Criteria
1. Best Interest of Child
2. Must Show Harm
3. Prior Grandparent/Grandchild Relationship
4. Effect on Parent/Child Relationship
5. Any Marital Status of Parents
6. Parents are Deceased, Divorced
and/or Unmarried.
United States Supreme Court Parental
Rights Caselaw
In its order granting the Appellate'
motion for summary judgment, the district
court began its analysis by setting
forth the elements of a § 1983 claim
against an individual state actor
as follows:
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed constitutional
right's of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the acts or omissions of the defendant
were intentional;
(3) the defendant acted under color
of law; and
(4) the acts or omissions of the defendant
caused the constitutional deprivation.
Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F. Supp.2d
957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The court
also stated that, to establish municipal
liability, a plaintiff must show that
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional
right of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the municipality had a policy
or custom;
(3) this policy or custom amounts
to deliberate indifference to [the
plaintiff's] constitutional right;
&
(4) the policy or custom caused constitutional
deprivation.
In the early 1920s, the United States
Supreme Court first reviewed the rights,
liberties and obligations of parents
to direct the upbringing of their
children. Two important decisions,
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, established a legacy which
was followed by a
series of decisions holding that parenting
is a fundamental constitutional right,
and among "the basic civil rights
of man." Choices about marriage,
family life, and the upbringing of
children are
among those rights the Court has ranked
as "of basic importance in our
society," and as sheltered by
the 14th Amendment against the State's
unwarranted usurpation, disregard,
or disrespect.
Assembled here are a majority of those
cases defining or reaffirming these
fundamental rights. Links are provided
to each case on the FindLaw Internet
Legal Resources service. Each is in
hypertext format, with links to related
opinions of the court contained in
the ruling.
---------------------------------
The construction of a constitutional
theory which will protect various
aspects of family life under Section
1983 rightly continues to command
a good deal of judicial interest.
The right of a parent to raise his
children has long been recognized
as a fundamental constitutional right,
"far more precious than property
rights." Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), quoting
May v. Anderson, 345, U.S. 528, 533
(1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541, (1942); Meyer v Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), See, e.q.
Castigno v Wholean, 239 Conn. 336
(1996); In re Alexander V., 223 Conn.
557 (1992). In Re: May V Anderson
(1953) 345 US 528, 533, 73 S. Ct.
840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221, 1226, This
case involved a mother stripped of
her rights without the right to utter
a single word in her defense. The
order was originally granted for 6
months in which the court allowed
the mother to "fight" for
her rights back, but kept getting
delayed so that the child would incur
more time with the father. This case
was reversed upon appeal, and also
gave rise to the statute citing that,
Presumption (750 ILCS 5/603) "A
court may consider the period of time
that a child has spent with a parent
by virtue of a temporary custody order
but there is no presumption in favor
of the existing custodian under 750
ILCS 5/602 as there is in modification
cases under 750 ILCS 5/610. In Re
Hefer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 73, 217 Ill.
Dec 701, 667 N.E. 2nd 1094 (4 Dist.
1996). Obviously, the argument is
that one parent may manipulate the
system to prolong proceedings that
he/she may think there is an automatic
award of custody. The 602 standards
still are mandated to be applied,
one of them including the wishes of
the children as well as other issues
such as safety and well-being of the
children (self-mutilation, in this
case due to psychological and/or other
abuse in the Petitioner/Mother's residence).
M. L. B. v. S. L. J.
___ US ___, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996)
Choices about marriage, family life,
and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court
has ranked as "of basic importance
in our society," rights sheltered
by the 14th Amendment against the
State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard,
or disrespect. This case,
involving the State's authority to
sever permanently a parent-child bond,
demanded the close consideration the
Court has long required when a family
association so undeniably important
was at stake.
Santosky v Kramer
455 US 745 (1982)
The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child is protected
by the 14th Amendment, and does not
evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to
the State. A parental
rights termination proceeding interferes
with that fundamental liberty interest.
When the State moves to destroy weakened
familial bonds, it must provide the
parents with fundamentally fair procedures.
Lassiter v Department of Social Services
452 US 18 (1981)
The Court's decisions have by now
made plain that a parent's desire
for and right to "the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his
or her children" is an important
interest that "undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection." A parent's
interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision to terminate his or
her parental status is, therefore,
a commanding one.
Quilloin v Walcott
434 US 246 (1978)
We have little doubt that the Due
Process Clause would be offended "if
a State were to attempt to force the
breakup of a natural family, over
the objections of the parents and
their children, without some showing
of unfitness and for the sole reason
that to do so was thought to be in
the children's best interest."
Whatever might be required in other
situations, we cannot say that the
State was required in this situation
to find anything more than that the
adoption, and denial of legitimation,
were in the "best interests of
the child."
Smith v Organization of Foster Care
Families
431 US 816 (1977)
In this action, individual foster
parents and a foster parents organization,
sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against New York State and
New York City officials, alleging
that the statutory and regulatory
procedures for removal of foster children
from foster homes violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the 14th Amendment. The ruling
contains an analysis of the rights
of natural parents as balanced against
the rights of foster parents, as well
as a comprehensive discussion of foster
care conditions.
Moore v East Cleveland
431 US 494 (1977)
The Court has long recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A host of cases, tracing
their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters
have consistently acknowledged a "private
realm of family life which the state
cannot enter." When the government
intrudes on choices concerning family
living arrangements, the Court must
examine carefully the importance of
the governmental interests advanced.
Cleveland Board of Education v La
Fleur
414 US 632 (1974)
The Court has long recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is a right "to
be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget
a
child."
Stanley v Illinois
405 US 645 (1972)
The private interest here, that of
a man in the children he has sired
and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and protection. The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in
the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment, and the 9th
Amendment.
Wisconsin v Yoder
406 US 205 (1972)
In this case involving the rights
of Amish parents to provide for private
schooling of their children, the Court
held: "The history and culture
of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern
for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role
of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition."
Loving v Virginia
388 US 1 (1967)
In this case involving interracial
marriage, the Court reaffirmed the
principles set forth in Pierce and
Meyers, finding that marriage is one
of the basic civil rights of man,
fundamental to our very existence
and survival. "The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom
of choice
to marry not be restricted by invidious
racial discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and
cannot be infringed by the State."
Griswold v Connecticut
381 US 479 (1965)
The 4th and 5th Amendments were described
as protection against all governmental
invasions "of the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of
life." The Court referred to
the 4th Amendment as creating a "right
to privacy, no less important than
any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people."
Reaffirming the principles set forth
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and
Meyers v Nebraska.
Prince v Massachusetts
321 US 158 (1944)
It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition
of this that these decisions have
respected the
private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.
Skinner v Oklahoma
316 US 535 (1942)
"We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race."
Pierce v Society of Sisters
268 US 510 (1925)
The liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education
of children was abridged by a proposed
statute to compell public education.
"The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations."
Meyer v Nebraska
262 US 390 (1923)
"No state ... shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."
"While this court has not attempted
to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration and some of the
included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."
The "liberty interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control
of their children is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests"
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Troxel v.
Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999). Moreover,
the companionship, care, custody,
and management of a parent over his
or her child is an interest far more
precious than any property right.
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533,
(1952). As such, the parent-child
relationship is an important interest
that undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection. Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 452
U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
The law has long recognized and respected
the rights and duties of parents in
the raising of children. The Supreme
Court has been consistent in recognizing
the importance of respecting Parents
authority in the raising of their
children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 639 (1968). Furthermore,
the United States Supreme Court has
stated, "It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first with the
parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944).
A corollary to this fundamental principle
is that parents have broad discretion
in the disciplining of their children
and are allowed to use corporal punishment.
Under California state law, a parent
has the right to reasonably discipline
a child by physical punishment and
may administer reasonable punishment
without being liable for battery.
People v. Whitehurst, 9 Cal.App.4th
1045, 1050 (1992). In order to be
considered disciplinary the punishment
must be necessary (i.e. there must
be behavior by the child deserving
punishment), and the punishment must
be reasonable (i.e not excessive).
Id. It is important to remember that
the reasonableness of the punishment
will be judged by a third party and
it does not matter if the parent believes
the punishment was reasonable.
CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT RULES 9-0
ON MARCH 8, 2004, SUPREME COURT RULES
THAT HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE. PARENTS HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSER UNDER
THE 6TH AMENDMENT. COMPLY WITH THE
6TH AMENDMENT IN CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"a) The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child is protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and does
not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have
lost temporary custody of their child
to the State. A parental rights termination
proceeding interferes with that fundamental
liberty interest. When the State moves
to destroy weakened familial bonds,
it must provide the parents with fundamentally
fair procedures. Pp. 752-754."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"Before a State may sever completely
and irrevocably the rights of parents
in their natural child, due process
requires that the State support its
allegations by at least clear and
convincing evidence. A "clear
and convincing evidence" standard
adequately conveys to the fact finder
the level of subjective certainty
about his factual conclusions necessary
to satisfy due process."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment demands more
than this. Before a State may sever
the rights of parents in [455 U.S.
