |
That the general, great and essential
principles of liberty and free
government may be recognized and
forever unalterably established,
we declare: |
OHIO
OH
|
Section 3. |
SEC. 3. That all men have a natural
and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God
according to the dictates of conscience;
that no human authority can, in
any case whatever, control or
interfere with the rights of conscience;
that no man shall be compelled
to attend, erect or support any
place of worship, or to maintain
any ministry, against his consent,
and that no preference shall ever
be given, by law, to any religious
society or mode of worship, and
no religious test shall be required
as a qualification to any office
of trust or profit. But religion,
morality and knowledge being essentially
necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools
and the means of instructions
shall forever be encouraged by
legislative provision not inconsistent
with the rights of conscience.
(See Const. 1851, Art. I, § 7.) |
OHIO |
|
Done in convention, at Chillicothe,
the twenty-ninth day of November,
in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and
two, and of the independence of
the United States of America,
the twenty-seventh.
In testimony whereof, we have
hereunto subscribed our names. |
|
|
b.)
Citing Locke again, that it
is a fact, that the State of Ohio
was established upon the common law
Lockean principles of Civil Society,
which was that society established
under God::
It is the duty of every man to render
to the Creator such homage, and such
only, as he believes to be acceptable
to him. This duty is precedent
both in order of time and degree of
obligation, to the claims of Civil
Society. Before any man can
be considered a member of Civil Society,
he must be considered as a subject
of the Governor of the Universe: And
if a member of Civil Society, who
enters into any subordinate Association,
must also do it with a reservation
of his duty to the general authority,
must every man who becomes a member
of any particular Civil Society, do
it with a saving of his allegiance
to the Universal Sovereign.” |
|
c.)
This has in fact, evolved into
our form of American government.
ITEM: The common law is the
underlying law within all 50 states
as well as the United States which
mandates the acknowledgement of God
and the Christian religion as the
predominant religion recognized under
the law as the foundation of our organic
law:
§ 4 – Christianity.
See 10 Cent. Dig. Com. Law § 4 TA \l
"10 Cent. Dig. Com. Law § 4"
\s "10 Cent. Dig. Com. Law § 4"
\c 3 .
§ 1. Nature
and authority in general.
See 10 Cent. Dig. Com Law, §§ 1, 2
If a custom has been recognized by
a statute, either expressly or by
necessary implication, it will thereby
receive vitality, and the right claimed
under it may be asserted as conferred
by the statute. – Delaplane v. Crenshaaw,
15 Grat. 457 TA \l "Delaplane
v. Crenshaaw, 15 Grat. 457" \s
"Delaplane v. Crenshaaw, 15 Grat.
457" \c 1 .
See also:
CHRISTIANITY. The religion established
by Jesus Christ.
2. Christianity
has been judicially declared to
be a part of the common law of
Pennsylvania;
11 Serg. & Rawle, 394; 5 Binn.
R.555; of New York, 8 Johns.
R. 291; of Connecticut, 2 Swift's
System, 321; of Massachusetts,
Dane's Ab. vol. 7, c. 219, a. 2, 19.
To write or speak contemptuously
and maliciously against it, is an indictable
offence. Vide Cooper on the Law of Libel,
59 and 114, et seq.; and
generally, 1 Russ. on Cr. 217;
1 Hawk, c. 5; 1 Vent. 293; 3 Keb.
607; 1 Barn. & Cress. 26.
S. C. 8 Eng. Com. Law R. 14;
Barnard. 162; Fitzgib. 66;
Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 524; 2 Str. 834;
3 Barn. & Ald. 161;
S. C. 5 Eng. Com. Law R. 249 Jeff.
Rep. Appx. See 1 Cro.
Jac. 421 Vent. 293;
3 Keb. 607; Cooke on Def. 74;
2 How. S. C. 11-ep. 127, 197 to 201.
See also:
Sec. 200. The Common Law is
a term which has, with us, a double
significance. In the United
States, when we speak of he common
law, the mind of the lawyer naturedly
refers to the system of English jurisprudence,
and indefinite and undescribed portion
of which was said to be the birthright
of the colonists, and has been adopted
in most of the states as a portion
of our jurisprudence. By the
common law a great many of our most
important transactions are governed.
In view of the common law
every statute enacted by a state legislature
is construed, and in every statues
is said to be in derogation of the
common law, or declaratory of it,
unless the subject is one that was
uncertain at common law. P.
242.
[fn 1 ] Custom: a species
of legislation by the people themselves,
which in this county and England is
the foundation of the common law itself,
or, in other words, general customs
obtaining by common consent.” Gibson,
U., in Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. &.
R. 323-329 TA \l "Gibson, U., in
Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. &. R. 323-329"
\s "Gibson, U., in Lyle v. Richards,
9 S. &. R. 323-329" \c 1 |
|
3.1.0
Blackstone’s in his Commentaries
on the Laws of England, discussed the
concomitant obligations of Nations within
the Law of Nations to recognize the
law of God and to subordinate themselves
thereto and not to violate those Christian
precepts clearly espoused within the
Decalogue of the Holy Bible:
With regard to the first of these, the
declaratory part of the municipal law,
this depends not so much upon the law
of revelation or of nature as upon the
wisdom and will of the legislator. This
doctrine, which before was slightly
touched, deserves a more particular
explication. Those rights then which
God and nature have established, and
are therefore called natural rights,
such as are life and liberty, need not
the aid of human laws to be more effectually
invested in every man than they are;
neither do they receive any additional
strength when declared by the municipal
laws to be inviolable. On the contrary,
no human legislature has power
to abridge or destroy them, unless the
owner shall himself commit some act
that amounts to a forfeiture.
Neither do divine or natural duties
(such as, for instance, the worship
of God, the maintenance of children,
and the like) receive any stronger sanction
from being also declared to be duties
by the law of the land. The case is
the same as to crimes and misdemesnors,
that are forbidden by the superior laws,
and therefore stiled mala in se,
such as murder, theft, and perjury;
which contract no additional turpitude
from being declared unlawful by the
inferior legislature. For that legislature
in all these cases acts only, as was
before observed, in subordination to
the great lawgiver, transcribing and
publishing his precepts. So that, upon
the whole, the declaratory part of the
municipal law has no force or operation
at all, with regard to actions that
are naturally and intrinsically right
or wrong.
… This will of his maker is called the
law of nature. For as God, when he created
matter, and endued it with a principle
of mobility, established certain rules
for the perpetual direction of that
motion; so, when he created man,
and endued him with freewill to conduct
himself in all parts of life, he laid
down certain immutable laws of human
nature, whereby that freewill is in
some degree regulated and restrained,
and gave him also the faculty of reason
to discover the purport of those laws.
Considering the creator only as a being
of infinite power, he was able unquestionably
to have prescribed whatever laws he
pleased to his creature, man, however
unjust or severe. But as be is
also a being of infinite wisdom, he
has laid down only such laws as were
founded in those relations of justice,
that existed in the nature of things
antecedent to any positive precept.
These are the eternal, immutable laws
of good and evil, to which the creator
himself in all his dispensations conforms;
and which he has enabled human reason
to discover, so far as they are necessary
for the conduct of human actions. Such
among others are these principles: that
we should live honestly, should hurt
nobody, and should render to every one
his due; to which three general precepts
Justinian[1] has reduced the whole doctrine
of law.
… This law of nature, being coeval
with mankind and dictated by God himself,
is of course superior in obligation
to any other-It is binding over all
the globe in all countries, and at all
times; no human laws are of any validity,
if contrary to this: and
such of them as are valid derive all
their force, and all their authority,
mediately or immediately, from this
original.
… This has given manifold occasion for
the benign interposition of divine providence;
which, in compassion to the frailty,
the imperfection, and the blindness
of human reason, hath been pleased,
at sundry times and in divers manners,
to discover and enforce it's laws by
an immediate and direct revelation.
The doctrines thus delivered we call
the revealed or divine law, and they
are to be found only in the holy scriptures.
These precepts, when revealed, are found
upon comparison to be really a part
of the original law of nature, as they
tend in all their consequences to man's
felicity. But we are not from thence
to conclude that the knowledge of these
truths was attainable by reason, in
it's present corrupted state; since
we find that, until they were revealed,
they were hid from the wisdom of ages.
As then the moral precepts of this law
are indeed of the same original with
those of the law of nature, so their
Intrinsic obligation is of equal strength
and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the
revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity
than that moral system, which is framed
by ethical writers, and denominated
the natural law. Because one is the
law of nature, expressly declared so
to be by God himself; the other is only
what, by the assistance of human reason,
we imagine to be that law. If we could
be as certain of the latter as we are
of the former, both would have an equal
authority; but, till then, they can
never be put in any competition together.
Upon these two foundations,
the law of nature and the law of revelation,
depend all human laws; that is to say,
no human laws should be suffered to
contradict these. There
are, it is true a great number of indifferent
points, in which both the divine law
and the natural leave a man at his own
liberty; but which are found necessary
for the benefit of society to be restrained
within certain limits. And herein it
is that human laws have their greatest
force and efficacy; for, with regard
to such points as are not indifferent,
human laws are only declaratory of,
and act in subordination to, the former.
But man was formed for society; and,
as is demonstrated by the writers on
this subject, is neither capable of
living alone, nor indeed has the courage
to do it. However, as it is impossible
for the whole race of mankind to be
united in one great society, they must
necessarily divide into many; and form
separate states, commonwealths and nations,
entirely independent of each other,
and yet liable to a mutual intercourse.
Hence arises a third kind of law, to
regulate this mutual intercourse, called
"the law of nations:" which,
as none of these states will acknowledge
a superiority in the other, cannot be
dictated by any; but depends entirely
upon the rules of natural law, or upon
mutual compacts, treaties, leagues,
and agreements between these several
communities: in the construction also
of which compacts we have no other rule
to resort to, but the law of nature;
being the only one to which all the
communities are equally subject: and
therefore the civil law very justly
observes, that quod naturalis ratio
inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur
jus gentium. |
|
d.)
Whereas, the Ohio Rule 75(N)
and R.C. § 3109.4 are in fact, null
and void—and opprobrious and in direct
contradistinction to the concise rule
of law, as laid down and protected
and secured by the Constitution for
Ohio 1802, as well as the Constitution
for the United States 1787-1791; these
facts are irreversible:
All acts of the legislature apparently
contrary to natural rights and justice
are, in our law and must be in the
nature of things, considered as void.
The laws of nature are the laws of
God, whose authority can[not] be superseded
by no power on earth. A legislature
must not obstruct our obedience to
him from whose punishments they cannot
protect us. All human constitutions
which contradict his [God's] laws,
we are in conscience bound to disobey."
Robin v. Hardaway, 1
Jefferson 109. (1772) TA \l "Robin
v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109.
(1772)" \s "Robin v. Hardaway,
1 Jefferson 109. (1772)" \c 1
|
|
1.12
–This well-settled law, solemnly
protecting and securing Mr. Galluzzo’s
right to be a father, gestating from
natural law, declared within the common
law, and protected by Constitutional
right, has led to the formation of
well-settled law which has not been
superceded, nor can be overturned
by the Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. §
3109.4:
a.)
ITEM: Lex de responses
prudentum. ORGANIC LAW: “The fundamental
law, or constitution, of a state or
nation, written or unwritten; that
law or system of laws or principles
which defines and establishes the
organization of its government.
St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46
S.W. 976, 42 L.R.A. 686, 68 Am.St.Rep.
575 TA \l "St. Louis v. Dorr,
145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 L.R.A.
686, 68 Am.St.Rep. 575" \s "St.
Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W.
976, 42 L.R.A. 686, 68 Am.St.Rep.
575" \c 1 .
b.)
ITEM: Stare Decisis:
Lat. To abide by, or adhere
to, decided cases.
Policy of courts to stand by precedent
and not to disturb settled point.
Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d
338, 390, 391 TA \l "Neff v. George,
364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 338, 390, 391"
\s "Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306,
4 N.E.2d 338, 390, 391" \c 1 .
Doctrine that, when court has once laid
down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply
it to all future cases, where facts
are substantially the same. Moore
v. City of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410
TA \l "Moore v. City of Albany,
98 N.Y. 396, 410" \s "Moore
v. City of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410"
\c 1 ; Regardless of whether the parties
and property are the same. Horne
v. Moody, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 505,
509, 510 TA \l "Horne v. Moody,
Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510"
\s "Horne v. Moody, Tex.Civ.App.,
146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510" \c 1
…
Federal courts should in all instances
follow the law of the state with respect
to the construction of state statutes,
and where that law has been determined
by the courts of last resort their decisions
are “stare decisis” and must be followed,
irrespective of federal courts’ opinions
concerning what the law ought to be,
but with respect to the pronouncement
of other state courts, federal courts
are not so bound and may conclude that
the decision does not truly express
state law. Keharya v. Axton, D.C.N.Y.,
32 F.Supp. 266, 268 TA \l "Keharya
v. Axton, D.C.N.Y., 32 F.Supp. 266,
268" \s "Keharya v. Axton,
D.C.N.Y., 32 F.Supp. 266, 268"
\c 1 .
Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
“To adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established.”
87 Pa. 286; Ballard County v. Kentucky
County Debt Commission, 290 Ky. 770,
162 S.W.2d 771, 773 TA \l "Ballard
County v. Kentucky County Debt Commission,
290 Ky. 770, 162 S.W.2d 771, 773"
\s "Ballard County v. Kentucky
County Debt Commission, 290 Ky. 770,
162 S.W.2d 771, 773" \c 1 .
TA \l "Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed.
844 (1963)." \s "Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10
L.Ed. 844 (1963)." \c 1
c.)
It is a fact, that the opposing
side makes the following specious
argument: That the country has
now changed, and the “new law”
and the “new understanding” thusly
established and evolved cannot allow
the Father’s Rights or any part of
the Christian religion to be recognized
by the secular government and therefore
the “compelling state interests” reigns
supreme in this legal argument.
