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CASE
CITATION |
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From:
http://www.redressinc.org/CaseCitations.html |
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SUBJECTS:
Constitutional Rights, Corruption of
Authority, Dismissal of Suit, Equal
Protection Under Law, Government, Habeus
Corpus, Judicial Immunity, Jurisdiction,
Justice Department, Peaceful Assembly
(Demonstrations), Probable Cause, Pro
Se Rights/Lawyer Incompetence. |
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NOTE: We are not attorneys.
The cases cited herein were collected
through multiple sources such as media,
law libraries, etc., often by pro se
litigants, and serve as an educational
resource only. It is suggested
that full copies of the cited cases
be obtained and studied. These
cases are illustrative of situations
in which parties were fighting for their
legal rights in situations where their
rights were being illegally withheld
or attacked. |
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Redress, Inc. maintains a file on
each case cited. We are currently
in process of "shephardizing"
the cases; this means that portions
of some cases are "red-lined"
(a lot of it was overturned) or "yellow-lined"
(some of it was over-turned).
When this project is complete, we will
notate the information accordingly. |
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CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS: |
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Boyd v. United,
116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885) |
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Justice Bradley, "It may be that
it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in
that way; namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes
of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the security
of persons and property should be liberally
construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their
efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation
of the right, as if it consisted more
in sound than in substance. It
is the duty of the Courts to be watchful
for the Constitutional Rights of the
Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. Their motto should be
Obsta Principiis." |
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Downs v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901) |
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"It will be an evil day for American
Liberty if the theory of a government
outside supreme law finds lodgement
in our constitutional jurisprudence.
No higher duty rests upon this Court
than to exert its full authority to
prevent all violations of the principles
of the Constitution." |
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Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 155 (1966), cited also in Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.644 |
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"Constitutional 'rights'
would be of little value if they could
be indirectly denied." |
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Juliard v. Greeman,
110 U.S. 421 (1884) |
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Supreme Court Justice Field, "There
is no such thing as a power of inherent
sovereignty in the government of the
United States... In this country, sovereignty
resides in the people, and Congress
can exercise power which they have not,
by their Constitution, entrusted to
it. All else is withheld." |
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Mallowy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 |
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"All rights and safeguards contained
in the first eight amendments to the
federal Constitution are equally applicable." |
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Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 426, 491; 86 S. Ct. 1603 |
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"Where rights secured by the
Constitution are involved, there can
be no 'rule making' or legislation which
would abrogate them." |
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Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425 p. 442 |
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"An unconstitutional act is not
law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is in legal contemplation,
as inoperative as though it had never
been passed." |
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Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44, 7; 8 S. Ct. 568, 2 L. Ed.
2d 603 (1958) |
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"...in our country the people
are sovereign and the government cannot
sever its relationship to them by taking
away their citizenship." |
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Sherar v. Cullen,
481 F. 2d 946 (1973) |
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"There can be no sanction or
penalty imposed upon one because of
his exercise of constitutional rights." |
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Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) |
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"The claim and exercise of a
Constitution right cannot be converted
into a crime"... "a denial
of them would be a denial of due process
of law". |
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Warnock v. Pecos
County, Texas., 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir.
1996) |
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Eleventh Amendment does not protect
state officials from claims for prospective
relief when it is alleged that state
officials acted in violation of federal
law. |
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CORRUPTION
OF AUTHORITY: |
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Burton v. United
States, 202 U.S. 344, 26 S. Ct. 688
50 L.Ed 1057 |
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United States Senator convicted of,
among other things, bribery. |
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Butz v. Economou,
98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); United States
v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S. Ct. at
261 (1882) |
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"No man [or woman] in this country
is so high that he is above the law.
No officer of the law may set that law
at defiance with impunity. All
the officers of the government from
the highest to the lowest, are creatures
of the law, and are bound to obey it." |
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*Cannon v. Commission
on Judicial Qualifications, (1975) 14
Cal. 3d 678, 694 |
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Acts in excess of judicial authority
constitutes misconduct, particularly
where a judge deliberately disregards
the requirements of fairness and due
process. |
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*Geiler v. Commission
on Judicial Qualifications, (1973) 10
Cal.3d 270, 286 |
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Society's commitment to institutional
justice requires that judges be solicitous
of the rights of persons who come before
the court. |
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*Gonzalez v. Commission
on Judicial Performance, (1983) 33 Cal.