745, 748] their natural child, due
process requires that the State support
its allegations by at least clear
and convincing evidence."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"In Lassiter, it was "not
disputed that state intervention to
terminate the relationship between
[a parent] and [the] child must be
accomplished by procedures meeting
the requisites of the Due Process
Clause." Id., at 37 (first dissenting
opinion); see id., at 24-32 (opinion
of the Court); id., at 59-60 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). See also Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). The
absence of dispute reflected this
Court's historical recognition that
freedom of personal choice in matters
of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978); Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 -640
(1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 -652 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534 -535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does
not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have
lost temporary custody of their child
to the State. Even when blood relationships
are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable
destruction of their family life.
If anything, persons faced with forced
dissolution of their parental rights
have a more critical need for procedural
protections than do those resisting
state intervention into ongoing family
affairs. When the State moves to [455
U.S. 745, 754] destroy weakened familial
bonds, it must provide the parents
with fundamentally fair procedures."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
Lassiter declared it "plain beyond
the need for multiple citation"
that a natural parent's "desire
for and right to `the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his
or her children'" is an interest
far more precious than any property
[455 U.S. 745, 759] right. 452 U.S.,
at 27 , quoting Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S., at 651 . "When the
State initiates a parental rights
termination proceeding, it seeks not
merely to infringe that fundamental
liberty interest, but to end it. "If
the State prevails, it will have worked
a unique kind of deprivationà A parent's
interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision to terminate his or
her parental status is, therefore,
a commanding one." 452 U.S.,
at 27.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"At such a proceeding, numerous
factors combine to magnify the risk
of erroneous fact finding. Permanent
neglect proceedings employ imprecise
substantive standards that leave determinations
unusually open to the subjective values
of the judge. See Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S., at 835.
Raising the standard of proof would
have both practical and symbolic consequences.
Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.,
at 426 . The Court has long considered
the heightened standard of proof used
in criminal prosecutions to be "a
prime instrument for reducing the
risk of convictions resting on factual
error." In re Winship, 397 U.S.,
at 363 . An elevated standard of proof
in a parental rights termination proceeding
would alleviate "the possible
risk that a factfinder might decide
to [deprive] an individual based solely
on a few isolated instances of unusual
conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior."
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at 427
. "Increasing the burden of proof
is one way to impress the fact finder
with the importance [455 U.S. 745,
765] of the decision and thereby perhaps
to reduce the chances that inappropriate
terminations will be ordered. Ibid.
The court's theory assumes that termination
of the natural parents' rights invariably
will benefit the child. Yet we have
noted above that the parents and the
child share an interest in avoiding
erroneous termination. Even accepting
the court's assumption, we cannot
agree with its conclusion that a preponderance
standard fairly distributes the risk
of error between parent and child.
Use of that standard reflects the
judgment that society is nearly neutral
between erroneous termination of parental
rights and erroneous failure to terminate
those rights. Cf. In re Winship, 397
U.S., at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
For the child, the likely consequence
of an erroneous failure to terminate
is preservation of [455 U.S. 745,
766] an uneasy status quo. For the
natural parents, however, the consequence
of an erroneous termination is the
unnecessary destruction of their natural
family. A standard that allocates
the risk of error nearly equally between
those two outcomes does not reflect
properly their relative severity.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
Two state interests are at stake in
parental rights termination proceedings
- a parens patriae interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child
and a fiscal and administrative interest
in reducing the cost and burden of
such proceedings. A standard of proof
more strict than preponderance of
the evidence is consistent with both
interests."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"while there is still reason
to believe that positive, nurturing
parent-child relationships exist,
the parens patriae interest favors
preservation, not [455 U.S. 745, 767]
severance, of natural familial bonds.
17 384-b.1.(a)(ii). "[T]he State
registers no gain towards its declared
goals when it separates children from
the custody of fit parents."
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at
652."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The logical conclusion of this
balancing process is that the "fair
preponderance of the evidence"
standard prescribed by Fam. Ct. Act
622 violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
noted in Addington: "The individual
should not be asked to share equally
with society the risk of error when
the possible injury to the individual
is significantly greater than any
possible harm to the state."
441 U.S., at 427. Thus, at a parental
rights termination proceeding, a near-equal
allocation of risk between the parents
and the State is constitutionally
intolerable."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The next question, then, is
whether a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" or a "clear and convincing"
standard is constitutionally mandated.
In Addington, the Court concluded
that application of a reasonable-doubt
standard is inappropriate in civil
commitment proceedings for two reasons
- because of our hesitation to apply
that unique standard "too broadly
or casually in non-criminal cases,"
id., at 428, and because the psychiatric
evidence ordinarily adduced at commitment
proceedings is [455 U.S. 745, 769]
rarely susceptible to proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id., at 429-430,
432-433. To be sure, as has been noted
above, in the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 102(f),
92 Stat. 3072, 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) (1976
ed., Supp. IV), Congress requires
"evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt" for termination of Indian
parental rights, reasoning that "the
removal of a child from the parents
is a penalty as great [as], if not
greater, than a criminal penaltyà"
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 22 (1978)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"two federal courts have addressed
the issue. Each has held that allegations
supporting parental rights termination
must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Sims v. State Dept. of Public
Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1194 (SD
Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415
(1979); Alsager v. District Court
of [455 U.S. 745, 751] Polk County,
406 F. Supp. 10, 25 (SD Iowa 1975),
aff'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 1137
(CA8 1976)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"the standard of proof is a crucial
component of legal process, the primary
function of which is `to minimize
the risk of [455 U.S. 745, 758] erroneous
decisions.'" Post, at 785, quoting
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,
442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). àonly the standard
of proof "instruct[s] the fact
finder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have
in the correctness of factual conclusions"
he draws from that information. In
re Winship, 397 U.S., at 370 (Harlan,
J., concurring). The statutory provision
of right to counsel and multiple hearings
before termination cannot suffice
to protect a natural parent's fundamental
liberty interests if the State is
willing to tolerate undue uncertainty
in the determination of the dispositive
facts."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The Family Court Judge in the
present case expressly refused to
terminate petitioners' parental rights
on a "non-statutory, no-fault
basis." App. 22-29. Nor is it
clear that the State constitutionally
could terminate a parent's rights
without showing parental unfitness.
See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978). "We have little
doubt that the Due Process Clause
would be offended `[i]f a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of
a natural family, over the objections
of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do
so was thought to be in the children's
best interest,'" quoting Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"Any parens patriae interest
in terminating the natural parents'
rights arises only at the dispositional
phase, after the parents have been
found unfit."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"à the interest of parents in
their relationship with their children
is sufficiently fundamental to come
within the finite class of liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, supra, at 862-863."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. Finding: "... the
Federal Constitution permits a State
to interfere with this right (infringing
on parents' fundamental right to rear
their children) only to prevent harm
or potential harm to the child...".137
Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice Thomas
agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's
recognition of a fundamental right
of parents to direct their children's
upbringing resolves this case, but
concluded that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental
rights. Here, the State lacks a compelling
interest in second-guessing a fit
parent's decision..."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice O'Connor,
joined by The Chief Justice, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, concluded
that º26.10.160(3), as applied to
Granville and her family, violates
her due process right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and
control of her daughters. Pp. 5ù17."
"(a) The Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause has a substantive
component that "provides heightened
protection against government interference
with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests," Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720,
including parents' fundamental right
to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children,
see, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651. Pp. 5ù8." "(b)"..
broad statute effectively permits
a court to disregard and overturn
any decision by a fit custodial parentà
based solely on the judge's determination
of the child's best interest. A parent's
estimation of the child's best interest
is accorded no deference." (Arbitrary
Classification at work)
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "A combination
of several factors compels the conclusion
that º26.10.160(3)àexceeded the bounds
of the Due Process Clauseà no court
has found, that Granville was an unfit
parent. There is a presumption that
fit parents act in their children's
best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442
U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no
reason for the State to inject itself
into the private realm of the family
to further question fit parents' ability
to make the best decisions regarding
their children, see, e.g., Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "The ... Court
intervened, but that when it did so,
it gave no special weight to à determination
of HER daughters' best interests."