The original intent of the framers of
the United States Constitution should
not be discounted. However, the society
for which it was written and the society
of today differ greatly. For this reason
we must make every effort not to rely
too heavily on the "advice of the
Founding Fathers" because historical
messages often tend to be "ambiguous"
and not relevant to a society far more
heterogeneous than that of the framers.
Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579,
10 L.Ed. 844 (1963). TA \l "Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed.
844 (1963)." \s "Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed.
844 (1963)." \c 1
d.)
However, in contra: ·
"If the Constitution
is to be construed to mean what the
majority at any given period in history
wish the Constitution to mean, [then]
why a written Constitution?"
·
"That for the Constitution
to declare a right inalienable, and
at the same time leave the Legislature
unlimited power over it, would be
a contradiction in terms, an idle
provision, proving that a Constitution
was mere parchment barrier, insufficient
to protect the citizen, delusive and
visionary, and the practical result
of which would be to destroy, not
conserve, the rights it vainly presumed
to protect." Billings v.
Hall, 71 Cal.App. 15-17 TA \l "Billings
v. Hall, 71 Cal.App. 15-17" \s
"Billings v. Hall, 71 Cal.App.
15-17" \c 1 . ·
"In questions of power, then,
let no more be heard of confidence
in man, but bind him down from mischief
with the chains of the Constitution."
Thomas Jefferson.
·
"The Constitution
which at any time exists, 'till changed
by an explicit and authentic act of
the whole People, is sacredly obligatory
upon all." --George
Washington ·
The necessities which gave birth
to the constitution, the controversies
which precede its formation and the
conflicts of opinion which were settled
by its adoption, may properly be taken
into view for the purposes of tracing
to its source, any particular provision
of the constitution, in order thereby,
to be enabled to correctly interpret
its meaning. — Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
558 TA \l "Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
558" \s "Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
558" \c 1 .
·
The values of the Framers
of the Constitution must be applied
in any case construing the Constitution.
Inferences from the text and history
of the Constitution should be given
great weight in discerning the original
understanding and in determining the
intentions of those who ratified the
constitution. The precedential value
of cases and commentators tends to
increase, therefore, in proportion
to their proximity to the adoption
of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights,
or any other amendments. — Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969).
TA \l "Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 547 (1969)." \s "Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)."
\c 1 ·
"It is not only
the same in words, but the same in
meaning, and delegates the same powers
to the Government, and reserves and
secures the same rights and privileges
to the citizens; and as long as it
continues to exist in its present
form, it speaks not only in the same
words, but with the same meaning and
intent with which it spoke when it
came from the hands of its framers,
and was voted on and adopted by the
people of the United States. Any other
rule of construction would abrogate
the judicial character of this court,
and make it the mere reflex of the
popular opinion or passion of the
day." South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905)
TA \l "South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905)"
\s "South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905)"
\c 1
e.)
Whereas, Constitutional construction
and understanding, is clear, and well-settled
on this issue. ·
Where the words of a constitution
are unambiguous and in their commonly
received sense lead to a reasonable
conclusion, it should be read according
to the natural and most obvious import
of the framers, without resorting
to subtle and forced construction
for the purpose of limiting or extending
its operation. A State
Ex Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev.
378, 32 P. 190 TA \l "State Ex
Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378,
32 P. 190" \s "State Ex
Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378,
32 P. 190" \c 1 .
·
If the legislature clearly
misinterprets a constitutional provision,
the frequent repetition of the wrong
will not create a right.
Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So.
619 TA \l "Amos v. Mosley, 74
Fla. 555; 77 So. 619" \s "Amos
v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619"
\c 1 . ·
Disobedience or evasion
of a constitutional mandate may not
be tolerated, even though such disobedience
may, at least temporarily, promote
in some respects the best interests
of the public. State v.
Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367;
9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660 TA \l "State
v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367;
9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660" \s "State
v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367;
9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660" \c 1
.
·
Ratio est legis anima,
mutata legis ratione mutatuer et lex.
"Reason is the soul of the law;
the reason of the law being changed,
the law is also changed." TA \l
"Ratio est legis anima, mutata
legis ratione mutatuer et lex.
\"Reason is the soul of the law;
the reason of the law being changed,
the law is also changed.\""
\s "Ratio est legis anima, mutata
legis ratione mutatuer et lex.
\"Reason is the soul of the law;
the reason of the law being changed,
the law is also changed.\""
\c 8
f.)
That the settled law of “Father’s
Rights’ has been erroneously marketed,
both by feminists, socialists, and
the mainstream media, as “old” and
“outdated” and/or “abusive” and “discriminatory.”
Because of this, they have “changed
the reason of the law,” in not supporting
“Father’s Rights.” In fact, ‘Father’s
Rights’ (Patriarchy), is a very, very
recent, and advanced social human
invention—and is the cornerstone of
all free Capitialist “Western” Civilizations.
It is ingrained in all Western Civilized
societies laws and cultures, and is
declared throughout the natural law,
and common law, and factually protected
and a secured liberty under the Union
of Several State’s Constitutional
Laws as well as the Federal Constitution.
It is in fact, Matriarchy (feminism,
Socialism, and Communism) which come
under the penumbra of ancient “tribal”
social doctrines, those of which our
founding fathers openly declared and
understood to be failed:
“Among
nations of hunters, the lowest and
rudest state of society, such as we
find it [is] among the native tribes
of North America, everyman is a warrior
as well as hunter...”
·
When the common law
and the statute concur, the common
law is to be preferred."
4 Co. 71. TA \l "When the common
law and the statute concur, the common
law is to be preferred.\"
4 Co. 71." \s "When the
common law and the statute concur,
the common law is to be preferred.\"
4 Co. 71." \c 8
here two rights concur, the more
ancient shall be preferred TA \l "Where
two rights concur, the more ancient
shall be preferred" \s "Where
two rights concur, the more ancient
shall be preferred" \c 8 ."
Se a jure discedas vagus eris, et erunt
ominia omnibus incerta. "If
you depart from the law, you will wander
without a guide, and everything will
be a state of uncertainty to every one."
Co. Litt. 227b TA \l "Se a jure
discedas vagus eris, et erunt ominia
omnibus incerta. \"If
you depart from the law, you will wander
without a guide, and everything will
be a state of uncertainty to every one.\"
Co. Litt. 227b" \s "Se a jure
discedas vagus eris, et erunt ominia
omnibus incerta. \"If you
depart from the law, you will wander
without a guide, and everything will
be a state of uncertainty to every one.\"
Co. Litt. 227b" \c 8 .
·
A traditional legal
principle that has been frozen into
a concise expression TA \l "A
traditional legal principle that has
been frozen into a concise expression"
\s "A traditional legal principle
that has been frozen into a concise
expression" \c 8 .
·
Periculosum est res
novas et inusitatas inducere.
"It is dangerous to introduce
new and dangerous things."
Co.Litt. 379 TA \l "Periculosum
est res novas et inusitatas inducere.
\"It
is dangerous to introduce new and
dangerous things.\"
Co.Litt. 379" \s "Periculosum
est res novas et inusitatas inducere.
\"It is dangerous to introduce
new and dangerous things.\"
Co.Litt. 379" \c 8
·
Periculosum est res
novas et inusitatas inducere.
Co. Litt. 379a. “It is perilous
to introduce new and untried things.
TA \l "Periculosum est res novas
et inusitatas inducere.
Co. Litt. 379a. \“It is perilous
to introduce new and untried things."
\s "Periculosum est res novas
et inusitatas inducere.
Co. Litt. 379a. \"It is
perilous to introduce new and untried
things." \c 8 ”
·
Quae praeter consuetudinem
et morem majorum fiunt, neque placent,
necque recta videntur. “What
is done contrary to the custom of
our ancestors, neither pleases nor
appears right.” 4
Co. 78 TA \l "Quae praeter consuetudinem
et morem majorum fiunt, neque placent,
necque recta videntur. \“What
is done contrary to the custom of
our ancestors, neither pleases nor
appears right.\”
4 Co. 78" \s "Quae
praeter consuetudinem et morem majorum
fiunt, neque placent, necque recta
videntur. \"What is done
contrary to the custom of our ancestors,
neither pleases nor appears right.\"
4 Co. 78" \c 8
·
Quea contra ratioonem
juris introducta sunt, non debent
trahi in consequentiam. “Things
introduced contrary to the reason
of law, ought not to be drawn into
precedents.” 12 Co. 75 TA \l
"Quea contra ratioonem juris
introducta sunt, non debent trahi
in consequentiam. \“Things introduced
contrary to the reason of law, ought
not to be drawn into precedents.\”
12 Co. 75" \s "Quea contra
ratioonem juris introducta sunt, non
debent trahi in consequentiam.
\"Things introduced contrary
to the reason of law, ought not to
be drawn into precedents.\"
12 Co. 75" \c 8
1.13
Whereas, it is well-settled and
understood, and a natural law, common
law and Civil Right of Michael A. Galluzzo,
that by his status, and his status as
a father, give him substantive rights,
perfect rights and Constitutional Rights
to life, liberty and property, understood
and protected at law. Whereas,
“Fatherhood mean’s something,” other
than having a judge seize his rights
in overt violation to the Constitution
of Ohio 1802.
|
|
The
American Digest
1897 – 1906 |
|
§99 Custody of Infants |
|
(1) In General
[a] The father is the natural
guardian of his child, and [the father]
will be awarded possession of his
person, unless he is unworthy, and
incompetent to discharge the trust
imposed upon him.
(Ohio—C.C. 1899)
In re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47
11 O.C.D. 208 TA \l "In
re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11
O.C.D. 208" \s "In
re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11
O.C.D. 208" \c 1 ;
(Tex. Civ. App. 1905)
Parker v. Wiggins, 86 SW 786 TA \l
"Parker
v. Wiggins, 86 SW 786"
\s "Parker v. Wiggins, 86 SW
786" \c 1
(W.Va.
1891)
Green v. Campbell, 35 W.Va. 698 14
S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 843
TA \l "Green v. Campbell, 35
W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St.
Rep. 843" \s "Green v. Campbell,
35 W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St.
Rep. 843" \c 1
[c]
(Ga. 1893)
The
father is entitled to the custody
of his child during minority, unless
such right has been relinquished or
forfeited. – Franklin v. Carswell,
29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga. 553 TA \l "Franklin
v. Carswell, 29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga.
553" \s "Franklin
v. Carswell, 29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga.
553" \c 1 .
[d]
(Ga. 1902)
On
the hearing of a writ of Habeas Corpus
to determine the custody of a minor
child, it is an improper exercise
of discretion to render Judgment depriving
on of the custody and awarding it
to another, where there is undisputed
evidence of the right and fitness
of the [father] to have such custody,
and there is no evidence to the contrary.
Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116
Ga. 114 TA \l "Carter
v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114"
\s "Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E.
348, 116 Ga. 114" \c 1 .
Determinations of Particular issues
or question – Custody of Infants.
[j]
(Mass. 1834)
In
general, as the Father is by law clearly
entitled to the custody of his child,
the court will so far interfere as
to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus
and inquire into the circumstances
of the case, in order to prevent a
party entitled to the custody of a
child from seeking it by force or
stratagem.
And the court will feel bound to restore
the custody to the father, where the
law has placed it, unless in a clear
and strong case of unfitness on his
part to have such custody. --
Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass.
(16 Pick.) 203 TA \l "Commonwealth
v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.)
203" \s "Commonwealth v.
Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.)
203" \c 1
[l]
Upon
a petition for habeas Corpus, the
court has authority to relieve an
infant from restraint; but it has
no power to determine matters of guardianship,
appointment of trustees, disposition
of the property, or moneys of the
parties, or the making of provision
for the child placed in the custody
of the Father. Ibid.
[f]
(S.C. 1883)
Other
things being equal, the claims of
the Father to the custody and control
of his children are superior to those
of the mother, but it is discretionary
with the court to which one of the
parents children shall be committed,
and, where they are under the age
of choice, the court will exercise
that discretion, looking solely to
the welfare and happiness of the children.
Ex. Parte Reed, 19 S.C. 604 TA \l
"Ex. Parte Reed, 19 S.C. 604"
\s "Ex. Parte Reed, 19 S.C. 604"
\c 1 .
|
|
LEGAL
POINT 2. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION. |
|
2.01
–The State of Ohio, is in fact,
a common law state of decision.
The courts are bound as to the common
law rule of decision in all the courts
of its state. |
|
2.02
–The Ohio Revised Codes, are
in fact, not law, nor are binding on
Michael L. Galluzzo. Judicially
note and place on the record the legal
term “law.” LAWz. |
|
2.03
–The Constitution of the State
of Ohio, nor of the United States;
is not a grant of state (or Federal)
power, but a complete restriction
upon the awesome powers of the state
and especially the Legislature, as
well as all branches of government:
"The constitution of this state
is not to be considered as a grant
of power, but rather as a restriction
upon the powers of the legislature,
and it is competent for the legislature
to exercise all powers not forbidden
by the constitution of this state,
or delegated to the general government,
or prohibited by the constitution
of the United States."
People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46 TA \l
"People
v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46"
\s "People v. Coleman, 4 Cal.
46" \c 1 ;
People v Bigler, 5 Cal. 23
TA \l "People
v Bigler, 5 Cal. 23" \s
"People v Bigler, 5 Cal. 23"
\c 1 ;
Williams v. Thompson, Jan T. 1856
TA \l "Williams
v. Thompson, Jan T. 1856"
\s "Williams v. Thompson, Jan
T. 1856" \c 1 .
As well as the Police Powers of the
state:
"It is well settled that the
Constitutional Rights protected from
invasion by the police power, include
Rights safeguarded both by express
and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions."