3d 359, 371, 374 |
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Acts in excess of judicial authority
constitutes misconduct, particularly
where a judge deliberately disregards
the requirements of fairness and due
process. |
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Olmstad v. United
States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438 |
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"Crime is contagious. If
the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy." |
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Owen v. City of
Independence |
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"The innocent individual who
is harmed by an abuse of governmental
authority is assured that he will be
compensated for his injury." |
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Perry v. United
States, 204 U.S. 330, 358 |
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"I do not understand the government
to contend that it is any less bound
by the obligation than a private individual
would be..." "It is
not the function of our government to
keep the citizen from falling into error;
it is the function of the citizen to
keep the government from falling into
error." |
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*Ryan v. Commission
on Judicial Performance, (1988) 45 Cal.
3d 518, 533 |
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Before sending a person to jail for
contempt or imposing a fine, judges
are required to provide due process
of law, including strict adherence to
the procedural requirements contained
in the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ignorance of these procedures is not
a mitigating but an aggravating factor. |
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U.S. v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261,
27 L. Ed 171 (1882) |
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"No man in this
country is so high that he is above
the law. No officer of the law
may set that law at defiance, with
impunity. All the officers of
the government, from the highest to
the lowest, are creatures of the law
are bound to obey it."
"It is the only supreme
power in our system of government,
and every man who, by accepting office
participates in its functions, is
only the more strongly bound to submit
to that supremacy, and to observe
the limitations which it imposes on
the exercise of the authority which
it gives." |
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Warnock v. Pecos
County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir.
1996) |
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Eleventh Amendment does not protect
state officials from claims for prospective
relief when it is alleged that state
officials acted in violation of federal
law. |
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DISMISSAL
OF SUIT: |
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Note: [Copied verbiage; we
are not lawyers.] It can be
argued that to dismiss a civil rights
action or other lawsuit in which a
serious factual pattern or allegation
of a cause of action has been made
would itself be violating of procedural
due process as it would deprive a
pro se litigant of equal protection
of the law vis a vis a party who is
represented by counsel.
Also, see Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 60 - Relief from Judgment
or Order (a) Clerical Mistakes and
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. |
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Warnock v. Pecos
County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir.
1996) |
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Eleventh Amendment does not protect
state officials from claims for prospective
relief when it is alleged that state
officials acted in violation of federal
law. |
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Walter Process Equipment
v. Food Machinery, 382 U.S. 172 (1965) |
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... in a "motion to dismiss,
the material allegations of the complaint
are taken as admitted". From
this vantage point, courts are reluctant
to dismiss complaints unless it appears
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief (see Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). |
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EQUAL
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW |
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Cochran v. Kansas,
316 U.S. 255, 257-258 (1942) |
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"However inept Cochran's choice
of words, he has set out allegations
supported by affidavits, and nowhere
denied, that Kansas refused him privileges
of appeal which it afforded to others.
*** The State properly concedes
that if the alleged facts pertaining
to the suppression of Cochran's appeal
were disclosed as being true, ... there
would be no question but that there
was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." |
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Duncan v. Missouri,
152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894) |
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Due process of law and the equal protection
of the laws are secured if the laws
operate on all alike, and do not subject
the individual to an arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government." |
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Giozza v. Tiernan,
148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893), Citations
Omitted |
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"Undoubtedly it (the Fourteenth
Amendment) forbids any arbitrary deprivation
of life, liberty or property, and secures
equal protection to all under like circumstances
in the enjoyment of their rights...
It is enough that there is no discrimination
in favor of one as against another of
the same class. ...And due process
of law within the meaning of the [Fifth
and Fourteenth] amendment is secured
if the laws operate on all alike, and
do not subject the individual to an
arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government." |
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Kentucky Railroad
Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 337 (1885) |
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"The rule of equality... requires
the same means and methods to be applied
impartially to all the constitutents
of each class, so that the law shall
operate equally and uniformly upon all
persons in similar circumstances". |
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Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312, 332 |
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"Our whole system of law is predicated
on the general fundamental principle
of equality of application fo the law.