"àit placed à the burden of disproving
that visitation would be in her daughters'
best interest and thus failed to provide
any protection for her fundamental
right." "These factors,
when considered with the ... Court's
slender findings, show that this case
involves nothing more than a simple
disagreement between the court and
Granville concerning her children's
best interests, and that the visitation
order was an unconstitutional infringement
on Granville' (the Parent's) right
to make decisions regarding the rearing
of her children. Pp. 8ù 14."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000) 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice Thomas
agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's
recognition of a fundamental right
of parents to direct their children's
upbringing resolves this case, but
concluded that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental
rights. Here, the State lacks a compelling
interest in second-guessing a fit
parent's decisionà"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
463 U.S. 248, "Where an à father
demonstrates a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood
by "com[ing] forward to participate
in the rearing of his child, à his
interest in personal contact with
his child acquires substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause."
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392."
CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979),
"à sex-based distinction in ...
between à mothers and à fathers violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it bears
no substantial relation to any important
state interest. Pp. 388-394. [441
U.S. 380, 381]. Gender-based distinctions
"must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives"
in order to withstand judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). See also Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971). Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized
the due process right of natural fathers
to maintain a parental relationship
with their children absent a finding
that they are unfit as parents."
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S., at 76 , "statutory
"classifications `must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)." Judical decisions on
the basis of gender are therefore
arbitrary and UnConstitutional.
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), 434 U.S. 246. "In Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
this Court held that the State of
Illinois was barred, as a matter of
both due process and equal protection,
from taking custody of the children
of a à father, absent a hearing and
a particularized [434 U.S. 246, 248]
finding that the father was an unfit
parent. The Court concluded, on the
one hand, that a father's interest
in the "companionship, care,
custody, and management" of his
children is "cognizable and substantial,"
id., at 651-652, and, on the other
hand, that the State's interest in
caring for the children is "de
minimis" if the father is in
fact a fit parent, id., at 657-658."
De Minimus defined: Trifling or insignificant
matters, with which a court will not
concern itself. The full expression
is de minimis non curat lex. This
is a Latin phrase which means "the
law does not care about very small
matters". It can be used to describe
a component part of a wider transaction,
where it is in itself insignificant
or immaterial to the transaction as
a whole, and will have no legal relevance
or bearing on the end result.
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), 434 U.S. 246, "à unless
and until the child is legitimated,
the mother is the only recognized
parent and is given exclusive authority
to exercise all parental prerogatives,
74-203."
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), 434 U.S. 246, "We have
recognized on numerous occasions that
the relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected.
See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley
v. Illinois, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 -401 (1923). "It
is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
And it is now firmly established that
"freedom of personal choice in
matters of . . . family life is one
of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639 -640 (1974). We have little doubt
that the Due Process Clause would
be offended "[i]f a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of
a natural family, over the objections
of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do
so was thought to be in the children's
best interest." Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
862 -863 (1977).
MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S.
390 (1923), 'No state ... shall deprive
any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.' While
this court has not attempted to define
with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt,
it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men." Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union
Co. v. Crescent City Co ., 111 U.S.
746 , 4 Sup. Ct. 652; Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 , 6 Sup. Ct. 1064; Minnesota
v. Bar er, 136 U.S. 313 , 10 Sup.
Ct. 862; Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 , 17 Sup. Ct. 427; Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 Sup.
Ct. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining
v. New Jersey 211 U.S. 78 , 29 Sup.
Ct. 14; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.
v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 , 31 Sup.
Ct. 259; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 , 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D,
545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Adams v.
Tanner, 224 U.S. 590 , 37 Sup. Ct.
662, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas.
1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct.
337, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 , 42 Sup. Ct.
124; Adkins v. Children's Hospital
(April 9, 1923), 261 U.S. 525 , 43
Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. --; Wyeth
v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200
Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am. St.
Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147.
The established doctrine is that this
liberty may not be interfered [262
U.S. 390, 400] with, under the guise
of protecting the public interest,
by legislative action which is arbitrary
or without reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency
of the state to effect. Determination
by the Legislature of what constitutes
proper exercise of police power is
not final or conclusive but is subject
to supervision by the courts. Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 , 14
S. Sup. Ct. 499."
Equal Protection Case Law CALIFANO
v. GOLDFARB, 430 U.S. 199 (1977),
"To withstand constitutional
challenge,à classifications by gender
must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially
related to [430 U.S. 199, 211] the
achievement of those objectives."
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). Such classifications, however,
have frequently been revealed on analysis
to rest only upon "old notions"
and "archaic and overbroad"
generalizations, Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S., at 14 ; Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S., at 508 ; cf. Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512 -513 (1976),
and so have been found to offend the
prohibitions against denial of equal
protection of the law. Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton
v. Stanton, supra; Craig v. Boren,
supra. See also Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975)."
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"The concept of equal justice
under law requires the State to govern
impartially. New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
587 (1979). The sovereign may not
draw distinctions between individuals
based solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971). 24 Specifically, [463
U.S. 248, 266] it may not subject
men and women to disparate treatment
when there is no substantial relation
between the disparity and an important
State purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 -199 (1976).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
Justice Stewart correctly observed:
"Even if it be assumed that each
married parent after divorce has some
substantive due process right to maintain
his or her parental relationship,
cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (opinion
concurring in judgment), it by no
means follows that each unwed parent
has any such right. Parental rights
do not spring full-blown from the
biological connection between parent
and child. They require relationships
more enduring." 441 U.S., at
397 (emphasis added). In a similar
vein, the other three dissenters in
Caban were prepared to "assume
that, if and when one develops, the
relationship between a father and
his natural child is entitled to protection
against arbitrary state action as
a matter of due process." Caban
v. Mohammed, supra, at 414 (emphasis
added). [463 U.S. 248, 261]"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no State shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. When that Clause
is invoked in a novel context, it
is our practice to begin the inquiry
with a determination of the precise
nature of the private interest that
is threatened by the State. We therefore
first consider the nature of the interest
in liberty for which appellant claims
constitutional protection and then
turn to a discussion of the adequacy
of the procedure that New York has
provided for its protection."
"The intangible fibers that connect
parent and child have infinite variety.
They are woven throughout the fabric
of our society, providing it with
strength, beauty, and flexibility.
It is self-evident that they are sufficiently
vital to merit constitutional protection
in appropriate cases. In deciding
whether this is such a case, however,
we must consider the broad framework
that has traditionally been used to
resolve the legal problems arising
from the parent-child relationship"
"When an unwed father demonstrates
a full commitment to the responsibilities
of parenthood by "com[ing] forward
to participate in the rearing of his
child," Caban, 441 U.S., at 392
, his interest in personal contact
with his child acquires substantial
protection under the Due Process Clause.
At that point it may be said that
he "act[s] as a father toward
his children." Id., at 389, n.
7. But the mere existence of a biological
link does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection. The actions of judges
neither create nor sever genetic bonds.
"[T]he importance of the familial
relationship, to the individuals involved
and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association,
and from the role it plays in `promot[ing]
a way of life' through the instruction
of children . . . as well as from
the fact of blood relationship."
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 -233 (1972)).
17 [463 U.S. 248, 262]"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),"..
the Federal Constitution supersedes
state law and provides even greater
protection for certain formal family
relationships. In those cases, as
in the state cases, the Court has
emphasized the paramount interest
in the welfare of children and has
noted that the rights of the parents
are a counterpart of the responsibilities
they have assumed. Thus, the "liberty"
of parents to control the education
of their children that was vindicated
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), was described
as a "right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare
[the child] for additional obligations."
Id., at 535. The linkage between parental
duty and parental right was stressed
again in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), when the
Court declared it acardinal principle
"that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside [463 U.S. 248,
258] first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Ibid. In
these cases the Court has found that
the relationship of love and duty
in a recognized family unit is an
interest in liberty entitled to constitutional
protection. See also Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(plurality opinion). "[S]tate
intervention to terminate [such a]
relationship àmust be accomplished
by procedures meeting the requisites
of the Due Process Clause." Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
There are also a few cases in which
this Court has considered the extent
to which the Constitution affords
protection to the relationship between
natural parents and children born
out of wedlock. In some we have been
concerned with the rights of the children,
see, e. g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972). In this case, however,
it is a parent who claims that the
State has improperly deprived him
of a protected interest in liberty.
This Court has examined the extent
to which a natural father's biological
relationship with his child receives
protection under the Due Process Clause
in precisely three cases: Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979), "The significance
of the biological connection is that
it offers the natural father an opportunity
that no other male possesses to develop
a relationship with his offspring.
If he grasps that opportunity and
accepts some measure of responsibility
for the child's future, he may enjoy
the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development.
If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically
compel a State to listen to his opinion
of where the child's best interests
lie."
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"The Equal Protection Claim."
The concept of equal justice under
law requires the State to govern impartially.
