Permanent order. In 1990, the Legislature rewrote the statute, see St. 1990, c. 403,  3, adding language that expressly grants the judge discretionary authority to "enter a permanent order" at the renewal hearing, generally, the date set in the original order when "the order is to expire" and "the matter will again be heard." G. L. c. 209A,  3.[6] See Crenshaw v. Macklin, 430 Mass. 633, 634-635 (2000). General Laws c. 209A,  3, mandates that initial relief be granted for a fixed period of time, not to exceed a year, and that the order state on its face the date and time that the order is to "expire" and the matter will again be "heard." Upon that date, if the plaintiff appears, the court is directed to "determine" whether to extend or make permanent the order. Without further action by the court, the Legislature has directed that the order expire. There is no presumption that the order be continued. There is no entitlement that the order be made permanent. The order expires unless extended after a judicial determination, essentially, a new finding, that the plaintiff continues to require protection from "abuse" as explicitly defined in c. 209A,  1 -- in this case, requiring a finding that a permanent order is, in fact, what is reasonably necessary to protect Jones from being placed "in fear of imminent serious physical harm" by Gallagher. See Commonwealth v. Molloy, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 306, 309 (1998) ("extension of an annual order pursuant to  3 . . . is . . . by no means automatic"); Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 929-930.

There is no burden on a defendant to testify or present evidence. "The burden is on the complainant to establish facts justifying the . . . continuance of an abuse prevention order. . . . The plaintiff must make the case for the awarding of relief." Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596. "Although it is not expressly stated in G. L. c. 209A, . . . [the] plaintiff must make a case for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 597. See Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. at 522.