Tiche vs. Osborne, 131 A. 60
"As a rule, fundamental limitations
of regulations under the police power
are found in the spirit of the Constitutions,
not in the letter, although they are
just as efficient as if expressed
in the clearest language."
Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882 TA
\l "Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146
NW 882" \s "Mehlos vs. Milwaukee,
146 NW 882" \c 1
"There should be no arbitrary
deprivation of Life or Liberty ..."
Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31
TA \l "Barbour vs. Connolly,
113 US 27, 31" \s "Barbour
vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31"
\c 1 ;
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356
TA \l "Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356"
\s "Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118
US 356" \c 1 |
|
2.04
–The Constitution of Ohio,
1802, is in fact, a perfect document.
CONST. PERFECT CITES |
|
2.05
–That in any legal construction
of law, the Legislature is to first
hold the proposed Revised Statute up
to the Constitution and see if the law
squares with the common law and the
Constitution. Reference: Heydon's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 637(Ex. 1584) TA \l "Heydon's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 637(Ex. 1584)" \s "Heydon's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex.
1584)" \c 1 Pierson,
Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967)
386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 288 TA \l "Pierson,
Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967)
386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 288" \s "Pierson, Et
al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S. 547,
87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288"
\c 1 . |
|
2.06
That the Legislature is then
to hold the proposed Revised Statute
up to common law construction, to see
if it squares with the law of highest
reason. |
|
"Common law having been adopted
as rule of decision in this state, it
is duty of courts to enforce it, leaving
all questions of its policy for consideration
of legislature." Johnson
v. Fall (1856), 6 C. 359, 65
Am.Dec. 518 TA \l "Johnson
v. Fall (1856), 6 C. 359, 65
Am.Dec. 518" \s "Johnson v.
Fall (1856), 6 C. 359, 65 Am.Dec. 518"
\c 1 . |
|
"Common law at time state constitution
was adopted included whole body of common
law of England as it stood at that time,
influenced by statute." People
v. Richardson (1934), 138 C.A.
404, 32 P.2d 433. |
|
"In 1850, legislature made rule
of common law "rule of decision"
in this state except where such common
law was "repugnant" or inconsistent
with law of this State."
Sahlender Estate (1948),
89 C.A.2d. 329, 339, 201 P.2d 69 TA
\l "Sahlender Estate
(1948), 89 C.A.2d. 329, 339, 201 P.2d
69" \s "Sahlender Estate (1948),
89 C.A.2d. 329, 339, 201 P.2d 69"
\c 1 . |
|
"Jurisprudence of California
rests exclusively upon common law, which
was made rule of decision at time of
formation of state government in all
cases where not abrogated or modified
by statute." Renton
Estate (1892), 3 Cof. 519. |
|
2.07
–It is a fact, that Mr. Galluzzo,
as a Ohio state Citizen’s, rights
do not diminish, nor is the state
to diminish his rights as vested in
him by right and status under the
Constitution for Ohio 1820.
“Glanville XE "Glanville:Father
can punish those who take children"
XE "Glanville" maintained
a contrary doctrine, and insisted that
the action lay. ‘For,’ said he, ‘the
father hath an interest in every
of his children XE "father
hath an interest in every of
his children:He can punish:
Vaughn v. Rhodes" , to educate
them and to provide for them; and he
hath his comfort by them; wherefore
it is not reasonable that any
should take them from him, and to do
him such an injury, but that he
should have his remedy to punish
it.”
Vaughan v. Rhodes, 2 McCord
227 |
|
See also:
We begin with In re Baby Girl M. (1984)
37 Cal.3d 65 (Baby Girl M.), in which
we held a trial court erred in terminating
a natural father's parental rights
based on a best-interest-of-the-child
standard without first determining
whether granting custody to the natural
father would be detrimental to the
child.
"'. . . the state may not
deny biological parents the opportunity
to establish a protected custodial
relationship.'" (37 Cal.3d at
p. 74 (italics added), quoting Buchanan,
The Constitutional Rights of Unwed
Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson
(1984) 45 Ohio State L.J. 313, 351.)
This observation, although perhaps
unnecessary, tends to support petitioner's
position. (Cited From: Adoption
of KELSEY S. (Citations Omitted).
TA \l "Vaughan v. Rhodes, 2 McCord
227" \s "Vaughan v. Rhodes,
2 McCord 227" \c 1 |
|
2.08
The Doctrine of Parens Patriae,
allegedly invoked by Respondent’s state
powers under and by Ohio Rule 75(N)
and R.C. §
3109.4, are in fact, a SUBORDINATE LEGAL
DOCTRINE to the individual rights of
the Father.
|
|
2.09
–That it is fact, that Mr.
Galluzzo’s rights and privileges as
a father do in fact, supercede any
“Judge” or “Family Court’ attempting
to invoke Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C.
§ 3109.4:
"The
statist notion XE "statist notion:that
state is superior to parent, repugnant
to law" that government
may supercede parental authority in
order to ensure bureaucratically or
judicially determined "best interests"
of children has been rejected as repugnant
to American traditions.
Judges and state officials are ill-equipped
to second guess parents and are precluded
from intervening in absence of powerful
countervailing interests."
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138
(Pa. Super. 1990) TA \l "Zummo
v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa.
Super. 1990)" \s "Zummo
v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa.
Super. 1990)" \c 1 , citing Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61,
103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed.
2d 614, 623-29 (1982) TA \l "Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61,
103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed.
2d 614, 623-29 (1982)" \s "Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61,
103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed.
2d 614, 623-29 (1982)" \c 1 .
See also:
“The institution of marriage has played
a critical role both in defining the
legal entitlements of family members
and in developing the decentralized
XE "decentralized:family"
structure of our democratic society.
|
|
2.10
That it is a fact, that the father’s
rights cannot be superceded by the state
for altruistic, or state social engineering
purposes, that the right of the father
to the child is unlimited, and unqualified
under law:
"The discretion to be exercised
is not an arbitrary one, but, in the
absence of any positive disqualification
of the father for the proper discharge
of his parental duties, he has, as it
seems to us, a paramount right to the
custody of his infant child, which no
court is at liberty to disregard. And,
while we are bound also to regard the
permanent interests and welfare of the
child, it is to be presumed that its
interests and welfare will be best promoted
by continuing that guardianship which
the law has provided, until it is made
plainly to appear that the father is
no longer worthy of the trust. The breaking
of the ties which bind the father and
the child can never be justified without
the most solid and substantial reasons.
Upon the father the child must mainly
depend for support, education, and advancement
in life; and as security for this he
has the obligation of law, as well as
the promptings of that parental affection
which rarely fails to bring into the
service of the child the best energies
and the most thoughtful care of the
father. In any form of proceeding, the
sundering of these ties will always
be approached by the courts with great
caution, and with a deep sense of responsibility."
Moran, et al. v. Liano, et ux.,
No. 13429, (1959 TX. 313) TX. Ct.Civ.App
TA \l "Moran,
et al. v. Liano, et ux.,
No. 13429, (1959 TX. 313) TX. Ct.Civ.App"
\s "Moran, et al. v. Liano, et
ux., No. 13429, (1959 TX. 313) TX. Ct.Civ.App"
\c 1
. |
|
2.11
–It is a fact, that Michael
A. Galluzzo, in fact, has no positive
disqualification of being a father
whose rights can be taken away or
subrogated by the state, therefore,
at law, he is vested with full and
substantive rights legally as a father.
"It is true that the child's
welfare is the superior and comprehensive
test of custody. Rice v. Rice, 21
Tex. 58 TA \l "Rice
v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58" \s
"Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58"
\c 1 ;
Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28
S.W. 281 TA \l "Legate
v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281"
\s "Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex.
248, 28 S.W. 281" \c 1 ;
State v. Deaton, supra; Castro v.
Castellanos (Tex.Com.App.), 294 S.W.
525 TA \l "Castro v. Castellanos
(Tex.Com.App.), 294 S.W. 525"
\s "Castro v. Castellanos (Tex.Com.App.),
294 S.W. 525" \c 1 ;
Edwards v. Edwards (Tex.Com.App.),
295 S.W. 581; Cecacci v. Martelli
(Tex.Civ.App.), 235 S.W. 951
TA \l "Cecacci
v. Martelli (Tex.Civ.App.), 235 S.W.
951" \s "Cecacci
v. Martelli (Tex.Civ.App.), 235 S.W.
951" \c 1 ;
Davis v. Elkins (Tex.Civ.App.), 249
S.W. 1099 TA \l "Davis
v. Elkins (Tex.Civ.App.), 249 S.W.
1099" \s "Davis v.
Elkins (Tex.Civ.App.), 249 S.W. 1099"
\c 1 .
But the presumptions noticed mean
that in general the child's welfare
and the parent's fitness commonly
rest in the natural relation [of the
father] which may not be disturbed
save by that rebuttal which exhibits
positive disqualification of the parent.
State v. Deaton, supra; Legate v.
Legate, supra; Weir v. Marley, 99
Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798, 6 L.R.A. 672
TA \l "Weir
v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798,
6 L.R.A. 672" \s "Weir
v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798,
6 L.R.A. 672" \c 1 ;
State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272,
275 TA \l "State
v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275"
\s "State v. Richardson, 40 N.H.
272, 275" \c 1
."
"In DeWitt v. Brooks, 143 Tex.
122, 182 S.W.2d 687, 694, our Supreme
Court held as follows: 'The plaintiffs
contend that since they were admittedly
the natural parents of the child, and
since the trial court found that they
were suitable persons to have the custody
of the child, they were, as a matter
of law, entitled to its custody. The
holding of this Court in the case of
State ex rel. Wood v. Deaton, 93 Tex.
243, 54 S.W. 901, seems to justify that
contention."
In the case of State ex rel. Wood
v. Deaton, 93 Tex. 243, 54 S.W. 901,
903, the Supreme Court reversed a
judgment of a lower court and directed
that the child be delivered to its
mother, quoting with approval from
the case of State ex rel. Herrick
v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275, as
follows: 'The discretion to be exercised
is not an arbitrary one, but, in the
absence of any positive disqualification
of the father for the proper discharge
of his parental duties, he has, as
it seems to us, a paramount right
to the custody of his infant child,
which no court is at liberty to disregard.'"
We are
not unmindful of Chief Justice Calvert's
opinion in Mumma v. Aguirre, Tex., 364
S.W.2d 220 TA \l "Mumma v. Aguirre,
Tex., 364 S.W.2d 220" \s "Mumma
v. Aguirre, Tex., 364 S.W.2d 220"
\c 1 ,
in which he stated, ". . . our
courts do not normally concern themselves
with the righteousness of claims to
custody of children; their paramount
concern is with the best interests of
the children." In Re: Johnny Herrera,
a minor, 409 S.W.2d 395 (1966)
TA \l "In
Re: Johnny Herrera, a minor, 409 S.W.2d
395 (1966)" \s "In
Re: Johnny Herrera, a minor, 409 S.W.2d
395 (1966)" \c 1 |
|
2.12
--Whereas, it is the courts
whose rights are expanded under Ohio
Rule 75(N) and R.C. §
3109.4, that is subrogating and abrogating
Mr. Galluzzo’s rights under color
of law and under color of authority.
The judiciary is only to state and
declare what the law is: and do nothing
more:
Although
constitutional term analysis is an
enormous task, a judge is bound by
oath
XE "judge is bound by oath:Marbury
v. Madison" as well as
the Marbury v. Madison XE "Marbury
v. Madison"
duty to say what the law is.
See also:
“Justice Ormond, claimed that by this
language (9th Amendment) the courts
were authorized to declare void any
act which was repugnant to natural
justice and equity.
Hence, "any act of the legislature
which violates any of these asserted
rights of which entrenches on any
of these great principles of civil
liberty, or inherent rights of man
shall be void." Re
Dorsey, 7 Porter (ALA) 293, 377-378
(1883). TA \l "Re
Dorsey, 7 Porter (ALA) 293, 377-378
(1883)." \s "Re Dorsey,
7 Porter (ALA) 293, 377-378 (1883)."
\c 1
See also:
“Federal Court Judge Robert Bork XE
"Bork" said: "America
is in decline XE "America is
in decline:Bork, Robert" and
the rot is spreading. It is
the courts that threaten our liberty
- the liberty that govern ourselves
-- more profoundly than does any legislature".
(New Jersey Herald & News, Sept.
17, 1996) Because, ". . . If
a State may compel the surrender of
one's constitutional rights as a condition
of its favor, it may, in like manner,
compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable
that guaranties embedded in the Constitution
of the United States may thus be manipulated
out of existence." Paul v. Virginia,
8 Wall. 168, 181, 19 L.Ed. 357 TA
\l "Paul
v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181, 19
L.Ed. 357" \s "Paul
v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181, 19
L.Ed. 357" \c 1 .
See also:
“Between 1975 and 1979, there were
24 references to "judicial activism"
XE "\judicial activism\"
or "judicial activist,"
with an average of 5 references per
year. Between 1980 and 1984, there
were 305 references, with an average
of 24 references per year. For 1985
to 1989, the amount of references
tripled to 993, averaging 200 references
per year. The years 1990 to 1994 saw
1,560 references and an average of
312 references per year. In 1995,
there were 372 references; 1996 had
578 references; and 1997 had 1,349
references, almost quadrupling 1995's
record. Search of LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws & Arcnws Files (Jan. 4,
1998). |
|
2.13
--Whereas, the state has the
substantive burden of showing a “positive
disqualification” of unfitness
of Mr. Galluzzo before it divests
any father of his children or rights,
nor can legally bestow upon themselves
the doctrine of parens patriae:
“More important, the court seemed
to indicate that a father's parental
rights could not be terminated absent
a showing of his unfitness, and
that a showing of the child's best
interest would be an insufficient
basis for termination of the father's
rights. "What is the state
interest in separating children from
fathers without a hearing designed
to determine whether the father
is unfit XE "unfit"
in a particular disputed case?