New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
The sovereign may not draw distinctions
between individuals based solely on
differences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
24 Specifically, [463 U.S. 248, 266]
it may not subject men and women to
disparate treatment when there is
no substantial relation between the
disparity and an important state purpose.
Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 -199 (1976).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979), the Court held that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause
to grant the mother a veto [over the
adoption of a 4-year-old girl and
a 6-year-old boy,] but not to grant
a veto to their father, who had admitted
paternity and had participated in
the rearing of the children. The Court
made it clear, however, that if the
father had not "come forward
to participate in the rearing of his
child, nothing in the Equal Protection
Clause [would] preclud[e] the State
from withholding from him the privilege
of vetoing the adoption of that child."
Id., at 392."
CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
"Gender, like race, is a highly
visible and immutable characteristic
that has historically been the touchstone
for pervasive but often subtle discrimination.
Although the analogy to race is not
perfect and the constitutional inquiry
therefore somewhat different, gender-based
statutory classifications deserve
careful constitutional examination
because they may reflect or operate
to perpetuate mythical or stereotyped
assumptions about the proper roles
and the relative capabilities of men
and women that are unrelated to any
inherent differences between the sexes.
Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 . Sex-based
classifications are in many settings
invidious because they relegate a
person to the place set aside for
the group on the basis of an attribute
that the person cannot change. Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 ; Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 ; Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 ; Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 ; Orr
v. Orr, supra. Such laws cannot be
defended, as can the bulk of the classifications
that fill the statute books, simply
on the ground that the generalizations
they reflect may be true of the majority
of members of the class, for a gender-based
classification need not ring false
to work a discrimination that in the
individual case might be invidious."'...
parental rights without proof of unfitness
on his part violates the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Secondarily,
he attacks 111 (1) (c)'s disparate
[441 U.S. 380, 402] treatment of natural
mothers and natural fathers as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of
the same Amendment." "if
and when one develops, the relationship
between a father and his natural child
is entitled to protection against
arbitrary state action as a matter
of due process. See Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 "...some Members
of the [US Supreme] Court have concluded
that greater protection is due the
"private realm of family life,"
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (emphasis added), e. g.,
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 "For a traditional classification
is more likely to be used without
pausing to consider its justification
than is a newly created classification.
Habit, rather than analysis, makes
it seem acceptable and natural to
distinguish between male and female,
alien and citizen, legitimate and
illegitimate; for too much of our
history there was the same inertia
in distinguishing between black and
white. But that sort of stereotyped
reaction [441 U.S. 380, 404] may have
no rational relationship û other than
pure prejudicial discrimination -
to the stated purpose for which the
classification is being made."
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520
-521. First Amendment Rights U.S.
Constitution, First Amendment û pertaining
to the right to absolute religious
freedom. Holy Bible, Matthew Chapter
28, verses 17-19: "The Great
Commission of Jesus Christ" "Therefore
go and make disciples of all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the
Father and of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit, and teaching them to obey
everything I have commanded you."
Holy Bible, 2nd Corinthians, Chapter
5, Verse 20 -"à we are ambassadors
for Christà"; Holy Bible, Ephesians
Chapter 6, verse 4 - "à Parents,
do not provoke your children to anger,
but bring them up in the discipline
and instruction of the Lord."
Holy Bible, Deuteronomy Chapter 6,
Verses 6¡7: "And you must think
constantly about these commandments
I am giving you today. You must teach
them to your children and talk about
them when you are at home or out for
a walk; at bedtime and the first thing
in the morning." Holy Bible,
Proverbs Chapter 22, Verse 6: "Train
a child in the way he should go, and
when he is old he will not turn from
it."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944) "rests squarely on
freedom of religion under the First
Amendment, applied by the Fourteenth
to the states. She buttresses this
foundation, however, with a claim
of parental right as secured by the
due process clause of the latter Amendment.
8 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446.
"two claimed liberties are at
stake. One is the parent's, to bring
up the child in the way he should
go, which for appellant means to teach
him the tenets and the practices of
their faith. The other freedom is
the child's, to observe these;"
"If by this position appellant
seeks for freedom of conscience a
broader protection than for freedom
of the mind, it may be doubted that
any of the great liberties insured
by the First Article (US Constitution)
can be given higher place than the
others. All have preferred position
in our basic scheme. Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A. L.R. 1352.
All are interwoven there together.
Differences there are, in them and
in the modes appropriate for their
exercise. But they have unity in the
charter's prime place because they
have unity in their human sources
and [321 U.S. 158, 165] functionings.
Heart and mind are not identical.
Intuitive faith and reasoned judgment
are not the same. Spirit is not always
thought. But in the everyday business
of living, secular or otherwise, these
variant aspects of personality find
inseparable expression in a thousand
ways. They cannot be altogether parted
in law more than in life."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "To make accommodation
between these freedoms and an exercise
of state authority always is delicate.
It hardly could be more so than in
such a clash as this case presents.
On one side is the obviously earnest
claim for freedom of conscience and
religious practice. With it is allied
the parent's claim to authority in
her own household and in the rearing
of her children. The parent's conflict
with the state over control of the
child and his training is serious
enough when only secular matters are
concerned. It becomes the more so
when an element of religious conviction
enters. Against these sacred private
interests, basic in a democracy, stand
the interests of society to protect
the welfare of children, and the state's
assertion of authority to that end,
made here in a manner conceded valid
if only secular things were involved.
The last is no mere corporate concern
of official authority. It is the interest
of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded
from abuses and given opportunities
for growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens. Between
contrary pulls of such weight, the
safest and most objective recourse
is to the lines already marked out,
not precisely but for guides, in narrowing
the no man's land where this battle
has gone on."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "The rights of children
to exercise their religion, and of
parents to give them religious training
and to encourage them in the practice
of religious belief, as against preponderant
sentiment and assertion of state power
voicing it, have had recognition here,
most recently in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. [321 U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct.
1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct.
571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had
sustained the parent's authority to
provide religious with secular schooling,
and the child's right to receive it,
as against the state's requirement
of attendance at public schools. "
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), And in Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R.
1446, children's rights to receive
teaching in languages other than the
nation's common tongue were guarded
against the state's encroachment.
It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition
of this that these decisions have
respected the private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter.
But it is said the state cannot do
so here. This, first, because when
state action impinges upon a claimed
religious freedom, it must fall unless
shown to be necessary for or conducive
to the child's protection against
some clear and present danger, cf.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 , 39 S.Ct. 247; and, it is added,
there was no such showing here. "
Accordingly, in view of the preferred
position the freedoms of the First
Article occupy, the statute in its
present application must fall. It
cannot be sustained by any presumption
of validity. Cf. Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146. And,
finally, it is said, the statute is,
as to children, an absolute prohibition,
not merely a reasonable regulation,
of the denounced activity."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), " "Religious
training and activity, whether performed
by adult or child, are protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment against interference
by state action, except insofar as
they violate reasonable regulations
adopted for the protection of the
public health, morals and welfare."
"à The state court has construed
these statutes to cover the activities
here involved, cf. State v. Richardson,
92 N.H. 178, 27 A.2d 94, thereby imposing
an indirect restraint through the
parents and guardians on the free
exercise by minors of their religious
beliefs. This indirect restraint is
no less effective than a direct one.
A square conflict between the con-
[321 U.S. 158, 173] stitutional guarantee
of religious freedom and the state's
legitimate interest in protecting
the welfare of its children is thus
presented. In dealing with the validity
of statutes which directly or indirectly
infringe religious freedom and the
right of parents to encourage their
children in the practice of a religious
belief, we are not aided by any strong
presumption of the constitutionality
of such legislation. United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 , 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, note
4.
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "On the contrary,
the human freedoms enumerated in the
First Amendment and carried over into
the Fourteenth Amendment are to be
presumed to be invulnerable and any
attempt to sweep away those freedoms
is prima facie invalid. It follows
that any restriction or prohibition
must be justified by those who deny
that the freedoms have been unlawfully
invaded."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "The great interest
of the state in shielding minors from
the evil vicissitudes of early life
does not warrant every limitation
on their religious training and activities.
If the right of a child to practice
its religion in that manner is to
be forbidden by constitutional means,
there must be convincing proof that
such a practice constitutes a grave
and immediate danger to the state
or to the health, morals or welfare
of the child. West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 , 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186.