'All men are equal before the law,'
"This is a government of laws and
not of men,' 'No man is above the law,'
are all maxims showing the spirit in
which legislatures, executives, and
courts are expected to make, execute
and apply laws. But the framers
and adopters of the (Fourtheenth) Amendment
were not content to depend... upon the
spirit of equality which might not be
insisted on by local public opinion.
They therefore embodied that spirit
in a specific guaranty." |
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HABEUS
CORPUS: |
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Duncan v. Bradley,
No. 01-55290 (9th Circ., 12-24-02) |
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A state trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury on an entrapment defense, in
a second trial on drug sale charges,
amounted to prejudicial constitutional
error where evidence presented at a
first trial warranted such an instruct.
To read entire text of the opinion,
see
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0155290p.pdf |
JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY: |
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See
Judicial Immunity page for more
citations (links) and news articles
regarding the topic.
See also, 42 USC 1983 - Availability
of Equitable Relief Against Judges. |
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Note:
[Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.]
Judges have given themselves judicial
immunity for their judicial functions.
Judges have no judicial immunity for
criminal acts, aiding, assisting,
or conniving with others who perform
a criminal act or for their administrative/ministerial
duties, or for violating a citizen's
constitutional rights. When
a judge has a duty to act, he does
not have discretion - he is then not
performing a judicial act; he is performing
a ministerial act.
Nowhere was the judiciary given immunity,
particularly nowhere in Article III;
under our Constitution, if judges
were to have immunity, it could only
possibly be granted by amendment (and
even less possibly by legislative
act), as Art. I, Sections 9 &
10, respectively, in fact expressly
prohibit such, stating, "No Title
of Nobility shall be granted by the
United States" and "No state
shall... grant any Title of Nobility."
Most of us are certain that Congress
itself doesn't understand the inherent
lack of immunity for judges.
Article III, Sec. 1, "The Judicial
Power of the United States shall be
vested in one supreme court, and in
such inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good behavior."
Tort
& Insurance Law Journal, Spring
1986 21 n3, p 509-516, "Federal
tort law: judges cannot invoke
judicial immunity for acts that violate
litigants' civil rights." - Robert
Craig Waters. |
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Ableman v. Booth,
21 Howard 506 (1859) |
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"No judicial process, whatever
form it may assume, can have any lawful
authority outside of the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court or judge by
whom it is issued; and an attempt to
enforce it beyond these boundaries is
nothing less than lawless violence." |
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Chandler v. Judicial
Council of the 10th Circuit, 398 U.S.
74, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 26 L. Ed. 2d 100 |
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Justice Douglas, in his dissenting
opinion at page 140 said, "If (federal
judges) break the law, they can be prosecuted."
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion
at page 141) said, "Judges, like
other people, can be tried, convicted
and punished for crimes... The judicial
power shall extend to all cases, in
law and equity, arising under this Constitution". |
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Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958) |
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Note: Any judge
who does not comply with his oath
to the Constitution of the United
States wars against that Constitution
and engages in acts in violation of
the supreme law of the land.
The judge is engaged in acts of treason.
The U.S. Supreme Court
has stated that "no state legislator
or executive or judicial officer can
war against the Constitution without
violating his undertaking to support
it". See also In Re Sawyer,
124 U.S. 200 (188); U.S.
v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101
S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406
(1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257
(1821). |
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Cooper v. O'Conner,
99 F.2d 133 |
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There is a general rule that a ministerial
officer who acts wrongfully, although
in good faith, is nevertheless liable
in a civil action and cannot claim the
immunity of the sovereign. |
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Davis v. Burris,
51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938) |
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A judge must be acting within his
jurisdiction as to subject matter and
person, to be entitled to immunity from
civil action for his acts. |
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Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. at 227-229, 108 S.
Ct. at 544-545 (1987); Westfall
v.Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1987);
United States v. Lanier (March
1997) |
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Constitutionally and
in fact of law and judicial rulings,
state-federal "magistrates-judges"
or any government actors, state or
federal, may now be held liable, if
they violate any Citizen's Constitutional
rights, privileges, or immunities,
or guarantees; including statutory
civil rights.