We observe that the State registers
no gain towards its declared goals
[of protecting the child's best interest]
when it separates children from
the custody of fit parents.
Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father,
the State spites its own articulated
goals when it needlessly separates
him from his family." (Id.,
at pp. 652-653, italics added.) The
court has characterized Stanley as
holding that the father's constitutional
rights were violated "absent
a hearing and a particularized finding
that the father was an unfit parent."
(Quilloin v. Walcott
(1978) 434 U.S. 246, 247-248 TA \l
"Quilloin v. Walcott
(1978) 434 U.S. 246, 247-248"
\s "Quilloin v. Walcott (1978)
434 U.S. 246, 247-248" \c 1 ,
italics added.)” Adoption
of Kelsey S., (1992) TA \l
"Adoption of Kelsey S.,
(1992)" \s "Adoption of
Kelsey S., (1992)" \c 1
See
also:
"But
before the court can deprive the [father
of his] right to the minor's custody
and give her into the charge of strangers,
there must be a finding that the [father]
is an unfit XE "unfit"
person
to have the custody of [his] child."
Eddlemon v. Eddlemon,
27 Cal. App. 2d 343 [80 P.2d 1009]
TA \l "Eddlemon v. Eddlemon,
27 Cal. App. 2d 343 [80 P.2d 1009]"
\s "Eddlemon v. Eddlemon, 27
Cal. App. 2d 343 [80 P.2d 1009]"
\c 1 ; In re White,
54 Cal. App. 2d 637 [129 P.2d 706]
TA \l "In re White,
54 Cal. App. 2d 637 [129 P.2d 706]"
\s "In re White, 54 Cal. App.
2d 637 [129 P.2d 706]" \c 1 ;
Guardianship of De Ruff,
38 Cal. App. 2d 529 [101 P.2d 521]
TA \l "Guardianship of
De Ruff, 38 Cal. App. 2d 529
[101 P.2d 521]" \s "Guardianship
of De Ruff, 38 Cal. App. 2d 529 [101
P.2d 521]" \c 1 ;
and Roche v. Roche,
25 Cal. 2d 141 [152 P.2d 999]
TA \l "Roche v. Roche,
25 Cal. 2d 141 [152 P.2d 999]"
\s "Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d
141 [152 P.2d 999]" \c 1
See also:
See
also:
We begin with In re Baby Girl
M. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 65 (Baby
Girl M.), TA \l "In re
Baby Girl M. (1984) 37 Cal.3d
65 (Baby Girl M.)," \s "In
re Baby Girl M. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 65
(Baby Girl M.)," \c 1 in
which we held a trial court erred
in terminating a natural father's
parental rights based on a best-interest-of-the-child
standard XE "terminating a
natural father's parental rights
based on a best-interest-of-the-child
standard:In re Baby Girl M."
without first determining
whether gra “We recognize that, as
a matter of substantive due process,
the parental rights of a Kelsey S.
father cannot be terminated without
a finding that he is unfit
XE "unfit" .” (Adoption
of Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th
at pp. 830-834, 849.) Robert
D. v. Jamie T., 87 Cal.App.4th
1392, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 (Cal.App.
Dist.4 03/27/2001) TA \l "Robert
D. v. Jamie T.,
87 Cal.App.4th 1392, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d
341 (Cal.App. Dist.4 03/27/2001)"
\s "Robert D. v. Jamie T., 87
Cal.App.4th 1392, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d
341 (Cal.App. Dist.4 03/27/2001)"
\c 1 nting custody to the natural
father would be detrimental to the
child. |
|
2.14
--Whereas, it is a fact, and
uncontroverted that Michael A. Galluzzo
is seeking redress of grievances from
this court
to sustain and affirm his fundamental
rights at law in the light of the
offending Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C.
§
3109.4 which disenfranchises him of
his rights.
This review made by this court must
be unbiased, fair, and embodied with
substantive justice in the light most
favorable towards Mr. Galluzzo.:
In a case where it is asserted that
a person has been deprived by a State
court of a fundamental right secured
by the Constitution, an independent
examination of the facts by this Court
is often required to be made. See
Norris v. State of Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 590 , 580 TA \l "Norris
v. State of Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 590 , 580"
\s "Norris v. State of Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 590 , 580" \c 1
;
Pierre v. State of Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354, 358 , 538, 539
TA \l "Pierre
v. State of Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354, 358 , 538, 539"
\s "Pierre v. State of Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354, 358 , 538, 539"
\c 1 ;
Chambers v. State of Florida,
309 U.S. 227 , 228, 229, 473, 474;
Lisenba v. People of State of
California, 314 U.S. 219 ,
237, 238, 290, 291; [331 U.S. 367
, 374] TA \l "Lisenba
v. People of State of California,
314 U.S. 219 , 237, 238, 290, 291;
[331 U.S. 367 , 374]"
\s "Lisenba v. People of State
of California, 314 U.S. 219 , 237,
238, 290, 291; [331 U.S. 367 , 374]"
\c 1 Ashcraft
v. State of Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 , 147, 148, 923. TA
\l "Ashcraft
v. State of Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 , 147, 148, 923."
\s "Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 , 147, 148, 923."
\c 1
See also:
"When no facts are present, or
only such facts as have neither legal
value nor color of legal value in
the affair, then, in that event, for
the magistrate to take jurisdiction
is not, in any manner, the performance
of a judicial act, but simply
the commission of an unofficial wrong.
This criterion seems a reasonable
one it leaves him answerable
for the commission of a wrong that
is practically willful . . . such
responsibility is imperative to guard
the citizen against official oppression".
Grove v. Van Duyn, 44
N.J.L. 654, 660-61, 42 Am. Rep. 648,
654 1882) TA \l "Grove
v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654,
660-61, 42 Am. Rep. 648, 654 1882)"
\s "Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L.
654, 660-61, 42 Am. Rep. 648, 654
1882)" \c 1 .
|
|
2.15
–It is also a fact, that Mr.
Galluzzo’s substantive natural born,
common law and constitutional rights,
to not diminish, whatsoever, nor can
they be taken away for “state” purposes:
"The State cannot diminish
rights of the people
XE "State cannot diminish
rights of the people:Hurtado v.
California" ."
Hurtado v. California,110
U.S. 516 TA \l "Hurtado
v. California,110
U.S. 516" \s "Hurtado
v. California,110 U.S. 516" \c
1 .
See
also:
Johnson
v. Zerbst, supra, 304
U.S. 458 TA \l "Johnson
v. Zerbst,
supra, 304 U.S. 458" \s
"Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304
U.S. 458" \c 1 ,
sets the standard: "It has been
pointed out that 'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver'
of fundamental constitutional rights
and that we 'do not presume acquiescence
in the loss of fundamental rights.'"
(304 U.S. at p. 464 [82 L.Ed. at p.
1466] (fn. citations omitted).) |
|
2.16
--That it is a fact, and well-settled
law and established, that Mr. Galluzzo’s
rights to his children, are primary
and a fundamental property right at
law:
"The United States Supreme Court
noted that a parent's right to "the
companionship, care, custody and management
of his or her children" is an
interest "far more precious"
than any property right
XE "property right"
." May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843,
(1952) TA \l "May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843,
(1952)" \s "May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843,
(1952)" \c 1
Please note, that California, establishes
this fact, and drives this point home
even further:
“Under
the general law, and independently
of the provisions of the codes, the
father has a natural right to the
care and custody of the child…The
father’s right…though not commonly
spoken of as such, is of essentially
the same nature as the right of
property XE "right
of property:Parents to children"
. The right must therefore
be regarded as coming within the reason,
if not within the strict letter, of
the constitutional provisions for
the protection of property…”
In re Campbell, 130
C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900) TA \l
"In
re Campbell,
130 C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900)"
\s "In re Campbell, 130 C. 380,
382, 62 P. 613 (1900)" \c 1
See also: TA \l "In re
Campbell, 130 C. 380, 382,
62 P. 613 (1900)" \s "In
re Campbell, 130 C. 380, 382, 62 P.
613 (1900)" \c 1
“The right of a fit and proper parent
to his child's custody is somewhat
in the nature of a property right
XE "CHILD is property right:Turner
and Petrosky cases" \t "See
Best Interest of the Child \"test\""
, and is paramount,
in a sense, to the child's theoretical
welfare and best interests.”
Turner v. Turner (1959)
334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636 TA \l
"Turner v. Turner
(1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636"
\s "Turner v. Turner (1959) 334
P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636" \c
1 .
|
|
2.17
--Whereas, it is a fact, that
under the Campbell
[Id.] test. noted above, Mr.
Galluzzo has a fundamental “unlawful
taking’s of property” conflict which
in fact, arises out of Ohio Rule 75(N)
and R.C. §
3109.4 statutory conflict, with which
he has no substantive due process rights
to defend, nor any constitutionally
protected redress of grievances to
assert his substantive rights at law. |
|
2.18
It is self-evident and declaratory,
that the State of Ohio, does in fact,
view Mr. Galluzzo’s children as their
property, and controls, owns, and
assigns them thereto, by and through
their authority under the doctrine of
parens patriae implemented under
color of law and color of authority
of Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. §
3109.4.. If the state is
not allowing Mr. Galluzzo his rights
to property, it is most assuredly enforcing
it’s rights to property by unlawfully
superceding and abrogating his common
law rights to his own children. |
|
2.19
--It is therefore an identity,
that Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. §
3109.4 are in conflict with the rights
established under Constitution of
Ohio, Article VIII, section 1 (noted
above) and this courts Constitution
for the United States, Amendment the
Fifth, which makes said Revised Code
§
3109.4 patently unconstitutional.
No judge can assume power over a father
by either Legislative fiat or judicial
edict. No branch of government
may supercede a true and proper fathers’
rights vested at law:
[O]ur fathers were not absurd enough
to put unlimited power in the hands
of the ruler and take away the protection
of law from the rights of individuals.
[That course would not] 'secure the
blessings of liberty to themselves
and their posterity.' (Preamble, US
Constitution) They determined that
not one drop of the blood which had
been shed on the other side of the
Atlantic, during seven centuries of
contest with arbitrary power, should
sink into the ground; but the fruits
of every popular victory should be
garnered up in this new government.
Of all the great rights already won
they threw not an atom away. They
went over Magna Charta, the Petition
of Right, the [English] Bill of Rights,
and the rules of the common law, and
whatever was found there to favor
individual liberty they carefully
inserted in their own system, improved
by clearer expression, strengthened
by heavier sanctions, and extended
by a more universal application. They
put all those provisions into the
organic law, so that neither tyranny
in the executive [or judiciary], nor
... in the legislature, could change
them without destroying the government
itself. Ex Parte Milligan,
71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 4 Wall. 2
(1866). TA \l "Ex
Parte Milligan,
71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 4 Wall. 2
(1866)." \s "Ex Parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281,
4 Wall. 2 (1866)." \c 1
See
also:
“Compelling
State interest” while applying
“strict scrutiny” requires
a vague statute, or a statute that
infringes upon fundamental rights
to fail. “It is well settled that,
quite apart from the guarantee of
equal protection, if a law impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly
or implicitly secured by the Constitution,
it is presumptively unconstitutional.”
Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980). TA \l
"Harris
v. McRae,
448
U.S. 297, 312 (1980)."
\s "Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 312 (1980)." \c 1 |
|
2.20
--Under our form of government,
we do not transfer our rights to be
Lorded over by government ministers,
as that is in direct violation of
the construct of our free form of
government which is to be Republican
in Form:
“John Locke agreed with Hobbes
XE "Hobbes:Agrees
with Locke re: personal liberty"
on the existence of a
social contract but to the contrary
contended that humankind is naturally
sociable and endowed with the
right to personal liberty, the
right to work and consequently the
right to property, and that the
State is formed for the sole purpose
of guaranteeing these rights.
Locke said that the State was formed
because in nature there was no guarantee
to secure these rights. Similarly,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that
humankind was born good and was born
happy. He taught that the social
contract was "a postulate of
reason" and not an historical
fact and explained how it came about:
For an instant, the individuals confer
all their rights (natural ones) to
the State which thereafter gives them
all back (civil rights) with the name
changed; by this novation or transformation,
the individuals have been assured
by the State of those rights by which
they already possessed by nature.” |
|
2.21
--Our form of government, comes
under the construct of Lockean “Social
Compact Theory.” It is a fact,
that neither Mr. Galluzzo, nor we
the people yield our sovereignty nor
rights to those whom rule over us,
in any branch of government; in any
way, shape or form.
|
|
2.22
–That these predicate rights
are fundamental in the light most
favorable to Mr. Galluzzo, are unqualified
and unalienable by and through the
concise rule of well-settled and established
law (of which Ohio Rule 75(N) and
R.C. §
3109.4, by Legislative design; abrogates).
This is overt violation of Mr. Galluzzo’s
substantive rights, as well as settled
foundational laws and birthrights
of men and father’s everywhere:
"That no man, from henceforth,
shall be attached by any accusation,
nor forejudged of life or limb, nor
his land, tenements, goods, nor chattels,
seized into the kind's hands against
the form of the Great Charter, and
the law of the land." --St. 5
Edward III., Cp. 9 (1331) TA \l "St.
5 Edward III., Cp. 9 (1331)"
\s "St. 5 Edward III., Cp. 9
(1331)" \c 2
"Whereas it is contained in the
Great Chapter of the franchises of
England, that none shall be imprisoned,
nor put out of his freehold, nor of
his franchises, nor free customs,
unless it be by the law of the land;
it is accorded, assented, and established,
that from henceforth none shall be
taken by petition, or suggestion made
to our lord the king or to his council,
unless it be by indictment or presentment
of good and lawful people of the same
neighborhood where such deeds be done
in due manner, or by process made
by original writ at the common law;
nor that none be put out of his franchises,
nor of his freehold, unless he be
duly brought to answer, and forejudged
of the same by the course of the law;
and if anything be done against the
same, it shall be redress and holden
for none." St. 25 Edward
III., Ch4 (1350) TA \l "St.