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "The vital freedom
of religion, which is 'of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,'
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152.""The
state, in my opinion, has completely
failed to sustain its burden of proving
the existence of any grave or immediate
danger to any interest which it may
lawfully protect." "Nor
can parents or guardians be subjected
to criminal liability because of vague
possibilities that their religious
teachings might cause injury to the
child. The evils must be grave, immediate,
substantial. Cf. Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 262 , 62 S.Ct. 190,
193. Yet there is not the slightest
indication in this record, or in sources
subject to judicial notice, that children
engaged in distributing literature
pursuant to their religious beliefs
have been or are likely to be subject
to any of the harmful 'diverse influences
of the street.' Indeed, if probabilities
are to be indulged in, the likelihood
is that children engaged in serious
religious endeavor are immune from
such influences."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "No chapter in human
history has been so largely written
in terms of persecution and intolerance
as the one dealing with religious
freedom. From ancient times to the
present day, the ingenuity of man
has known no limits in its ability
to forge weapons of oppression for
use against rights of those [321 U.S.
158, 176]à" See Mulder and Comisky,
'Jehovah's Witnesses Mold Constitutional
Law,' 2 Bill of Rights Review, No.
4, p. 262
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "To them, along with
other present-day religious minorities,
befalls the burden of testing our
devotion to the ideals and constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom."
"Religious freedom is too sacred
a right to be restricted or prohibited
in any degree without convincing proof
that a legitimate interest of the
state is in grave danger. " "[
Footnote 8 ] The due process claim,
as made and perhaps necessarily, extends
no further than that to freedom of
religion, since in the circumstances
all that is comprehended in the former
is included in the latter. "
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "àa claim of parental
right as secured by the due process
clause of the latter Amendment. 8
Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
, 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "...two claimed liberties
are at stake. One is the parent's,
to bring up the child in the way he
should go."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "àit is allied the
parent's claim to authority in her
own household and in the rearing of
her children. The parent's conflict
with the state over control of the
child and his training is serious
enough when only secular matters are
concerned."à" Against these
sacred private interests, basic in
a democracy, stand the interests of
society to protect the welfare of
children, and the state's assertion
of authority to that end, made here
in a manner conceded valid if only
secular things were involved. The
last is no mere corporate concern
of official authority. It is the interest
of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded
from abuses and given opportunities
for growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens. Between
contrary pulls of such weight, the
safest and most objective recourse
is to the lines already marked out,
not precisely but for guides, in narrowing
the no man's land where this battle
has gone on."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "The rights of children
to exercise their religion, and of
parents to give them religious training
and to encourage them in the practice
of religious belief, as against preponderant
sentiment and assertion of state power
voicing it, have had recognition here,
most recently in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. [321 U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct.
1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct.
571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had
sustained the parent's authority to
provide religiousà" "And
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
, 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446, children's
rights to receive teaching in languages
other than the nation's common tongue
were guarded against the state's encroachment."
"It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra.
And it is in recognition of this that
these decisions have respected the
private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "Religious training
and activity, whether performed by
adult or child, are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against interference
by state action, except insofar as
they violate reasonable regulations
adopted for the protection of the
public health, morals and welfare....The
state court has construed these statutes
to cover the activities here involved,
cf. State v. Richardson, 92 N.H. 178,
27 A.2d 94, thereby imposing an indirect
restraint through the parents and
guardians on the free exercise by
minors of their religious beliefs.
This indirect restraint is no less
effective than a direct one. A square
conflict between the con- [321 U.S.
158, 173] Constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom and the state's
legitimate interest in protecting
the welfare of its children is thus
presented." "The human freedoms
enumerated in the First Amendment
and carried over into the Fourteenth
Amendment are to be presumed to be
invulnerable and any attempt to sweep
away those freedoms is prima facie
invalid."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "The vital freedom
of religion, which is 'of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,'
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, cannot be
erased by slender references to the
state's power to restrict the ...
activities of children." "Nor
can parents or guardians be subjected
to liability because of vague possibilities
that their religious teachings might
cause injury to the child. The evils
must be grave, immediate, substantial.
Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 262, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "If the Murdock doctrine
standsàa foundation is laid for any
state intervention in the indoctrination
and participation of children in religion,
provided it is done in the name of
their health or welfare. (Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 , 63
S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 82; Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 , 63 S.Ct.
862; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584
, 141 A.L.R. 514; Id., 19 U.S. 103
, 63 S.Ct. 890; Douglas v. Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882.)
MOORE v. EAST CLEVELAND, 431 U.S.
494 (1977), "(b) When the government
intrudes on choices concerning family
living arrangements, the usual deference
to the legislature is inappropriate;
and the Court must examine carefully
the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent
to which they are served by the challenged
regulation." d) The strong constitutional
protection of the sanctity of the
family established in numerous decisions
of this Court extends to the family
choice involved in this case and is
not confined within an arbitrary boundary
drawn at the limits of the nuclear
family (essentially a couple [431
U.S. 494, 495] and their dependent
children). Appropriate limits on substantive
due process come not from drawing
arbitrary lines but from careful "respect
for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values
that underlie our society." Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501
(Harlan, J., concurring). The history
and tradition of this Nation compel
a larger conception of the family."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "In 1798, when this
Court was asked to hold another Connecticut
law unconstitutional, Justice Iredell
said: ""[I]t has been the
policy of all the American states,
which have, individually, framed their
state constitutions since the revolution,
and of the people of the United States,
when they framed the Federal Constitution,
to define with precision the objects
of the legislative power, and to restrain
its exercise within marked and settled
boundaries. If any act of Congress,
or of the Legislature of a state,
violates those constitutional provisions,
it is unquestionably void;"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The principles laid
down in this opinion [by Lord Camden
in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1029] affect the very essence
of constitutional liberty and security.
They reach farther than the concrete
form of the case then before the court,
with its adventitious circumstances;
they apply to all invasions on the
part of the government and its employers
of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging
of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty
and private property, where that right
has never been forfeited by his conviction
of some public offence, it is the
invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence
of [381 U.S. 479, 485]." In spite
of having committed no crimes OR being
found unfit OR incompetent as a parent,
my Right to Constitutional protection,
Equal Treatment Under the Law and
My God Given Liberties as a Law Abiding
Citizen of the United States of America,
have been violated by the Circuit
Court for Howard County Maryland,
and the State Maryland. My personal
property - my children - have been
effectively seized and without a Constitutional
basis OR the "clear establishment
of unfitness as a parent" as
mandated by Federal case law.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
"àthe familiar principle, so
often applied by this Court, that
a "governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms." NAACP
v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The Fourth and Fifth
Amendments were described in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630,
as protection against all governmental
invasions "of the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of
life." * We recently referred
[381 U.S. 479, 485] in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656 , to the Fourth
Amendment as creating a "right
to privacy, no less important than
any other right carefully and particularly
reserved to the people." See
Beaney, The Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold,
The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 216 (1960).
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The Court stated
many years ago that the Due Process
Clause protects those liberties that
are "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental." The
[state] is free to regulate the procedure
of its courts in accordance with its
own conception of policy and fairness,
unless in so doing it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
106 , 111 S., 112, 29 S.Ct. 14; Rogers
v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 , 26 S.Ct.
87; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
604 , 20 S.Ct. 494; Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 , 4 S.Ct. 111, 292; Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 , 35
S.Ct. 582; Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 67 , 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R.
527.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "In determining which
rights are fundamental, judges are
not left at large to decide cases
in light of their personal and private
notions. Rather, they must look to
the "traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people" to
determine whether a principle is "so
rooted [there] à as to be ranked as
fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 . The inquiry is
whether a right involved "is
of such a character that it cannot
be denied without violating those
`fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions'
à." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 67 . "Liberty" also
"gains content from the emanations
of . . . specific [constitutional]
guarantees" and "from experience
with the requirements of a free society."
Poe [381 U.S. 479, 494] v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 517."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The protection guaranteed
by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments
is much broader in scope. The makers
of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men."
[381 U.S. 479, 495]."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's
statement in his dissenting opinion
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551
-552: "Certainly the safeguarding
of the home does not follow merely
from the sanctity of property rights.
The home derives its pre-eminence
as the seat of family life. And the
integrity of that life is something
so fundamental that it has been found
to draw to its protection the principles
of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right. Of this whole
`private realm of family life' it
is difficult to imagine what is more
private or more intimate than a husband
and wife's marital relations."
By Extension of Natural Law, this
same level of Constitutional protection
of Family Rights must be extended
to the unemancipated minor offspring
of that lawful and law abiding marital
relation û even in event of marital
divorce.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The entire fabric
of the Constitution and the purposes
that clearly underlie its specific
guarantees demonstrate that the rights
to marital privacy and to marry and
raise a family are of similar order
and magnitude as the fundamental rights
specifically protected."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "Although the Constitution
does not speak in so many words of
the right of privacy in marriage,
I cannot believe that it offers these
fundamental rights no protection.