A judge is not immune for
tortious acts committed in a purely
Administrative, non-judicial capacity. |
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Gregory v. Thompson,
F.2d 59 (C.A. Ariz. 1974) |
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Generally, judges are immune from
suit for judicial acts within or in
excess of their jurisdiction even if
those acts have been done maliciously
or corruptly; the only exception being
for acts done in the clear absence of
all jurisdiction. |
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Hoffsomer v. Hayes,
92 Okla 32, 227 F. 417 |
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"The courts are not bound by
an officer's interpretation of the law
under which he presumes to act." |
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Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) |
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"... the particular phraseology
of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential
to all written constitutions, that
a law repugnant to the constitution
is void, and that courts, as well
as other departments, are bound by
that instrument."
"In declaring what shall be
the supreme law of the land, the Constitution
itself is first mentioned; and not
the laws of the United States generally,
but those only which shall be made
in pursuance of the Constitution,
have that rank".
"All
law (rules and practices) which are
repugnant to the Constitution are
VOID".
Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution
states "NO State (Jurisdiction)
shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the rights, privileges,
or immunities of citizens of
the United States nor deprive any
citizens of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, ...
or equal protection under the law",
this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional. |
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Piper v. Pearson,
2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed.
646 (1872) |
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"Where there is no jurisdiction,
there can be no discretion, for discretion
is incident to jurisdiction." |
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Pulliam v. Allen,
466 U.S. 522 (1984); 104 S. Ct. 1781,
1980, 1981, and 1985 |
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In 1996, Congress passed a law
to overcome this ruling which stated
that judicial immunity doesn't exist;
citizens can sue judges for prospective
injunctive relief.
"Our own experience is fully
consistent with the common law's rejection
of a rule of judicial immunity.
We never have had a rule of absolute
judicial immunity. At least
seven circuits have indicated affirmatively
that there is no immunity... to prevent
irreparable injury to a citizen's
constitutional rights..."
"Subsequent interpretations
of the Civil Rights Act by this Court
acknowledge Congress' intent to reach
unconstitutional actions by all state
and federal actors, including judges...
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
a state [federal] from denying any
person [citizen] within its jurisdiction
the equal protection under the laws.
Since a State [or federal] acts only
by its legislative, executive or judicial
authorities, the constitutional provisions
must be addressed to those authorities,
including state and federal judges..."
"We conclude that judicial immunity
is not a bar to relief against a judicial
officer acting in her [his] judicial
capacity." |
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Mireles v. Waco,
112 S. Ct. 286 at 288 (1991) |
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A judge is not immune for tortious
acts committed in a purely Administrative,
non-judicial capacity; however, even
in a case involving a particular attorney not
assigned to him, he may reach out into
the hallway, having his deputy use "excessive
force" to haul the attorney into
the courtroom for chastisement or even
incarceration. A Superior Court
Judge is broadly vested with "general
jurisdiction." Provided the
judge is not divested of all jurisdiction,
he may have his actions excused as per
this poor finding. |
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Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) |
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Note:
By law, a judge is a state officer.
The judge then acts not as a judge,
but as a private individual (in his
person). When a judge acts as
a trespasser of the law, when a judge
does not follow the law, the Judge
loses subject-matter jurisdiction
and the judges' orders are not voidable,
but VOID, and of no legal force or
effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court
stated that "when a state officer
acts under a state law in a manner
violative of the Federal Constitution,
he comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution, and
he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power
to impart to him any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority
of the United States." |
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Stump v. Sparkman,
id., 435 U.S. 349 |
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Some Defendants urge that any act
"of a judicial nature" entitles
the Judge to absolute judicial immunity.
But in a jurisdictional vacuum (that
is, absence of all jurisdiction) the
second prong necessary to absolute
judicial immunity is missing.
A judge is not immune for tortious
acts committed in a purely Administrative,
non-judicial capacity. |
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Rankin v. Howard,
633 F.2d 844 (1980) |
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed an Arizona District Court dismissal
based upon absolute judicial immunity,
finding that both necessary immunity
prongs were absent; later, in Ashelman
v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (1986),
the Ninth Circuit, en banc,
criticized the "judicial nature"
analysis it had published in Rankin
as unnecessarily restrictive.
But Rankin's ultimate result was not
changed, because Judge Howard had been
independently divested of absolute judicial
immunity by his complete lack of jurisdiction. |
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U.S. Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. (State use of),
217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697 |
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When a judicial officer acts entirely
without jurisdiction or without compliance
with jurisdiction requisites he may
be held civilly liable for abuse of
process even though his act involved
a decision made in good faith, that
he had jurisdiction. |
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U.S. v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261,
27 L. Ed 171 (1882) |
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"No man in this
country is so high that he is above
the law. No officer of the law
may set that law at defiance with
impunity. All the officers of
the government, from the highest to
the lowest, are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it."