25 Edward III., Ch4 (1350)"
\s "St. 25 Edward III., Ch4 (1350)"
\c 2
"That no man, of what estate
or condition that he be, shall be
put out of land or tenement, nor taken,
nor imprisoned, nor disinherited,
nor put to death, without being brought
in answer to due process of law."
St. 28 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1354)
"That no man be put to answer
without presentment before justices,
or matter of record, or by due process
and writ original, according to
the old law of the land.
And if anything from henceforth be
done to the contrary, it shall be
void in law, and holden for error."
St. 42 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1368) TA
\l "St.
42 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1368)"
\s "St. 42 Edward III., Ch. 3
(1368)" \c 2
The foregoing interpretation of the
words nisi per legem terrae--that
is, but due process of law--including
indictment, &c., has been adopted
as the true one by modern writers
and courts; as, for example, by Kent,
(2 Comm. 13,) Story, (3 Comm. 661)
and the Supreme Court of New York,
(19 Wendell, 676; 4 Hill, 146)
"A privilege which is couched
in almost the same words with that
of the Emperor Conrad two hundred
years before: 'nemo beneficium
suum perdat, nis secundum consuetudinem
antecssorum nostrorum, et judicium
parium suorum." (“No
one shall lose his estate unless according
to he custom of our ancestors, and
the judgments of his peers.”) --3
Blackstone, 350 TA \l "3
Blackstone,
350" \s "3 Blackstone,
350" \c 5
“It has even been said that the principle
was known before Magna [Charta] and
that it was originally designated
to secure the subject against arbitrary
action of the crown, and to place
[the citizen] under the protection
of the law. It is settled beyond
question that this principle came
from England to America as part of
the common law and has been a fundamental
rule in common law. When first
adopted in the Magna [Charta], the
phrase, “law of the land” had referenced
to the common and statute law then
existing in England; and when embodied
in constitutions in this country,
it referred to the same common law
as previously modified, and as far
as suited to the wants and conditions
of the people.” 16 Am. Jur.
2d, Constitutional Law,
Section 543 TA \l "16 Am. Jur.
2d, Constitutional Law,
Section 543" \s "16 Am.
Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Section
543" \c 5 .
|
|
2.23
–Please also judicially note
and place on the record, that by identity,
Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. §
3109.4 are both unconstitutional,
because it does not allow the people
to control it’s own government, (by
individual self-determination and
self-government) thereby, that is
a violation of the Constitution for
the United States, Article IV, Section
4:
|
|
LEGAL POINT 3:
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN. |
|
3.01
—The BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD is in fact, a test.
“…which
would trigger the best interest of
the children test.
XE "trigger the best
interest of the children test."
”
Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris
XE "Matter of Dickson v.
Lascaris" , 153 N.Y.2d
204; 207 TA \l "Matter
of Dickson v. Lascaris, 153
N.Y.2d 204; 207" \s "Matter
of Dickson v. Lascaris, 153 N.Y.2d
204; 207" \c 1 ; Op. Judge Cooke.
|
|
3.02
–It is a fact, that the State of Ohio,
has in fact, never undertaken this test,
nor applied it to Mr. Galluzzo, in accordance
with the concise rule of law. |
|
3.03
--This BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
“test” is well-settled and established
at law and is in consonance with Michael
A. Galluzzo’s substantive rights as
a father. This is in fact, the
declension of the Best Interests of
the Child test which is mandated at
law. This, in fact, is the Best
Interests of the Child “test”: |
|
BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD “TEST”
DECLINATION CHART XE "BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD \“TEST\”
DECLINATION CHART" XE "BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD \“TEST\” DECLINATION
CHART:Declination of persons who have
primary rights over state as parens
patriae" |
|
# |
ORDINATE
EVENT |
WHAT
PARENT |
CITE |
1 |
|
FATHER
(Could be mother in certain
instances, could be Grandfather,
grandmother, Uncle, etc.). “That
person to whom the family looks
to for guidance and support…” |
"Family" 'means in the
strict sense, a collective body
of persons in one house and under
one head manager, a household
including parents, children and
servants. In another sense,
family means brother and sister,
kindred, descendents of ONE common
progenitor." In re
Jessup, (1889) 81 C 408, 21 P.
972, 22 P.742, 1028, 6 LRA 594
TA \l "In re Jessup, (1889)
81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742,
1028, 6 LRA 594" \s "In
re Jessup, (1889) 81 C 408, 21
P. 972, 22 P.742, 1028, 6 LRA
594" \c 1 ; Bennett Estate
(1901) 134 C. 320, 66 P. 370 TA
\l "Bennett
Estate (1901) 134 C. 320, 66 P.
370" \s "Bennett
Estate (1901) 134 C. 320, 66 P.
370" \c 1 |
2 |
FATHER FIT-1st choice,
head of household under law.
“The petition in this case
fails to show that the children
have no father who was their
guardian, or that he was unfit
XE "unfit"
to have the care and custody
of his children…” Ferguson
v. Ferguson, et al (1865)
36 Mo. 197 TA \l "Ferguson
v. Ferguson, et al (1865)
36 Mo. 197" \s "Ferguson
v. Ferguson, et al (1865)
36 Mo. 197" \c 1
(Father) is “Dominant Parental
Right” doctrine XE "Dominant
Parental Right\”
doctrine:Vested in Father"
, and the case Newby, v. Newby,
55 C.A. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921)
TA \l "Newby, v. Newby,
55 C.A. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921)"
\s "Newby, v. Newby,
55 C.A. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921)"
\c 1 was the first case
to expound this doctrine. |
FATHER
NOTE: "The proof in
this case supports the trial court's
finding that the father is not
unfit XE "unfit"
to have custody, and that
he has developed a substantial
relationship with the child.
It shows that the child is in
no danger of substantial harm.
The father, therefore, has a fundamental
interest in parenting the child
which precludes (stops) a "best
interest" determination of
custody.” XE "Father present
precludes (stops) a \"best
interest\" determination
of custody.\”:Petrosky
v. Keene" Petrosky
v. Keene, 898 S.W.2d 726, at 728
(Tenn. 1995)[61]
TA \l "Petrosky v. Keene,
898 S.W.2d 726, at 728 (Tenn.
1995)" \s "Petrosky
v. Keene, 898 S.W.2d 726, at 728
(Tenn. 1995)" \c 1 |
“It is a well settled doctrine
of the common law, that the father
is entitled to the custody of
his minor children, as against
the mother and every body else;
that he is bound for their maintenance
and nurture, and has the corresponding
right to their obedience and their
services… 2 Story's Eq., secs.
1343-1350; 2 Kent's Com. 193;
1 Bl. Com. 453; Jenness v. Emerson,
15 N. H. 486; Huntoon v. Hazelton,
20 N. H. 389… that no court is
to disregard.”
SEE: State v. Richardson,
40 N.H. 272, 275 TA \s "State
v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275"
, 277. |
3 |
MOTHER FIT-2nd
choice.
(Mother)
is “Second Principle XE "Second
Principle:Vested in mothers"
” or “Maternal Preference” see
Cooke v. Cooke.
(Right of mother to custody of
children must be recognized next
to right of father. Waltham
v. Waltham, (1857) 1 Lab. 146
TA \l "Waltham v. Waltham,
(1857) 1 Lab. 146" \s "Waltham
v. Waltham, (1857) 1 Lab. 146"
\c 1 .) |
MOTHER
(Natural guardian of infant
of tender years doctrine XE
"tender years doctrine:In
J.B. v. A.B." )
In J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d
248 (W. Va. 1978) TA \l "In
J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248
(W. Va. 1978)" \s "In
J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248
(W. Va. 1978)" \c 1 , Justice
Richard Neely freely acknowledged
the maternal preference bias
of his Court in the following
terms:
"We
reject this [father's] argument
as it violates our rule that
a mother is the natural custodian
of children of tender years." |
“Although a thorough review of
the record brings us to the same
conclusion, we cannot stand mute
when faced with the wrongful application
of the "second principle"
or maternal preference.”
Cooke v. Cooke, 319 A.2d 841 (No.
757 1974) TA \l "Cooke v.
Cooke, 319 A.2d 841 (No. 757 1974)"
\s "Cooke v. Cooke, 319 A.2d
841 (No. 757 1974)" \c 1
“On death
of [father] parent court does
not have discretion in best
interests of child to award
custody to a party other than
surviving [mother] parent without
showing of abandonment of child,
cruel treatment of child, termination
of parental right by court of
competent jurisdiction, unfitness,
or other grounds authorized
by law.” Bryant v. Wigley,
269 S.E.2d 418, 246 Ga. 155,
appeal after remand 277 S.E.2d
246, 247 Ga. 487.
“In a divorce
action the right of a mother
to custody of a minor child
is not superior to that of father
except that a child of tender
years should be given to mother,
other things being equal and
it appearing that such award
is for the best interest of
child.” Johnson v. Johnson,
(1946) 165 P. 2d 552, 72 C.A.2d
721 TA \l "Johnson v. Johnson,
(1946) 165 P. 2d 552, 72 C.A.2d
721" \s "Johnson v.
Johnson, (1946) 165 P. 2d 552,
72 C.A.2d 721" \c 1 . |
4 |
|
|
""The
"individual" may stand
upon "his Constitutional
Rights" as a CITIZEN.
He is entitled to carry on his
"private" business
in his own way. "His power
to contract is unlimited."
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
TA \s "Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43" at 89
(1906) TA \s "Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 at 89 (1906)"
|
5 |
AFFINITY
RULES
To the third
degree of consanguinity. |
GRANDPARENTS,
Brother’s, Sister’s, Uncles,
Etc. |
This is attempted in California
Welfare and Institutions Code
§§
361 et seq. (See 361.3 et seq.)
(Massive reading, very confusing). |
|
|
|
14 year old
child actor, making 2 million
a year, who lives alone, is
found to be emancipated by the
court and released into custody
thereto. |
|
CHILD NEEDS RESCUING!!!
“Positive Disqualification” |
STATE
HAS NOW MET THRESHOLD LEVEL
TO LAWFULLY INVOKE PARENS PATRIAE |
CHILD NEEDS RESCUING!!!!
“Positive Disqualification” |
7 |
CHILD NEEDS
“RESCUING”
|
STATE
UNDER PARENS PATRIAE Finally
Meets:
Threshold
level
“Best Interests
of the Child ‘Test’”
(Now
state can “do” something).
a.)
Child must be incompetent.
b.)
Parents must be incompetent
or unfit. (e.g. “Postive Disqualification”)
c.)
Parens Patriae XE "Parens
Patriae" only used
as a reluctant and last resort. |
“Hence a
statute authorizing courts a
and magistrates to award to
the overseers of the poor the
custody of children found to
be neglected by their parents
and growing up without education
or salutary control, and in
circumstances exposing them
to lead idle or dissolute lives,
is held to be constitutional:
Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass.
203; 55 Am.Rep. 452 TA \l "Farnham
v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203; 55
Am.Rep. 452" \s
"Farnham v. Pierce, 141
Mass. 203; 55 Am.Rep. 452"
\c 1 ; it is a provision by
the commonwealth, as parens
patriae, for the custody and
care of neglected children,
and it is intended only to supply
to them the parental custody
which they have lost: Id.
Brooke v. Logan, 112 Indiana
183 (1877) TA \s "Brooke
v. Logan, 112 Indiana 183 (1877)"
|
|
|
3.04
–It is in fact, not in the Child’s
Best Interests, to place the State of
Ohio’s statutory authority, over
the rights of the Father.
(See the attached 2005 FRFS, in total).
See: “In the end, any determination
of child custody must be based upon
what is in the best interest of the
child and what will best promote his
or her welfare and happiness.”
In the Matter of Ronald F. v.
Lawrence G., 694 N.Y.S.2d 622,
624, 181 Misc.2d 760 (Fam.Ct., Kings
County 1999) TA \l "In
the Matter of Ronald F. v. Lawrence
G.,
694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624, 181 Misc.2d 760
(Fam.Ct., Kings County 1999)"
\s "In the Matter of Ronald F.
v. Lawrence G., 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624,
181 Misc.2d 760 (Fam.Ct., Kings County
1999)" \c 1 (Jeffrey S. Sunshine,
J.). This is the real constitutional
perversion of Ohio R.C. §
3109.4, is in that it places the judge
over the father, and is a malicious
instrument to overturn settled natural,
and common law rights of Michael A.
Galluzzo, as well as his children’s
rights. |
|
LEGAL
POINT 4: PARENS PATRIAE,
TRUSTS, AND GOVERNMENT AGENCY |
|
4.01
–As we have already proven,
that it is a legal fact, that Parens
Patriae is a subordinate doctrine to
the legal rights of the father, Michael
A. Galluzzo. |
|
4.02
--That without a “positive
disqualification” from the Father, Michael
A. Galluzzo; the state, in fact, must
subordinate itself to the “Best Interest
of the Child Test” and under Petrosky,
(Id.), that once the father is
found, or found to be fit, the Best
Interest of the Child test stops right
then and there. The law in fact,
supports fatherhood—and that is the
settled law on this matter, and no other. |
|
4.03
–Whereas, the State of Ohio,
in invoking Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C.
§
3109.4, is operating under a theory
of Legislative law, or of agency,
unknown to our form of government, as
positively declared under the Constitution
of Ohio, 1802. That it is a fact,
that Michael A. Galluzzo, has no comprehension
of the existence of a trust, nor the
nature and cause of any judicial discretion
used to overturn his rights and privileges
as a father, that supercedes his natural
born and common law rights as a father.
