That, the use of
garnishment is governed by federal
(there may be some state codes too)
statutes such as 15 USC 1673, and
its companion law,15 USC 1675 pertaining
to the very existence, or potential
existence of enforcement of any order
violating the maximum certain percentages
of actual disposable income-- rendering
the support and/or garnishment order
in violation of the law,-- (particularly
see paragraph C therein). Whichever
statute (federal or Indiana) that
provides greater protection to the
Respondent, prevails.
These [state, if any in MA-- there
are some in IN] federal statutes guarantee
protection (to the Respondent) from
having “imputed income” orders.
Furthermore, these statutes provide
(to the Respondent) protection of
his rights to be free from unlawful
child support or any kind of garnishment.
That, child support is a civil matter
and there is no probable cause to
seek or issue body attachment, bench
warrant, or arrest in child support
matters because it is a civil matter.
The use of such instruments (body
attachment, bench warrants, arrests,
etc) presumably is a method to "streamline"
arresting people for child support
and circumventing the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution,
and is used as a debt-collecting tool
using unlawful arrests and imprisonment
to collect a debt or perceived debt.
The arrest of non-custodial parents
in which men make up significant majority
of the "arrestees", is "gender
profiling", "gender biased
discrimination" and a "gender
biased hate crime" in that it
violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A man, pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution of the
United States, cannot be arrested
in a civil matter as a woman is not.
There is no escaping the fact that
there is no probable cause in a civil
matter to arrest or issue body attachment.
"Probable cause" to arrest
requires a showing that both a crime
has been, or is being committed, and
that the person sought to be arrested
committed the offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4. In the instant case, no probable
cause can exist, because the entire
matter has arisen out of a civil case.
Therefore, seeking of body attachment,
bench warrant, or arrest by the Petitioner
(and her attorney), and/or issuing
of the same by the court, in this
civil case would be against the law
and the Constitution.
Under U.S. v. Rylander ignorance of
the order or the inability to comply
with the [child support] order, or
as in this case, to pay, would be
a complete defense to any contempt
sanction, violation of a court order
or violation of litigant's rights.
Every U.S. Court of Appeals that has
addressed this issue, has held that
child support is a common, commercial
(and civil) debt, See, U.S. v. Lewko,
269 F.3d 64, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2001)(citations
omitted) and U.S. v. Parker, 108 F.3d
28, 31 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d
232 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals (citing cases from
the U.S. Supreme Court, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits)“by definition,
probable cause to arrest can only
exist in relation to criminal conduct;
civil disputes cannot give rise to
probable cause”; Paff v. Kaltenbach,
204 F.3d 425, 435 (3rd Cir. 2000)
(Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement
officers from arresting citizens without
probable cause. See, Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983), therefore, no
body attachment, bench warrant or
arrest order may be issued.
If a person is arrested on less than
probable cause, the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized
that the aggrieved party has a cause
of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for
violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct.
1213 (1967).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (there can be no objective reasonableness
where officials violate clearly established
constitutional rights such as--
(a) United States Constitution, Fourth
Amendment (including Warrants Clause),
Fifth Amendment (Due Process and Equal
Protection), Ninth Amendment (Rights
to Privacy and Liberty), Fourteenth
Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection).
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