"It is the only supreme
power in our system of government,
and every man who, by accepting office
participates in its functions, is
only the more strongly bound to submit
to that supremacy, and to observe
the limitations which it imposes on
the exercise of the authority which
it gives." |
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Zeller v. Rankin,
101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed
2d 326 |
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When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction,
or acts in the face of clearly valid
statutes expressly depriving him of
jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. |
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JURISDICTION: |
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NOTE: It is a fact of law that
the person asserting jurisdiction must,
when challenged, prove that jurisdiction
exists; mere good faith assertions of
power and authority (jurisdiction) have
been abolished. |
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Albrecht v. U.S. |
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Balzac v. People
of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) |
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"The United States District Court
is not a true United States Court, established
under Article 3 of the Constitution
to administer the judicial power of
the United States therein conveyed.
It is created by virtue of the sovereign
congressional faculty, granted under
Article 4, 3, of that instrument, of
making all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory belonging to
the United States. The resemblance
of its jurisdiction to that of true
United States courts, in offering an
opportunity to nonresidents of resorting
to a tribunal not subject to local influence,
does not change its character as a mere
territorial court." |
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Basso v. UPL, 495
F. 2d 906 |
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Brook v. Yawkey,
200 F. 2d 633 |
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Elliot v. Piersol,
1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828) |
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Under federal Law, which is applicable
to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that "if a court is without
authority, its judgments and orders
are regarded as nullities. They
are not voidable, but simply void, and
form no bar to a recovery sought, even
prior to a reversal in opposition to
them. They constitute no justification
and all persons concerned in executing
such judgments or sentences are considered,
in law, as trespassers." |
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Griffin v. Mathews,
310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272 |
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Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528 |
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Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356 (1990) |
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Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases
apply to State Court Cases. |
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Louisville &
N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 |
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Mack v. United States,
07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia |
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"The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those
of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program. It matters not whether
policy making is involved, and no case-by-case
weighing of the burdens or benefits
is necessary; such commands are fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty." |
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Mack v. United States,
07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia |
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"Residual state sovereignty was
also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's
conferral upon Congress of not all governmental
powers, but only discrete and enumerated
ones." |
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Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1 |
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Mookini v. U.S.,
303 U.S. 201 (1938) |
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"The term 'District Courts
of the United States' as used in the
rules without an addition expressing
a wider connotation, has its historic
significance. It describes the
constitutional courts created under
Article 3 of the Constitution.
Courts of the Territories are Legislative
Courts, properly speaking, and are
not district courts of the United
States. We have often held that
vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction
similar to that vested in the district
courts of the United States (98 U.S.
145) does not make it a 'District
Court of the United States'.
"Not only did the promulgating
order use the term District Courts
of the United States in its historic
and proper sense, but the omission
of provision for the application of
the rules the territorial court and
other courts mentioned in the authorizing
act clearly shows the limitation that
was intended." |
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McNutt v. General
Motors, 298 U.S. 178 |
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New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) |
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"We have held, however, that
state legislatures are not subject to
federal direction." |
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Owens v. The City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.
Ct. 1398 (1980) |
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Thomson v. Gaskill,
315 U.S. 442 |
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JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT: |
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United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. I at 16 (1976) |
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"It is deeply distressing that
the Department of Justice, whose mission
is to protect the constitutional liberties
of the people of the United States,
should even appear to be seeking to
subvert them by extreme and dubious
legal argument." |
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PEACEFUL
ASSEMBLY (DEMONSTRATIONS): |
|
Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347; 6 S. Ct. 2673; 49 L. Ed.
2d (1976) |
|
"Loss of First Amendment Freedoms,
for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury." |
|
Miller v. U.S.,
230 F. 2d. 486, 490; 42 |
|
"There can be no sanction or
penalty imposed upon one, because of
his exercise of constitutional rights." |
|
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 |
|
"No state shall convert
a liberty into a license, and charge
a fee therefore." |
|
Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, Alabama, 373 U.S.