Whereas, if in fact, there is no meeting
of the minds between Michael A. Galluzzo,
and the State of Ohio, then; any “trust”
or “public trust” or “parens patriae”
trust, is immediately dissolved by the
interests of that trust being divergent
and not settled. Whereas, any
establishment of any existence of a
public trust being invoked by the State
of Ohio, under Rule 75(N) and R.C. §
3109.4; is at the instant of separate,
or incompatible interests—that trust
is dissolved. |
|
4.04
–That there is in fact, a theology
promulgated by Feminists, Socialists,
and the courts, that there is a basic
flaw in American Capitalism, and that
FDR’s “New Deal” was a emergency condition,
to rectify that failure through the
advent of absolutist Administrative
Procedures, which in fact under this
political theory, due to the ‘emergency’,
allows the panoply of state agency Administrative
Decisions to overcome Constitutional
analysis itself: |
|
[T]he
Constitution itself imposes a requirement
that the person challenging agency
action have “standing.” In short,
this means that the person has suffered
(or is about to suffer) injury as
a result of the government action
and that a favorable court decision
can redress (or prevent) the injury.
The [Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)] imposes an additional statutory
requirement on the general requirement
when a person is challenging agency
action under the APA. The APA
creates a legal right to review for
persons “suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute,”
id. § 702. Thus, the person
suing must either be suffering a “legal
wrong” or be adversely affected “within
the meaning of a relevant statute.”
Chapter 5 discusses in detail the
doctrines that restrict access to
he courts to obtain judicial review
of agency action.
If
a court undertakes judicial review,
it must determine what scope of review
to apply. The APA contains three
standards of review of agency action
that establish a continuum raging
from no deference to almost complete
deference. The “de novo” standard
instructs a court to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.
Under this test, the court must agree
with the agency decision in order
to uphold it. The “substantial
evidence” standard instructs a court
to uphold a decision if it is “reasonable.”
Under this test, the court need not
agree with the agency’s conclusion
to affirm it; it only needs to find
that the agency’s conclusions are
reasonable ones. Finally, the
“arbitrary and capricious” or “abuse
of discretion” standards instruct
a court to affirm a decision unless
the judges can say that the decision
is “arbitrary.” The last standard
historically has been considered the
most deferential, although most courts
no longer find any practical difference
between the last two standards in
light of intervening judicial decisions.
1.
Passage of the APA was the
result of a decade long political
battle between the friends and foes
fo the New Deal. From the perspective
of today’s highly regulated society,
it is difficult to understand the
threat that the Roosevelt administration
posed for the business and legal communities.
Because the New Deal was extraordinary
for its time in the degree of intrusion
on private autonomy and in its promise
that the capitalistic market system
was fundamentally flawed, many business
and legal leaders were extremely
hostile.
Their criticism made little impression
on a public still reeling from the
worst depression in the history of
the country, but as economic conditions
slowly improved, the momentum for
procedural reform picked up steam.
In 1939 , Congress passed the Walter
Logan Bill, which was based on an
American Bar Association proposal.
Denounced as “so rigid, as needlessly
interfering as to bring about a crippling
of the administrative process,” id.
At 272, the bill was vetoed by President
Roosevelt. The political
tide was turned by an influential
report issued by the Attorney General
which endorsed a more flexible administrative
procedure set.
After war induced delay, Congress
passed the Administrative Procedure
Act [APA] in 1946.
2.
“Professor Martin Shapiro argues
that the APA was a compromise between
supporters and opponents of the New
Deal. He explains that the adjudicatory
procedures where “weighted heavily”
in favor of the opponents, but rulemaking
“constituted an almost total victory
for the liberal New Deal forces.”
3.
…Congress has required
some agencies to engaged in “hybrid”
rulemaking, which obligates an agency
to comply with procedures in addition
to those required for informal rulemaking.
Such additional procedures have been
criticized as unnecessary and too
slow. See, e.g. Barry Boyer,
Trade Regulation Procedure of the
Federal Trade Commission, in
1980 Administrative Conference of
the United States Recommendations
and Reports 33, 124-127. |
|
Whereas,
the result of this new “Village” Feminist
Jurisprudence and Marxist Jurisprudence
inflected by the courts are currently
being implementing against Mr. Galluzzo
by Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. §
3109.4 has been well-documented and
understood by this court:
"The
idea prevails with some -- indeed,
it found expression in arguments at
the bar -- that we have in this country
substantially and practically two
national governments; one, to be maintained
under the Constitution, with all of
its restrictions; the other to be
maintained by Congress outside and
independently of that instrument,
by exercising such powers as other
nations of the earth are accustomed
to exercise.
"I
take leave to say that if the principles
thus announced should ever receive
the sanction of a majority of this
court, a radical and mischievous change
in our system of government will be
the result. We will, in that event,
pass from the era of constitutional
liberty guarded and protected by a
written constitution into an era of
legislative absolutism.
"It
will be an evil day for American liberty
if the theory of a government outside
of the supreme law of the land finds
lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence.
No higher duty rests upon this court
than to exert its full authority to
prevent all violation of the principles
of the Constitution." See Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
TA \l "Downes
v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901)" \s
"Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901)" \c 1 ,
Harlan dissenting. |
|
4.05
–There is also a “Village” theology
rampant which declares that the Father
no longer “own’s” his own children—that
in fact, the “state” now owns the children,
and that the state ‘bestows’ a “temporary
trust” within the parents, which can
be abrogated at any time. We have
already settled law which declares this
idea repugnant to American ideals and
traditions. |
|
4.06
–The law is clear: the judge
cannot split the children. This
is well-settled law and established
precedent understood from the time
of Christianity, onwards:
Trying
to split children
Here be two maximes of the common
law. First, that no man can hold one
and the same land immediately of two
severall lords. Secondly, that one
man cannot of the same land be both
lord and tenant. And it is to be observed,
that it is holden for an inconvenience,
that any of the maximes of the law
should be broken, though a private
man suffer losse; for that by infringing
of a maxime, not onely a generall
prejudice to many, but in the end
a publike incertainty and confusion
to all would follow. Section 152b.
[Maxim’s
of Lord Coke] TA \l "Section
152b. [Maxim’s
of Lord Coke]" \s "Section
152b. [Maxim’s of Lord Coke]"
\c 8
That either the Father owns the child,
and has the qualified common law right
to determine where his children will
be domiciled:
4.07
–The Ohio Courts, under R.C.
§
3109.4, believe in the feminist doctrine,
that parents do not own their children,
and the courts are inflecting Feminist
Jurisprudence to effect that oppressive
and failed political theology:
“Parents do not own their children.
They merely care for them in trust
for the rest of society. To
maximize healthy growth and development,
all children should grow up surrounded
by social relationships that are close,
personal, and enduring.
4.08
–Legends joins with Michael
A. Galluzzo, and states that there
is no such “emergency” exists in this
nation, and that in fact, FDR’s “New
Deal” and those agencies which serve
us, do not have delegation of authority
to supercede settled constitutional
mandate nor the individual rights
of a father. They factually
act as an overt fraud, under color
of law and under color of authority
to overthrow settled Constitutional
law. We also rebuke, by point
and authority, the idea that Capitalism
failed in this nation, and that there
is an “emergency” or “exigency” of
some national scale which allows the
aegis of Administrative practice,
policy or procedure to overthrow Constitutional
law.
One man who tried to warn the people
back in the 1930's not to allow the
federal government to expand its powers
without constitutional amendment was
Herbert Hoover, the 31st President
of the United States. He openly stated
that the New Deal was a philosophy
of government that would end up destroying
liberty. He stated that if the socialist
policies of the New Deal were implemented
that "this will not be the America
which we have known in the past."
Mr. Hoover also pointed out that all
the alternative philosophies of government
such as socialism, fascism, naziism,
communism, etc, had one thing in common.
He stated that: "They all have
in common the idea of the servitude
of the individual to the state, and
the denial of liberties unassailable
by the state."
Fatherhood, that Mr. Galluzzo is attempting
to invoke over Ohio R.C. §
3109.4, is one of those unassailable
foundational liberties being overthrown
by the state by said revised code.
As Mr. Hoover and others have correctly
warned and adumbrated, “rule making”
by the offending Rule 75(N) and R.C.
§
3109.4, places states interests above
that of the individual father.
4.09
–Legends, stands ready to defend
what is erroneously referred to as
“old law” – and state factually—that
under law, Mr. Michael A. Galluzzo,
does in fact, own and control his
children; further, we exclaim that
the settled legal concept that the
state cannot intrude a foreign political
theology and failed political “social
engineering scheme”
upon Mr. Galluzzo, which factually:
destroys families and children, is
alien to the State of Ohio as well
as the Union of Several State’s settled
laws.
4.010
–Further, Legends factually
states with authority, that when courts
support feminism and women in their
efforts to create a socialist state,
that they are neither helping society,
nor are they helping children.
They are in fact, only destroying
father’s for profit and reward and
creating a Welfare state by an every
increasing artificial creation of
the Single Female Headed Household
(SFHH) home. Conversely, however;
supporting Fatherhood, does
not create Single Father
Headed Households (SFtHH); conversely,
when courts support fatherhood, all
any society obtains is strong families,
strong children, and a growing capitalist
society, with concomitant low
social pathology rates.
The following Maxim of Law is controlling:
Partus sequitur ventrem.”“The
offspring follow the condition of
the mother. This is the law
in the case of slaves and animals;
1 Bouviers Institutes n. 167,
502; but with regard to freemen,
children follow the condition of the
father.”
4.011
–It is a fact, and Legends
defends and asserts and declares with
authority, the fact that every time
a judge uses “discretion” and awards
a mother a child against its father—that
judge is in fact, unconstitutionally
“creating the condition of slaves
and animals,” and enlarging his Welfare
state. It is incontrovertible,
that those children whom he places
within the SFHH, chances of entering
the myriad of social pathology facts
and figures go up exponentially.
Whereas, all father’s are being asked
by a judge invoking “discretion” over
his foundational rights as a father,
is to enjoin with that judge in his,
and his children’s own destruction.
This violates the controlling Maxim
of Law; “No man is required to
participate in his own destruction.”
CONCLUSION:
Mr. Galluzzo is eminently correct
in that Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. §
3109.4 design and effect is to undermine
and subrogate his natural born and
common law rights as a father.
As denoted earlier, this is an identity
that the offending code is in fact,
unconstitutional and outside the concise
rule of law, thereby, null and void,
in ab initio, and therefore,
it must be summarily overturned and
found to be unconstitutional and not
in consonance to the Constitution
of Ohio, 1802; nor the Constitution
for the United States,1787-1791.
"So the legislature may from
time to time, alter or change the
remedy, this may do, provided they
do not materially affect the right.
But whenever the Legislature so far
alter the remedy as to impede, destroy,
change, or render the right scarcely
worth pursuing, They necessarily
impair the obligation of the contract
upon which such right is founded
and the act is unconstitutional
and void XE "act
is unconstitutional and void:Legislature
cannot affect right: Smith v. Morse"
." Smith v. Morse
2 Cal. 524 (1852) (1924) TA \l "Smith
v. Morse 2 Cal. 524 (1852)
(1924)" \s "Smith v. Morse
2 Cal. 524 (1852) (1924)" \c
1
Whereas, the applied statute, read
in the light of Mr. Galluzzo’s rights
as a father, fails miserably.
In fact, the statute only “controlling
state interest” is designed to subrogate
and diminish the rights of fatherhood:
"That if a statute
is part of an unlawful scheme
XE "statute is part of an
unlawful scheme:must fail; McCallen
v. Massachusetts" to
reach a prohibited result...the
statute must fail..."
McCallen v. Massachusetts,
27 U.S. 620, 630 TA \l "McCallen
v. Massachusetts, 27 U.S.
620, 630" \s "McCallen v.
Massachusetts, 27 U.S. 620, 630"
\c 1
"If a law has no other purpose
than to chill assertion of constitutional
rights XE "law has no other
purpose than to chill assertion
of constitutional rights:void,
Shapiro v. Thompson" by
penalizing those who choose to exercise
them, it is patently unconstitutional."
Shapiro v. Thompson,
89 S.Ct. 1322, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d
600 (1969). TA \l "Shapiro
v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322,
394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)."
\s "Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct.
1322, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600
(1969)." \c 1
“No state shall convert a liberty
into a privilege, license it XE
"convert a liberty into a
privilege, license it:Murdock
v. Penn." ,
and attach a fee to it.
“ Murdock v. Penn.,
319 U.S. 105 TA \l "Murdock
v. Penn., 319 U.S. 105"
\s "Murdock v. Penn., 319
U.S. 105" \c 1
Note the reiteration of law that addresses
this here: TA \l "Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516"
\s "Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516" \c 1
"The Court has held that the
deprivation of fundamental liberty
rights XE "deprivation
of fundamental liberty rights:Elrod
v. Burns" "for
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury."
Elrod v. Burns, 96 S.Ct.
2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976).
TA \l "Elrod v. Burns,
96 S.Ct. 2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976)."
\s "Elrod v. Burns, 96 S.Ct.
2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976)."
\c 1
"If the legislature clearly misinterprets
a constitutional provision, the frequent
repetition of the wrong will
not create a right XE "wrong
will not create a right:Amos
v. Mosley" ." Amos
v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77
So. 619 TA \l "Amos v.
Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So.
619" \s "Amos v. Mosley,
74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619" \c 1
.
It is a fact, that the state vests
its authority to take away and diminish
the rights of property against Mr.
Galluzzo, by and through Ohio R.C.
§ 3109.4. Yet, the state never
considers the unlawful takings of
property against Mr. Galluzzo’s children,
who, by law, are to receive a natural
guardian at law vested in their father.
He is not only the natural guardian,
but he is also the child’s mentor;
he is the child’s Master, there to
give it a trade if need be; he is
the child’s legal consultant; he is
in fact, the moral and religious teacher
of the child;
[The] Third Amendment prohibition
against unconsented peacetime quartering
of soldiers protects one aspect of
privacy from governmental intrusion…The
protection of a person’s general right
to privacy, that is, his right to
be let alone by other people, is,
like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely
to the law of the individual states.