The fact that no particular provision
of the Constitution [381 U.S. 479,
496] explicitly forbids the State
from disrupting the traditional relation
of the family - a relation as old
and as fundamental as our entire civilization
- surely does not show that the Government
was meant to have the power to do
so. Rather, as the Ninth Amendment
expressly recognizes, there are fundamental
personal rights such as this one,
which are protected from abridgment
by the Government though not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution."
Natural Laws clearly indicate that
Father's is to serve his children
in the capacity of a highly-valued
roles of provider, protector, role-model
and family leader û facts which have
been clearly established throughout
human history and tradition. Through
its anti-Father AND Anti-Male AND
Anti-Family rulings û AND with no
legal basis to do so û the Circuit
Court for Howard County Maryland,
and the State of Maryland, have engaged
in what can only be defined as the
arbitrary classification of all males.
The actions of this Court AND this
State, have no basis in Constitutional
Law, AND offends countless principles
of justice that are so deeply rooted
in the traditions and conscience of
our Nation's people, AND which are
considered fundamental principles
of the family by these very people.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "a ... State may
à serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments,'
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 280 , 311 (dissenting opinion),
I do not believe that this includes
the power to experiment with the fundamental
liberties of citizens à" "The
vice of the dissenters' views is that
it would permit such experimentation
by the States in the area of the fundamental
personal rights of its citizens. I
cannot agree that the Constitution
grants such power either to the States
or to the Federal Government."
The systematic exclusion of Fathers
from the traditional Family by the
Courts, represents little more than
a "social experiment" which
violates Natural Law and the fundamental
personal rights of its citizens. As
such, the Court's social-experiment
- the systematic exclusion of Fathers
from the lives of their children -
in the absense of any law breaking
or wrong doing on the part of the
Father - IS UnConstitutional. Based
up the state of the American Family
AND Our Nation, this social experiment
as clearly gone-awry, and must be
immediately eliminated from Our Families
and Our Nation.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "the Government,
absent a showing of a compelling subordinating
state interest, could not decree à."
[381 U.S. 479, 497] "Yet by their
reasoning such an invasion of marital
privacy would not be subject to constitutional
challenge because, while it might
be "silly," no provision
of the Constitution specifically prevents
the Government from curtailing the
marital right to bear children and
raise a family." "à the
Court today holds that the Constitution
protects the right of marital privacy,
in my view it is far more shocking
to believe that the personal liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution does
not include protection against such
totalitarian[ism] à, which is at complete
variance with our constitutional concepts.
Yet, if upon a showing of a slender
basis of rationality, a law outlawing
[voluntary birth control] by married
persons is valid, then, by the same
reasoning, a law requiring compulsory
birth control also would seem to be
valid. In my view, however, both types
of law would unjustifiably intrude
upon rights of marital privacy which
are constitutionally protected."
Just as the Government does not have
the Constitutional authority to interject
itself into the issue regarding the
decision by it's Citizens to bear
children, so it is also true that
the same Government does not have
the Constitutional authority to interject
itself into any issue regarding the
raising of those children once they
are born û unless AND until the law
abiding parents are "clearly
established to be unfit as parents"
or engage any some other form(s) of
lawlessness. By extension, it holds
true that the offspring of Citizens
are not wards of, nor property of,
the Government OR it's Courts, and
therefore beyond the authority of
the Government or it's Courts so long
as those Citizens AND off spring are
abiding by the Constitutionally authorized
laws of this Nation.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "In a long series
of cases this Court has held that
where fundamental personal liberties
are involved, they may not be abridged
by the States simply on a showing
that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation
of a proper state purpose. "Where
there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling,"
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 . The law must be shown "necessary,
and not merely rationally related,
to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy." McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 . See Schneider
v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "...law obviously
encroaches upon a fundamental personal
liberty, the State does not show that
the law serves any "subordinating
[state] interest which is compelling"
or that it is "necessary [381
U.S. 479, 498] à to the accomplishment
of a permissible state policy."
The State, at most, argues that there
is some rational relation between
this statute and what is admittedly
a legitimate subject of state concern.
à The rationality of this justification
is dubious,à see Tileston v. Ullman,
129 Conn. 84, 26 A. 2d 582. "But,
in any event, it is clear that the
state interest àcan be served by a
more discriminately tailored statute,
which does not, like the present one,
sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching
far beyond the evil sought to be dealt
with and intruding upon the privacy
of all married couples. See Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
514 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288,
307 -308; McLaughlin v. Florida, supra,
at 196. Here, as elsewhere, where,
"[p]recision of regulation must
be the touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438.
"... without the need to "invade
the area of protected freedoms."
NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 307. See
McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 196.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 , the Court, referring
to the Fourteenth Amendment, stated:
"While this Court has not attempted
to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration and some of the
included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also [for example,] the right
... to marry, establish a home and
bring up childrenà"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "This Court, in a
series of decisions, has held that
the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and
applies to the States those specifics
of the first eight amendments which
express fundamental personal rights.
The language and history of the Ninth
Amendment reveal that the Framers
of the Constitution believed that
there are additional fundamental rights,
protected from governmental infringement,
which exist alongside those fundamental
rights specifically mentioned in the
first eight constitutional amendments.
The Ninth Amendment reads, "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." The Amendment
is almost entirely the work of James
Madison. It was introduced in Congress
by him and passed the House and Senate
with little or no debate and virtually
no change in language. It was proffered
to quiet expressed fears that a bill
of specifically enumerated rights
could not be sufficiently broad to
cover all essential [381 U.S. 479,
489] rights and that the specific
mention of certain rights would be
interpreted as a denial that others
were protected. In presenting the
proposed Amendment, Madison said:
"It has been objected also against
a bill of rights, that, by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant
of power, it would disparage those
rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by
implication, that those rights which
were not singled out, were intended
to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard
urged against the admission of a bill
of rights into this system; but, I
conceive, that it may be guarded against.
I have attempted it, as gentlemen
may see by turning to the [381 U.S.
479, 490] last clause of the fourth
resolution [the Ninth Amendment]."
Annals of Congress 439 (Gales and
Seaton ed. 1834).
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "This clause (9th
Amendment) was manifestly introduced
to prevent any perverse or ingenious
misapplication of the well-known maxim,
that an affirmation in particular
cases implies a negation in all others;
and, e converso, that a negation in
particular cases implies an affirmation
in all others." Id., at 651.
"These statements of Madison
and Story make clear that the Framers
did not intend that the first eight
amendments be construed to exhaust
the basic and fundamental rights which
the Constitution guaranteed to the
people."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "While this Court
has had little occasion to interpret
the Ninth Amendment, "[i]t cannot
be presumed that any [381 U.S. 479,
491] clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect."
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
174. In interpreting the Constitution,
"real effect should be given
to all the words it uses." Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151.
The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution
may be regarded by some as a recent
discovery and may be forgotten by
others, but since 1791 it has been
a basic part of the Constitution which
we are sworn to uphold. To hold that
a right so basic and fundamental and
so deep-rooted in our society as the
right of privacy in marriage may be
infringed because that right is not
guaranteed in so many words by the
first eight amendments to the Constitution
is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and
to give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover,
a judicial construction that this
fundamental right is not protected
by the Constitution because it is
not mentioned in explicit terms by
one of the first eight amendments
or elsewhere in the Constitution would
violate the Ninth Amendment, which
specifically states that [381 U.S.
479, 492] "[t]he enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment
simply shows the intent of the Constitution's
authors that other fundamental personal
rights should not be denied such protection
or disparaged in any other way simply
because they are not specifically
listed in the first eight constitutional
amendments. I do not see how this
broadens the authority [381 U.S. 479,
493] of the Court; rather it serves
to support what this Court has been
doing in protecting fundamental rights.
"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 , held
simply that a State could not, consistently
with due process, refuse a lawyer
a license to practice law on the basis
of a finding that he was morally unfit
when there was no evidence in the
record, 353 U.S., at 246 -247, to
support such a finding."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "See Patterson, The
Forgotten Ninth Amendment (1955).
"Mr. Patterson urges that the
Ninth Amendment be used to protect
unspecified "natural and inalienable
rights." P. 4. The Introduction
by Roscoe Pound states that "there
is a marked revival of natural law
ideas throughout the world. Interest
in the Ninth Amendment is a symptom
of that revival." P. iii. In
Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights
. . . Retained by the People"?,
37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 787, Professor
Redlich, in advocating reliance on
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to
invalidate the Connecticut law before
us, frankly states: "But for
one who feels that the marriage relationship
should be beyond the reach of a state
law à, the à case poses a troublesome
and challenging problem of constitutional
interpretation. He may find himself
saying, `The law is unconstitutional
- but why?' There are two possible
paths to travel in finding the answer.