262 |
|
"If the State converts a right
(liberty) into a privilege, the citizen
can ignore the license and fee and engage
in the right (liberty) with impunity." |
|
United States Constitution,
First Amendment |
|
Right to Petition; Freedom of Association. |
|
PROBABLE
CAUSE: |
|
Brinegar v. U.S.,
388 US 160 (1949) |
|
Probable Cause to Arrest - Provides
details on how to determine if a crime
has been or is being committed. |
|
Carroll v. U.S.,
267 US 132 (1925) |
|
Probable Cause to Search - Provides
details on the belief that seizable
property exists in a particular place
or on a particular person. |
|
Draper v. U.S. (1959) |
|
Probable cause is where known facts
and circumstances, of a reasonably trustworthy
nature, are sufficient to justify a
man of reasonable caution in the belief
that a crime has been or is being committed.
Reasonable man definition; common textbook
definition; comes from this case. |
|
PRO
SE RIGHTS: |
|
Brotherhood of Trainmen
v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1; v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin,
Sheriff 407 U.S. 425 |
|
Litigants can be assisted by unlicensed
laymen during judicial proceedings. |
|
Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957) |
|
"Following the simple guide of
rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be
so construed as to do substantial justice"...
"The federal rules reject the approach
that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading
is to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits." The court also
cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds that
all pleadings shall be construed to
do substantial justice. |
|
Davis v. Wechler,
263 U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb v. California,
283 U.S. 359; NAACP v. Alabama, 375
U.S. 449 |
|
"The assertion of federal rights,
when plainly and reasonably made, are
not to be defeated under the name of
local practice." |
|
Elmore v. McCammon
(1986) 640 F. Supp. 905 |
|
"... the right to file a lawsuit
pro se is one of the most important
rights under the constitution and laws." |
|
Federal Rules of
Civil Procedures, Rule 17, 28 USCA "Next
Friend" |
|
A next friend is a person who represents
someone who is unable to tend to his
or her own interest. |
|
Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519 (1972) |
|
"Allegations such as those asserted
by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded,
are sufficient"... "which
we hold to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." |
|
Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed
2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456
2nd 233 |
|
Pro se pleadings are to be considered
without regard to technicality; pro
se litigants' pleadings are not to be
held to the same high standards of perfection
as lawyers. |
|
Maty v. Grasselli
Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938) |
|
"Pleadings are intended to serve
as a means of arriving at fair and just
settlements of controversies between
litigants. They should not raise
barriers which prevent the achievement
of that end. Proper pleading is
important, but its importance consists
in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish
the end of a just judgment." |
|
NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415); United Mineworkers
of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715; and Johnson v. Avery,
89 S. Ct. 747 (1969) |
|
Members of groups who are competent
nonlawyers can assist other members
of the group achieve the goals of the
group in court without being charged
with "unauthorized practice of
law." |
|
Picking v. Pennsylvania
Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit
Court of Appeals |
|
The plaintiff's civil rights pleading
was 150 pages and described by a federal
judge as "inept". Nevertheless,
it was held "Where a plaintiff
pleads pro se in a suit for protection
of civil rights, the Court should endeavor
to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without
regard to technicalities." |
|
Puckett v. Cox,
456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA) |
|
It was held that a pro se complaint
requires a less stringent reading than
one drafted by a lawyer per Justice
Black in Conley v. Gibson (see
case listed above, Pro Se Rights
Section). |
|
Roadway Express
v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982) |
|
"Due to sloth, inattention or
desire to seize tactical advantage,
lawyers have long engaged in dilatory
practices... the glacial pace of much
litigation breeds frustration with the
Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect
for the law." |
|
Sherar v. Cullen,
481 F. 2d 946 (1973) |
|
"There can be no sanction or
penalty imposed upon one because of
his exercise of Constitutional Rights." |
|
Schware v. Board
of Examiners, United State Reports 353
U.S. pages 238, 239. |
|
"The practice of law cannot be
licensed by any state/State." |
|
Sims v. Aherns,
271 SW 720 (1925) |
|
"The practice of law is an occupation
of common right." |
|
TO
SEE MORE CASES ON PRO SE RIGHTS, SEE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AT http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/delunbundcases.html. |
|
WORKING
TOGETHER TO ATTAIN FAIRNESS |
|