Katz v. U.S., 88 S.Ct.
507, 387 U.S. 347 (1967) TA \l "Katz
v. U.S., 88 S.Ct. 507, 387
U.S. 347 (1967)" \s "Katz
v. U.S., 88 S.Ct. 507, 387 U.S. 347
(1967)" \c 1 . TA \l "Degregory
v. Attorney General of State of N.H,
86 S.Ct. 1148, 383 U.S. 825, 16 L.Ed.2d
202." \s "Degregory v. Attorney
General of State of N.H, 86 S.Ct.
1148, 383 U.S. 825, 16 L.Ed.2d 202."
\c 1
"Congress of course acts
in the context of existing common-law
rules XE "Congress of course
acts in the context of existing common-law
rules:Heydon's Case" , and in
construing a statute a court considers
the "common law before the making
of the Act." Heydon's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 637(Ex. 1584) TA \l "Heydon's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 637(Ex. 1584)" \s "Heydon's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep.
637(Ex. 1584)" \c 1 Pierson,
Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967)
386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 288 TA \l "Pierson,
Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967)
386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 288" \s "Pierson,
Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S.
547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d
288" \c 1
"It is said that these constitutional
provisions do not mean the general
body of the law as it was at the time
the constitution took effect; but
they refer to certain fundamental
rights which the system of jurisprudence
of which ours is derivative has always
been recognized; if any of these are
disregarded in the processing by which
a person is condemned to the loss
of property, etc., then the deprivation
has not been by due process of law.
And it has been held that the state
cannot deprive a person of his property
without due process of law through
a constitution convention anymore
than it can through an act of the
legislature." In Brown
v. Leveee com'rs, 50 Miss
479 TA \l "In Brown v.
Leveee com'rs, 50 Miss 479"
\s "In Brown v. Leveee com'rs,
50 Miss 479" \c 1 ,
It is a fact, that the Respondent’s,
and their surrogate courts;
by and through their premeditated,
willful and overt acts and/or omissions
implemented by and through Ohio R.C.
§
3109.4, as well as United States Code,
Title 42 U.S.C. §§
651-666 and other “Welfare” transfer
of wealth, scams and/or schemes, that
they are directly responsible for
this societies massive divorce rates;
as well as explosive creation of Single
Female Headed Household’s; as well
as its attendant social pathologies
that largely effect children; which
all tend to increase respondent’s
and their surrogate courts and governments,
respective empires, by and through
the needless disenfranchisement of
Father’s Rights.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1.)
Legends Legal Aid Society,
Inc., comes before this solemn judicial
powers court in good faith with no
bad faith against any party.
2.)
That Legends Legal Aid Society,
Inc., comes before this court and
Almighty God seeking substantive justice
by Amicus Curiae relief for
Michael A. Galluzzo and similarly
situated fathers, everywhere.
3.)
That Legends joins with Mr.
Galluzzo, in stating the law contained
herein; and declares that Michael
A. Galluzzo is in fact, an Ohio State
Citizen, a Father w ith substantive
rights under the law; and, that Ohio
Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 are in
fact, unconstitutionally removing
and impeding those rights, privileges
and secured liberties from Mr. Galluzzo
by and through placing the state,
over him invoking some ‘superior’
Parens Patriae authority which
is in fact, outside the rule of law,
and invoked under color of law and
under color of authority.
4.)
Legends demands that
this court, find for Mr. Galluzzo
in his entirety, and further,
5.)
That Legends demands
that this court find that Mr. Galluzzo,
does in fact, own his own children,
in accordance with law.
6.)
Legends requests that
the offending Ohio Rule 75(N) and
R.C. § 3109.4 be struck down and publicly
excoriated and declared as being UNCONSTITUTIONAL
by this court and so publicly proclaimed.
7.)
That Legends also request
this court find that the State of
Ohio, by and through implementing
Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 against
Mr. Galluzzo and his family, that
it find that an “unlawful takings”
of property has in fact, occurred
against Mr. Galluzzo and his family.
8.)
That if this court does
not find for Mr. Galluzzo, that it
remit a written FINDINGS OF FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and a written
STATEMENT OF DECISION, showing the
concise rule of law decided by this
court, which is in consonance with
the Constitution for the United States
1787-1791 within fifteen (15) days
of its judicial determination.
9.)
That Legends request
that this court remit to Mr. Galluzzo,
any other further remedy, justice,
or relief, or redress of grievances,
that it deems fair, just and proper.
10.) |
Dated:
August 20, 2005
SEAL:
|
Robert
Lindsay Cheney Jr.
Founder
Legends
Legal Aid, Inc.
8837-A
Skyway
Paradise,
California [95969]
530-872-4636 |
|
|
VERIFICATION |
|
County of Butte
]
] ss.
State of California
] |
|
I,
Robert Lindsay Cheney Jr., being the
undersigned, declare under penalty
of perjury as follows:
That the afore-going Amicus
Curiae Brief, including referenced
and/or attached documents, and/or
duplicates of such documents are exacting
copies of the originals in my/or my
counsel’s (specifically not American
Bar Association, or professional “Attorney’s”)
possession. That I have read
the foregoing document(s) and attachments,
and know and understand their contents,
and having personal knowledge of them,
know them to be true. As to
those matters submitted therein upon
information and/or belief, as to those
matters, I also believe them true.
Executed
this August 25, 2005, in the Year
of Our Lord and Savior Jesus the Christ
Two-Thousand-Five. |
|
SEAL:
_____________________________
Robert Lindsay Cheney Jr.– AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Butte County Judicial District
8837-A Skyway
Paradise,
California 95969
530-872-4477
|
|
SUBSCRIPTION |
|
Subscribed
this 25th day of August,
under exigent circumstances, before
Almighty God, in the Year of Our Lord
and Savior, Jesus the Christ, Two-Thousand-Five.
SEAL:
_____________________________
Robert Lindsay Cheney Jr. – AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
Reserving All Rights, Giving Up None |
|
UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CINCINNATI, OHIO |
August Term |
|
Michael
A. Galluzzo,
Real Party of Interest,
Against,
CHAMPAIGN
COUNTY, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,
et als;
______________________________________________ |
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
] |
Case No.: 04-3527 MERGEFIELD
CTCaseNo
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
AFFIDAVIT AND DECLARATION
OF PROOF OF SERVICE
[CCP § 1013 and §
2015.5] |
|
|
I,
the undersigned server, hereby certify
and declare that I am over the age
of 18 years, and not a party to the
within entitled cause of action; and,
Further, hereby deposes and says:
that on the date signed below, I did
serve UNDER AUTHORITY OF APPELLANT/PETITIONER
the attached document named:
1.) AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF
LEGENDS LEGAL AID SOCIETY
70 Pages
|
|
____________________________________________________________________
TYPE The aforesaid documents were
served in the following manner: |
|
A |
By personal HAND service to
NAMED PARTY. I did personally
deliver the above-described
documents at the address, or
addresses captioned below: |
B |
By
the U.S. Postal Service MAIL
having knowledge of the United
States Mail Post
paid certified envelope, sealed
by my hand at PARADISE, CALIFORNIA
|
C |
By the U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED
MAIL having knowledge of the
United States CERTIFIED Mail
Post paid certified envelope,
sealed by my hand at PARADISE,
CALIFORNIA; Certified Number
_________________________________ |
D |
By phone communication transmission
[FAX], the material aforementioned
on-line was sent at a total
of ______ transmitted pages
to Tel.#(
) -
|
E |
OTHER: |
F |
NOT SERVED AT ALL: |
|
|
Michael A. Galluzzo
P.O. Box 710
St. Paris, OH. 43072
937-663-4505
Service Type |
C (Certified) |
|
Sanford H. Flack, Esq.
Flack & Mayhall
101 N. Fountain Avenue
Springfield, OH 45502
Counsel for Teresa A. Cook
(fka Galluzzo)
|
Stanley Charles Thorne
P.O. Box 50787
Amarillo, TX. 79159
713-444-*98/
|
Jack W. Whitesell Jr.
Champaign County Prosecutor
00 N. Main Street
Urbana, OH 43078
|
Elise W. Porter
Office of the Atty. Gen. Of
Ohio
30 E. Broad Street
17th Floor State
Office
Columbus, OH. 43215-3428
Service Type |
C (Certified) |
|
Teresa A. Cook
5569 Runkle Road
St. Paris, OH 43072
|
Michael Varble
P.O. Box 485
Shoreham, NY 11786
|
United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
100 East Fifth Street, Room
532
Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouse
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3988
513-564-7022
Service Type |
C (Certified) |
|
Families in Transition (FIT)
Dr. Steven J. Walker, Phd.
BURKE PROBITSKY, ESQ.
New York Bar #053243834
330 Motor Parkway, Suite 201
Happauge, New York 11788
631-231-0700
|
Bill Woods, Amicus Curiae, Pro
se
6220 Lake Providence Lane
Charlotte, N.C. 28277
704-905-5175
|
|
|
|
|
Further, I declare under penalty of
perjury knowing the laws thereof within
the State of California that the foregoing
is true and correct and that these documents
were served by me personally as stated
above and/or mailed and sealed as stated
above within the California Republic. |
|
DATED:
August ____, 2005
______________________________________
______AM/PM Name:
Frederick-Earl-By Lawful Service
City/State:
Paradise California
|
|
To escape this tyranny, Patriarchy created
the Feme Sole woman, who had
legal rights exactly conditioned upon
any individual man’s rights. It
was only in the institution of marriage,
where women came under “coverture”—e.g.
“legal protection of the husband” (see
legal definition of “Family” denoted
below)--which is still in existence
today, under the Doctrines of Child
Support and Alimony, which are Patriarchal
institutions (not state nor Matriarchal
ones). These two items of Child
Support and Alimony allow coverture
after marriage. They are
in direct opposition to Feminism, which
claims that women are just as good as
men, (feme sole), are sexually and contractually
unregulated; and can do without men
and “make it anywhere.” Yet, both
the state, and feminists, cling to the
Patriarchal Institutions of Child Support
and Alimony with a vengeance.
These two institutions of Child Support
and Alimony, created by Patriarchy admit,
women and children are incompetent,
and cannot take care of themselves after
marriage, and that they need taking
care of. They are established
off of the benevolent Patriarchal premise
that a man accrues the benefit of being
Head of Household, and the leader of
his family, and because of that recognized
privilege, that the father is then obligated
to Child Support and Alimony.
However; Ohio R.C. §
3109.4 factually removes any and all
privileges from the Father, therefore,
under law, he does not, nor legally
cannot assume the burden of Child Support
or Alimony because of this. Oddly,
marriage, (which is a voluntary institution)
was not in fact, an abusive institution
as the feminist would have us believe—in
fact, women for millennium have chosen
that institution over that of being
feme sole. Either we live in a
society that agrees with Patriarchy,
and forces those men whom accrue the
benefit of being Head of Family with
the burden of taking care of that women
and child after divorce (under coverture);
or we live in a Feminized society, where
women are in fact, EQUAL and FREE and
can dissolve the marriage at will—and
therefore, they assume the burden of
maintaining their and their children’s
own lives after divorce, and do not
get Child Support nor Alimony.
The controlling maxim of law here is:
“He who accrues the benefit, assumes
the burden.” TA \l "\“He
who accrues the benefit, assumes the
burden.\”" \s "\"He
who accrues the benefit, assumes the
burden.\"" \c 8 We
either live in a structured Patriarchal
society, or a free and sexually unregulated
Feminized society—but we cannot live
in both. |
|
“But he is not bound, without some
agreement, to pay another for maintaining
them; 9 C. & P. 497; nor is he bound
to pay their debts, unless he has authorized
them to be contracted.” 38 E. C. L.
R. 195, n. See 8 Watts, R. 366 1 Craig.
& Phil. 317; Bind; Nother; Parent.
This obligation ceases as soon as the
child becomes of age, unless he becomes
chargeable to the public. 1 Ld. Ray.
699 TA \l "Bouviers Law Dictionary,
1856; 1 Ld. Ray. 699" \s "1
Ld. Ray. 699" \c 3 .—BOUVIERS LAW
DICTIONARY 1856 [FATHER] |
|
"Codes of this state were intended
to establish law of state respecting
subjects to which they relate, so that
it is only when code and other statutes
are silent that common law governs,
under Pol. C. §4468." Burlingame
v. Traeger (1929), 101 C.A.
365, 281 P. 1051 TA \l "Burlingame
v. Traeger
(1929), 101 C.A. 365, 281 P. 1051"
\s "Burlingame v. Traeger (1929),
101 C.A. 365, 281 P. 1051" \c 1
. |
|
It is in fact, Feminism, which Dr. Daniel
Amneus, in his “The Case for Father
Custody,” and his earlier work,
“The Garbage Generation TA \l
"The Garbage Generation, Dr.
Daniel Amneus" \s "The
Garbage Generation" \c 3 ”, correctly
denoted feminism and Matriarchy (of
which these family courts uphold) which
is the older, more backwards of the
two models. Other scholarship,
ranging from Anthropology to Social
Science, is replete with this understanding. |
|
"In 1988 divorces filed involving
families with children 64.9% were filed
by women, which is down from 71.4^ filed
by women in 1975; 28.8% were filed by
men, which is up from 25.6% in 1975;
and 6.3% were filed jointly, which is
up from 2.6% in 1975." Address
to the Commonwealth Club of California,
1992, Quoted in FACE, August 1992 TA
\l "Address to the Commonwealth
Club of California, 1992, Quoted
in FACE, August 1992" \s "Address
to the Commonwealth Club of California,
1992, Quoted in FACE, August 1992"
\c 3 . |
|
|
|
Reference: In re Jamie T.