One is to revert to a frankly flexible
due process concept even on matters
that do not involve specific constitutional
prohibitions. The other is to attempt
to evolve a new constitutional framework
within which to meet this and similar
problems which are likely to arise."
Id., at 798." The Courts finding
was that a citizen had absolute freedom
from the state with respect to the
parents decision to produce offspring.
By Natural extension, this same Constitutional
protection must be extended to include
protection from those same States
following the birth of these "protected"
children. Insofar as no Constitutionally
recognized laws are broken by these
citizens (parents and children) -
the "sacred familial domain"
must be "Constitutionally Protected
from the Arbitrary and unlawful interjection
by the States' and their illegal courts.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "Compare Nicchia
v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 , upholding
a New York dog-licensing statute on
the ground that it did not "deprive
dog owners of liberty without due
process of law." And as I said
concurring in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 175 , "I believe
that faithful adherence to the specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures
a more permanent protection of individual
libertyà"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment,
like its companion the Tenth, which
this Court held "states but a
truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered," United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124,
was framed by James Madison and adopted
by the States simply to make clear
that the adoption of the Bill of Rights
did not alter the plan that [381 U.S.
479, 530] the Federal Government was
to be a government of express and
limited powers, and that all rights
and powers not delegated to it were
retained by the people and the individual
States."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "MR. JUSTICE STEWART,
whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins, dissenting.
"The Ninth Amendment, like its
companion the Tenth, which this Court
held "states but a truism that
all is retained which has not been
surrendered," United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 , was framed
by James Madison and adopted by the
States simply to make clear that the
adoption of the Bill of Rights did
not alter the plan that [381 U.S.
479, 530] the Federal Government was
to be a government of express and
limited powers, and that all rights
and powers not delegated to it were
retained by the people and the individual
States."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "At the oral argument
in this case we were told that the
Connecticut law does not "conform
to current community standards."
But it is not the function of this
Court to decide cases on the basis
of community standards. We are here
to decide cases "agreeably to
the Constitution and laws of the United
States. It is the essence of judicial
[381 U.S. 479, 531] duty to subordinate
our own personal views..."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The Amendments in
question were, as everyone knows,
originally adopted as limitations
upon the power of the newly created
Federal Government, not as limitation
upon the powers of the individual
States. But the Court has held that
many of the provisions of the first
eight amendments are fully embraced
by the Fourteenth Amendment as limitations
upon state action, and some members
of the Court have held the view that
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
made every provision of the first
eight amendments fully applicable
against the States. See Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 .
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "The first 10 amendments
were proposed and adopted largely
because of fear that Government might
unduly interfere with prized individual
liberties. The people wanted and demanded
a Bill of Rights written into their
Constitution. The amendments embodying
the Bill of Rights were intended to
curb all branches of the Federal Government
in the fields touched by the amendments-Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial. The Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments were
pointedly aimed at confining exercise
of power by courts and judges within
precise boundaries, particularly in
the procedure used for the trial of
criminal cases. Past history provided
strong reasons [332 U.S. 46 , 71]
for the apprehensions which brought
these procedural amendments into being
and attest the wisdom of their adoption.
For the fears of arbitrary court action
sprang largely from the past use of
courts in the imposition of criminal
punishments to suppress [ion of] speech,
press, and religion. Hence the constitutional
limitations of courts' powers were,
in the view of the Founders, essential
supplements to the First Amendment,
which was itself designed to protect
the widest scope for all people to
believe and to express the most divergent
political, religious, and other views."
"With full knowledge of the import
of the Barron decision, the framers
and backers of the Fourteenth Amendment
proclaimed its purpose to be to overturn
the constitutional rule that case
had announced àIn construing other
constitutional provisions, this Court
has almost uniformly followed the
precept of Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S.
1, 12 , 787, that 'It is never to
be forgotten that in the construction
of the language of the Constitution,
as indeed in all other instances where
construction becomes necessary, we
are to place ourselves as nearly as
possible in the condition of the men
who framed that instrument.' See also
Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 , 67 S. Ct. 504; Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 , 95, 102,
740, 744; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S.
41, 89 , 106, 766, 772; Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 ;
Barron v. Baltimore, supra, Pet. at
pages 250, 251; Cohens v. Virginia,
6 Wheat. 264, 416-420.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "...this Court also
held in a number of cases that [colored]
people must, because of the Fourteenth
Amendment, be accorded equal protection
of the laws. See, e.g., Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 ; cf.
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 ;
see also Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 ." à "when Munn
v. Illinois, supra, was decided, this
Court steadfastly declined to invalidate
states' legislative regulation of
property rights or business practices
under the Fourteenth Amendment unless
there were [racial] discrimination
involved in the state law challenged.
The first significant breach in this
policy came in 1889, in Chicago, M.
& St. P.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134
U.S. 418, 702. "A state's railroad
rate regulatory statute was there
stricken as violative of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This was accomplished by reference
to a due process formula which did
not necessarily operate so as to protect
the Bill of Rights' personal liberty
safeguards, but which gave a new and
hitherto undiscovered scope for the
Court's use of the due process clause
to protect property rights under natural
law concepts. And in 1896, in Chicago,
B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 , [332 U.S. 46 , 80] this
Court, in effect, overruled Davidson
v. New Orleans, supra, by holding,
under the new due process-natural
law formula, that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbade a state from taking privateà."
"Later decisions of this Court
have completely undermined the phase
of the Twining doctrine which broadly
precluded reliance on the Bill of
Rights to determine what is and what
is not a 'fundamental' right. Later
cases have also made the Hurtado case
an inadequate support for this phase
of the Twining formula. For despite
Hurtado and Twining, this Court has
now held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects from state invasion the following
'fundamental' rights safeguarded by
the Bill of Rights: right to counsel
in criminal cases, Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 67 , 63, 84, A.L.R. 527,
limiting the Hurtado case; see also
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 , and
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S.
663 ; freedom of assembly, De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 , 259;
at the very least, certain types of
cruel and unusual punishment and former
jeopardy, State of Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459
; the right of an accused in a criminal
case to be in- [332 U.S. 46 , 85]
formed of the charge against him,
see Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 , 332, 90 A.L.R. 575; the
right to receive just compensation
on account of taking private property
for public use, Chicago, B. &
Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
. And the Court has now through the
Fourteenth Amendment literally and
emphatically applied the First Amendment
to the States in its very terms. Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
; West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 , 1186,
147 A.L.R. 674; Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 268 , 196, 159 A.L.R.
1346."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "I cannot consider
the Bill of Rights to be an outworn
18th Century 'strait jacket' as the
Twining opinion did. Its provisions
may be thought outdated abstractions
by some. à In my judgment the people
of no nation can lose their liberty
so long as a Bill of Rights like ours
survives and its basic purposes are
conscientiously interpreted, enforced
and respected so as to afford continuous
protection against old, as well as
new, devices and practices which might
thwart those purposes. I fear to see
the consequences of the Court's practice
of substituting its own concepts of
decency and fundamental justice for
the language of the Bill of Rights
as its point of departure in interpreting
and enforcing that Bill of Rights.
If the choice must be between the
selective process of the Palk decision
applying some of the Bill of Rights
to the States, or the Twining rule
applying none of them, I would choose
the Palko selective process. But rather
than accept either of these choices.
I would follow what I believe was
the original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment-to extend to all the people
of the nation the complete protection
of the Bill of Rights. To hold that
this Court can determine what, if
any, provisions of the Bill of Rights
will be enforced, and if so to what
degree, is to frustrate the great
design of a written Constitution.
[332 U.S. 46, 90].
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "In Spies v. Illinois,
123 U.S. 131, 'à the first ten Amendments
were adopted as limitations on Federal
power, yet in so far as they secure
and recognize fundamental [332 U.S.
46, 122] rights-common law rights-of
the man, they make them privileges
and immunities of the man as citizen
of the United States, and cannot now
be abridged by a State under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "Mr. Justice Field
in his dissenting opinion in O'Neil
v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 , 361,
698, 707, stated that 'after much
reflection' he had become persuaded
that the definition of privileges
and immunities given by Mr. Tucker
in Spies v. Illinois, supra, 'is correct.'
And Mr. Justice Field went on to say
that 'While, therefore, the ten amendments
as limitations on power, and, so far
as they accomplish their purpose and
find their fruition in such limitations,
are applicable only to the federal
government and not to the states,
yet, so far as they declare or recognize
the rights of persons they are rights
belonging to them as citizens of the
United States under the constitution;
and the fourteenth amendment, as [332
U.S. 46 , 123] to all such rights,
places a limit upon state power by
ordaining that no state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge
them."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "every citizen of
the United States is protected from
punishments which are cruel and unusual.
It is an immunity which belongs to
him, against both state and federal
action. The state cannot apply to
him, any more than the United States,
the torture, the rack, or thumb-screw,
or any cruel and unusual punishment,
or any more than it can deny to him
security in his house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, or compel him to be
a witness against himself in a criminal
prosecution. These rights, as those
of citizens of the United States,
find their recognition and guaranty
against federal action in the constitution
of the United States, and against
state action in the fourteenth amendment.
The inhibition by that amendment is
not the less valuable and effective
because of the prior and existing
inhibition against such action in
the constitutions of the several states.
144 U.S. at page 363, 12 S.Ct. at
page 708.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "It is one thing
when the State exerts its power either
to forbid extra-marital sexuality
. . . or to say who may marry, but
it is quite another when, having acknowledged
a marriage and the intimacies inherent
in it, it undertakes to regulate by
means of the criminal law the details
of that intimacy." GIVEN that
the intimacy between the law abiding
Parties is "Constitutionally
off limits and beyond the regulation
of the Courts", so-too, must
be the result(s) of that intimacy
(the law abiding Parties unemancipated
minor children) be ""Constitutationally
off-limits" so long as "the
Parties remain law abiding" AND
are "not clearly established
as unfit parents."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "In the final analysis,
it seems to me that the Boyd doctrine,
though perhaps not required by the
express language of the Constitution
strictly construed, is amply justified
from an historical standpoint, soundly
based in reason, [367 U.S. 643, 663]
and entirely consistent with what
I regard to be the proper approach
to interpretation of our Bill of Rights
- an approach well set out by Mr.
Justice Bradley in the Boyd case:
"Constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property
should be liberally construed. A close
and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads
to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than
in substance. It is the duty of the
courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon."
And yet, in spite of the Constitutional
protections that are clearly in place,
the Circuit Court for Howard County
Maryland, and the State of Maryland,
have illegal interjected themselves
into the private sanctity of the law
abiding Parties' familial domain,
and willfully attempted to damage,
if not altogether destroy, the critical
relationship between the plaintiff
and his unemancipated minor children
- in violation of Natural Law, in
the total absence of a lawful suspension
of Writ of Habeas Corpus, and is therefore
in violation of numerous Rights and
Protections guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), æWhen we allowed States
to give constitutional sanction to
the "shabby business" of
unlawful entry into a home (to use
an expression of Mr. Justice Murphy,
Wolf v. Colorado, at 46), we did indeed
rob the Fourth Amendment of much meaningful
force."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), " à the principle
of privacy "which is at the core
of the Fourth Amendment." (Id.,
at 27.) It would not be proper to
expect or impose any precise equivalence,
either as regards the scope of the
right or the means of its implementation,
between the requirements of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. For the
Fourth, unlike what was said in Wolf
of the Fourteenth, does not state
a general principle only; it is a
particular command, having its setting
in a pre-existing legal context on
which both interpreting decisions
and enabling statutes must at least
build." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656, "Seventy-five years
ago, in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886), considering
the Fourth 4 and Fifth Amendments
as running "almost into each
other" on the facts before it,
this Court held that the doctrines
of those Amendments "apply to
all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of
his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, [367 U.S. 643, 647] that
constitutes the essence of the offence;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property."
The Plaintiff, AND the Parties, are
law abiding citizens of the United
States, have never been charge OR
adjudicated as "unlawful"
or "clearly established as unfit
to parent." Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656, The Court noted that:
"constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property
should be liberally construed àIt
is the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon." At p.
635." The Circuit Court of Howard
County, the State of Maryland, and
all States within the United States,
have indeed been "stealthy"
in their systematic encroachment upon
the Rights of the Citizens of the
Unites States of America. However,
the Plaintiff (and countless Fathers
throughout this land) now have their
eyes fully opened, and are cognizant
of the fact that their basic Civil
and Human Rights are being systematically
encroached upon by the States and
their illegal courts. As guaranteed
by the United States Constitution,
the Plaintiff (and countless Fathers
throughout this land), are also now
very cognizant of the fact that they
have the absolute Right to be Let
Alone, (The Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold,55
Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960). Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 . "We
find that, as to the Federal Government,
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and,
as to the States, the freedom from
unconscionable invasions of privacy.....,'
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,
543 -544 "The philosophy of each
Amendment and of each freedom is complementary
to, although not dependent upon, that
of the other in its sphere of influence
-" 367 U.S., at 656 -657.
BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
"Court held that the doctrines
of those Amendments "apply to
all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of
his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, [367 U.S. 643, 647] that
constitutes the essence of the offence;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property."
MALLOY v. HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1 (1964),
"In 1961, the [378 U.S. 1, 6]
Court held that in the light of later
decisions, it was taken as settled
that "àthe Fourth Amendment's
right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendmentà"
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), "1. Under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
petitioner was entitled to a hearing
on his fitness as a parent before
his children were taken from him.
Pp. 647-658." "(b) The State
cannot, consistently with due process
requirements, merely presume that
[unmarried] fathers in general and
petitioner in particular are unsuitable
and neglectful parents. Parental unfitness
must be established on the basis of
individualized proof. See Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 . Pp. 649-658.
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), "The Court has frequently
emphasized the importance of the family.
The rights to conceive and to raise
one's children have been deemed "essential,"
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923), "basic civil rights of
man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and "rights
far more precious . . . than property
rights," May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), "It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom
include preparation [of those children]
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
The integrity of the family unit has
found protection in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399,
the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma,
supra, at 541, and the Ninth Amendment,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)."
SKINNER v. STATE OF OKL. EX REL. WILLIAMSON,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) ".one of
the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental rights..."
Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1778 (1992), the court observed
that the Supreme Court has "recognized
the fact that the writ of habeas corpus
is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action.'
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91
(1969). "Therefore, the writ
must be "administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential
to insure that miscarriages of justice
within its reach are surfaced and
corrected." Harris, 394 U.S.
at 291. Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d
1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "The
writ of habeas corpus serves as an
important check on the manner in which
state courts pay respect to federal
constitutional rights. The writ is
"the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action."
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91
(1969). Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d
1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "The
Court observed that"[t]he writ
of habeas corpus is one of the centerpieces
of our liberties." Brown v. Vasquez,
952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992),
"Dismissal of habeas petition
under the "total exhaustion"
rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
520 (1982). Each of the claims raised
by petitioner must be exhausted before
district court may reach the merits
of any claim in habeas petition. Brown
v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1778 (1992), "a petitioner is
entitled to habeas relief only if
it can be established that the constitutional
error had "substantial and injurious
effectà" Brecht v. Abrahamson,
113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 & n.9 (1993).
Whether the constitutional error was
harmless is not a factual determination
entitled to the statutory presumption
of correctness under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d).
Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405; Marino v.
Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir.
1987)." What could be more "substantial
and injurious" to a law abiding
Citizen of the United States AND a
loving and committed Parent, than
the unlawful denial of a sustained
and healthy relationship with his
legitimated, unemancipated minor children?
Through the illegal and unconstitutional
actions of the Circuit Court for Howard
County û which represents nothing
short of "systemic-wrongs"
being perpetrated against the absolutely
law abiding, loving and committed
Plaintiff/Father. Through it's illegal
actions, the Circuit Court for Howard
County is inflicting extreme pain
and suffering upon the Parties unemancipated
minor children, which they would never
been subjected to had these governmental
entities simply "minded there
own business" (The Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev.
212; Griswold,55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216
(1960) and left the private matters
of the law abiding familial domain,
to those best-equipped to address
those matters û THE PARTIES. See Also:
O'NEIL v. VERMONT, 144 U.S. 323 (1892);
TWINING v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 211
U.S. 78 (1908); U.S. v. DARBY, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); Calder v. Bull, 3
Dall. 386, 399;Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S.105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R.
82; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882; MEYER v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
GARNER v. TEAMSTERS UNION, 346 U.S.
485 (1953), "(c) When federal
power constitutionally is exerted
for the protection of public or private
interests, or both, it becomes the
supreme law of the land and cannot
be curtailed, circumvented or extended
by a state procedure merely because
such procedure will apply some doctrine
of private right. Pp. 492-501. Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized
the due process right of natural fathers
to maintain a parental relationship
with their children absent a finding
that they are unfit as parents."
ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. DOUGHTON,
262 U.S. 413 (1923) 262 U.S. 41, "
an arbitrary classification is obnoxious
to the equal protection clause, Southern
Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 ,
30 Sup. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247."
ARBITRARY Defined: adj. Determined
by chance, whim, or impulse, and not
by necessity, reason, or principle.
Based on or subject to individual
judgment or preference. Established
by a court or judge rather than by
a specific law or statute. Not limited
by law; despotic. |