Cited from:
“The right of a fit and proper parent
to his child's custody is somewhat
in the nature of a property right
XE "CHILD is property right:Turner
and Petrosky cases" \t "See
Best Interest of the Child \"test\""
, and is paramount,
in a sense, to the child's theoretical
welfare and best interests.”
Turner v. Turner (1959)
334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636 TA \l
"Turner v. Turner
(1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636"
\s "Turner v. Turner (1959) 334
P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636" \c
1 |
|
As openly admitted by U.S.
v. Faasse,
265 F.3d 475, 489 (6th Cir. 2001)
(en banc).
From: Black’s Law Dictionary,
Third Ed., ã
1933, West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn. P. 753. [Pertinent parts quoted.]
See: In re Jessup, (1889)
81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742, 1028
TA \l "In re Jessup,
(1889) 81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742,
1028" \s "In re Jessup,
(1889) 81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742,
1028" \c 1 , 6 LRA 594; Bennett
Estate (1901) 134 C. 320,
66 P. 370 TA \l "Bennett
Estate (1901) 134 C. 320,
66 P. 370" \s "Bennett Estate
(1901) 134 C. 320, 66 P. 370"
\c 1 ----"Family" 'means
in the strict sense, a collective
body of persons in one house and under
one head manager, a household
including parents, children and servants.
In another sense, family means brother
and sister, kindred, descendents of
ONE common progenitor."
SEE ALSO: "Family"
as used in CCP §
690.11 concerning earnings exempt
from execution or attachment, means
a collection of persons living together
under ONE HEAD, under such
circumstances or conditions that the
head is under a legal or moral
obligation to support the other members,
and they are dependent upon him for
support. Lawson v. Lawson,
(1910) 158 C. 446, 111 P. 354] TA
\l "Lawson v. Lawson,
(1910) 158 C. 446, 111 P. 354]"
\s "Lawson v. Lawson, (1910)
158 C. 446, 111 P. 354]" \c 1
SEE: FAMILY XE "FAMILY"
, domestic relations. In a limited
sense it signifies the father, mother,
and children. In a more extensive
sense it comprehends all the individuals
who live under the authority
of another, and includes
the servants of the family. It is
also employed to signify all the relations
who descend from a common
ancestor, or who spring
from a common root.
Louis. Code, art. 3522, No. 16; 9
Ves. 323. – Bouvier’s Law Dictionary,
1856 ed. |
|
Long before Lord Hale declared that
Christianity was a part of the laws
of England, the Court of Kings Bench,
34 Eliz. in Ratcliff's case,
3 Coke Rep. 40, b. had gone so far
as to declare that "in almost
all cases, the common law was grounded
on the law of God, which it was
said was *causa causans*,"
and the court cited the 27th chapter
of Numbers, to show that their judgment
on a common law principle in regard
to the law of inheritance, was founded
on God's revelation of that law
to Moses. State v.
Chandler, 2 Harr. 553 at
561 (1837)
Please judicially note and place
on the record, how fatherhood is
intrinsically supported in this
cited case Fanning
here.
|
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"We have little doubt that the
Due Process Clause XE "Due Process
Clause:Smith v. Org. of Foster Fam."
would be offended [i]f a State
were to attempt to force the break up
of a natural family, over the objections
of the parents XE "State force
the break up of a natural family, over
the objections of the parents:Violation
of Due Process of Law: Smith v. Org.
of Foster Fam." and their
children, without some showing of unfitness..."
Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
at 862-63 TA \l "Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977) at 862-63"
\s "Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) at 862-63"
\c 1 . |
|
[THE MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS
OF NEW YORK, Book 2, Delehanzy,
Judges of the Several Courts Reported
During the Period Covered by this
Volume, p. 94] Fanning
v. Fanning XE "Fanning
v. Fanning:courts will not
sully name of father" , 2 Misc
N.Y. 97 TA \l "Fanning
v. Fanning, 2 Misc N.Y.
97" \s "Fanning v. Fanning,
2 Misc N.Y. 97" \c 1
Note also: "The law
does not encourage divorce actions
XE "The law does not
encourage divorce actions:Schlemm
v. Schlemm" and regards
such actions as imposing special
responsibilities upon the court
and attorneys as officers of the
court because, in every divorce
action, State is in fact, if not
in name, third party having substantial
interest, and public is represented
by 'court's conscience'. In
re Backes, 16 N.J. 430,
433-34 (1954) TA \l "In
re Backes,
16 N.J. 430, 433-34 (1954)"
\s "In re Backes, 16 N.J. 430,
433-34 (1954)" \c 1 .
See also, Schlemm v. Schlemm,
31 N.J. 557, 585 (1960) TA
\l "Schlemm
v. Schlemm,
31 N.J. 557, 585 (1960)"
\s "Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31
N.J. 557, 585 (1960)" \c 1
.
E.g. “positive disqualification” or
“unfitness.”
e.g. “A positive disqualification”
committed by the father, which Mr.
Galluzzo has no such disqualification
against his own children.
The "Welfare of a child,
XE " Welfare of a child:Cannot
take chidl away from father, Starr
v. Gorman" XE " Welfare
of a child:cannot be taken
from father" " is
gauged by father's means and station
in life and does not contemplate that
child be taken from father because
another can give child more in a material
way. Starr v.
Gorman, 136 N.J.L. 105, 40
A.2d 564, 565 TA \l " Starr
v. Gorman, 136 N.J.L. 105,
40 A.2d 564, 565" \s "Starr
v. Gorman, 136 N.J.L. 105, 40 A.2d
564, 565" \c 1 . Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, ã
1891-1957, West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, Minn., p. 1765 TA \l "Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, ã
1891-1957, West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, Minn., p. 1765" \s "Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, ( 1891-1957,
West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.,
p. 1765" \c 3 . In other
words, other persons have no right
to intrude against a father using
“altruism” or “social engineering
schemes,” unless by actualization
of a “positive disqualification” committed
by the father against the child, which
does not exist in this matter.
|
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“To
institute or establish; to make
an ordinance; to enact a constitution
or law. Kepner v. Comm.,
40 Pa. 124
TA \l "Kepner
v. Comm.,
40 Pa. 124"
\s "Kepner v. Comm., 40 Pa.
124" \c 1 ;
U.S. v. Smith, 4 N.J.
Law 38
TA \l "U.S.
v. Smith,
4 N.J. Law 38"
\s "U.S. v. Smith, 4 N.J. Law
38" \c 1 ;
State v. Dallas City,
72 Or. 337, 143 P. 1127, 1131, Ann.
Cas. 1916B, 855
TA \l "State
v. Dallas City,
72 Or. 337, 143 P. 1127, 1131, Ann.
Cas. 1916B, 855"
\s "State v. Dallas City, 72
Or. 337, 143 P. 1127, 1131, Ann.
Cas. 1916B, 855" \c 1 .
GOD. From the Saxon
god, good. The source of all
good; the supreme being. 1.
Every man is presumed to believe
in God, and he who opposes
a witness on the ground of
his unbelief is bound to prove it.
3 Bouv. Inst. u. 3180 TA \l "3
Bouv. Inst. u. 3180" \s "3
Bouv. Inst. u. 3180" \c 3 .
James Madison XE "James
Madison" , Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments §11 (1785
TA \l "Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments
§11 1785" \s "Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments §11 (1785" \c 5
,
reprinted in Everson v. Board
of Education, 330, U.S.
1, 64 TA \l "Everson
v. Board of Education,
330, U.S. 1, 64" \s
"Everson v. Board of Education,
330, U.S. 1, 64" \c 1 )
Rutledge, J., dissenting. XE "."
1906
Decennial Edition of the American
Digest, A Complete Digest of all
Reported Cases from 1897 to 1906,
Vol. 4, Carriers to Contractors,
© 1908, West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, Mn. (4 Decen.Dig.
’06), p. 1431 TA \l "1906
Decennial Edition of the American
Digest, A Complete Digest of all
Reported Cases from 1897 to 1906,
Vol. 4, Carriers to Contractors,
© 1908, West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, Mn. (4 Decen.Dig.
’06), p. 1431" \s "1906
Decennial Edition of the American
Digest, A Complete Digest of all
Reported Cases from 1897 to 1906,
Vol. 4, Carriers to Contractors,
© 1908, West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, Mn. (4 Decen.Dig.
’06), p. 1431" \c 3 .
Andrews’ American Law, A Treatise
on the Jurisprudence, Constitution
and Laws of the United States,
by James DeWitt Andrews, © 1900
by Callahan and Co., Chicago,
State Journal Printing Co., Madison,
Wis., p. 243.
FOOTNOTE meaning stated by Blackstone
follows: “Quod naturalis
ratio inter omnes homines constituit,
vocatur jus gentium.”
That which natural reason has established
among all men is called the “law
of nations.” 1 Bl.Comm
TA \l "1
Bl.Comm" \s "1
Bl.Comm" \c 5 .
43; Dig. 1, 1, 9: Inst. 1, 2, 1.
From: Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th
Edition, ã
1968, West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn., p. 1419 TA \l "Black’s
Law Dictionary, 4th Edition,
ã
1968, West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn., p. 1419" \s "Black’s
Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, ( 1968,
West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.,
p. 1419" \c 3 From:
Tucker's Blackstone is Copyright
© 1997-2003, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,.BOOK THE
FIRST., Part Second, of the Nature
of Laws in General, by Sir William
Blackstone TA \l "Tucker's
Blackstone
is Copyright © 1997-2003, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,.BOOK
THE FIRST., Part Second, of the
Nature of Laws in General, by Sir
William Blackstone"
\s "Tucker's Blackstone is
Copyright © 1997-2003, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,.BOOK THE
FIRST., Part Second, of the Nature
of Laws in General, by Sir William
Blackstone" \c 3
.
|
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From: Frank J. Hogan, President,
American Bar Assn. (1939) TA \l
"Frank J. Hogan, President,
American Bar Assn. (1939)"
\s "Frank J. Hogan, President,
American Bar Assn. (1939)"
\c 3
Black Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition,
© 1933, West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, Minn. p. 1625 TA \l
"Black
Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, © 1933,
West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.
p. 1625" \s "Black
Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, © 1933,
West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.
p. 1625" \c 3 .
Accordingly, so long as a parent
adequately cares for his or her
children (i.e., is fit), there will
normally be no reason for the State
to inject itself into the private
realm of the family XE "Normally
be no reason for the State to inject
itself into the private realm of
the family:Troxel v. Granville"
to further question the ability
of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing
of that parent's children. See,
e.g., [Reno v. ]
Flores, 507 U. S. [292,] at
304 TA \l "Reno v. ] Flores,
507 U. S. [292,] at 304" \s
"Reno v. ] Flores, 507 U. S.
[292,] at 304" \c 1 .
Troxel et vir. v. Granville,
530 US 57, 67 (2000) TA \l "Troxel
et vir. v. Granville, 530 US
57, 67 (2000)" \s "Troxel
et vir. v. Granville, 530 US 57,
67 (2000)" \c 1
By and through “unlimited powers
of discretion” of the judge.
See; “A stranger XE "stranger:no
privilege to interfere" however,
has no general privilege of interference
for the protection of what he believes
to be anyone's welfare...in general,
the stranger interferes at
his peril, regardless of worthy
motives XE "stranger
interferes at his peril,
regardless of worthy motives:Grinberger
. Brotherton" .”
Grinberger v. Brotherton,
1933, 173 Wash. 292, 22 p.2D 983
TA \l "Grinberger v.
Brotherton, 1933, 173 Wash.
292, 22 p.2D 983" \s "Grinberger
v. Brotherton, 1933, 173 Wash. 292,
22 p.2D 983" \c 1 ; Warren
v. Graham, 1916, 174 Iowa
162, 156 N.W. 323 TA \l "Warren
v. Graham, 1916, 174 Iowa
162, 156 N.W. 323" \s "Warren
v. Graham, 1916, 174 Iowa 162, 156
N.W. 323" \c 1 .
THE STATUTORY TERM ANALYSIS (STA)
METHOD , by Vincent P. Tassinari
TA \l "THE
STATUTORY TERM ANALYSIS (STA) METHOD
, by Vincent P. Tassinari"
\s "THE STATUTORY TERM ANALYSIS
(STA) METHOD , by Vincent P. Tassinari"
\c 5
|
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“This Government…has certainly
some power to protect its own
Citizens XE "Government…has
certainly some power to protect
its own Citizens:Congressional
Globe, 39th Congress" in
their own country. Allegiance
and protection are reciprocal
rights.” -
Congressional Globe XE
"Congressional Globe"
,
39th Congress,
1st Session, at page
1757 (1866). TA \l "Congressional
Globe, 39th Congress,
1st Session, at page
1757 (1866)." \s "Congressional
Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session,
at page 1757 (1866)." \c
4
"The law has three distinct
purposes XE "law
has three distinct purposes:Theory
of the Common Law" :
1. To maintain the existence
and well-being of society.
2. To maintain the preserve
the person and property of each
individual member free from all
burdens which are not common to
every other member. 3. To
maintain and preserve the special
rights of each member, and also
of each member in relation to
property.” The
Theory of Common Law, by James
M. Walker XE "The
Theory of Common Law,
by James M. Walker"
Charleston,
S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1852, p. 22 TA
\l "The
Theory of Common Law,
by James M. Walker Charleston,
S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1852, p. 22"
\s "The Theory of Common
Law, by James M. Walker Charleston,
S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1852, p. 22" \c
5
“Other things being equal, the
claims of the Father to the custody
and control of his children are
superior to those of the mother
XE "claims of the Father
to the custody and control of
his children are superior to those
of the mother:Ex Parte Reed"
, but it is discretionary with
the court to which one of the
parents children shall be committed,
and, where they are under the
age of choice, the court will
exercise that discretion, looking
solely to the welfare and happiness
of the children.” Ex.
Parte Reed, 19 S.C. 604
TA \s "Ex. Parte Reed, 19
S.C. 604" .
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