A voidable order Potenz Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill. App. 3d 617, 525 N.E. 2d  173, 175 (1988). In instances herein, the law has stated that the orders are void ab initio and not voidable because they are already void. Due to the violation of CONSTITUTIONAL rights by Judge

Dated:_________________                                                               

 SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1INTRODUCTION

1)             Article III  Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

                Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.  In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

                The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

2)             CANON 2

A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES

A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

B. A judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. A judge should not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of others; nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.

C. A judge should not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.

3)             TITLE 28 > PART I > CHAPTER 16 > § 351 § 351. Complaints; judge defined

Release date: 2005-09-29

(a) Filing of Complaint by Any Person.— Any person alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability, may file with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint containing a brief statement of the facts constituting such conduct. (b) Identifying Complaint by Chief Judge.— In the interests of the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts and on the basis of information available to the chief judge of the circuit, the chief judge may, by written order stating reasons therefor, identify a complaint for purposes of this chapter and thereby dispense with filing of a written complaint. (c) Transmittal of Complaint.— Upon receipt of a complaint filed under subsection (a), the clerk shall promptly transmit the complaint to the chief judge of the circuit, or, if the conduct complained of is that of the chief judge, to that circuit judge in regular active service next senior in date of commission (hereafter,

                for purposes of this chapter only, included in the term "chief judge"). The clerk shall simultaneously transmit a copy of the complaint to the judge whose conduct is the subject of the complaint. The clerk shall also transmit a copy of any complaint identified under subsection (b) to the judge whose conduct is the subject of the complaint.

(d) Definitions.— In this chapter—

(1) the term "judge" means a circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge; and

(2) the term "complainant" means the person filing a complaint under subsection (a) of this section.:

I am in Propria Persona, Sui Juris, and am acting as my own counsel3.

 NOTE:  I am not PRO SE and any labeling as such is a direct damage to me, as this court and all its judicial officers has knowledge of the law and come under strict construction of the law, while I as a

3)         SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1The Supremacy Clause appears in Article VI of the United States Constitution. It establishes the Constitution, Federal Statutes, and U.S. treaties as "the supreme law of the land." The Constitution is the highest form of law in the American legal system. State judges are required to uphold it, even if state laws or Constitutions conflict with it.

[4] Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306 (describing Harlow's standard as one of "objective legal reasonableness"). "A public official is not entitled to qualified immunity when the contours of the allegedly violated right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing

            violate[d] that right."

                 Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996) (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity  "requires a two-part inquiry:

     (A) Was the law governing the state official's conduct clearly established?

     (B) Under that law could a reasonable state official have believed his conduct was lawful?"

     Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Portland v. Bagley,

     988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993)).    

     This standard " `gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' " Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)).

5)        SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1ADVANCE \d 4That the United States Supreme Court has clearly, and repeatedly, held that any judge who acts without jurisdiction is engaged in an act of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101, S. Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980): Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).

6)        That The United States Supreme Court, in Twining v. New           

Jersery, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 24, (1908), stated that "Due   Process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction."; citing Old Wayne Mut. Life Assoc. V. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907); Scott v McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 14, S. Ct. 1108 (1894); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).

7)         Due Process is a requirement of the U.S. Constitution. Violation of the United States Constitution by a judge deprives that person from acting as a judge under the law. He/She is acting as a private person, and not in the capacity of being a judge (and, therefore, has no jurisdiction).

8)         The state Supreme Courts have held that those who aid, abet, advise, act upon and execute the order of a judge who acts without jurisdiction are equally guilty. They are equally guilty of a crime against the U.S. Government.

VOIDABLE V. VOID ORDERS

9)         A voidable order is an order that must be declared void by a judge to be void; a void order is an order issued without jurisdiction by a judge and is void ab initio and does not have to be declared void by a judge to be void. Only an inspection of the record of the case showing that the judge was without jurisdiction or violated a person’s due process rights, or where fraud was involved in the attempted procurement of jurisdiction, is sufficient for an order to be void. Potenz Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill. App. 3d 617, 525 N.E. 2d 173, 175 (1988). In instances herein, the law has stated that the orders are void ab initio and not voidable because they are already void.

10)       There is a misconception by some attorneys and judges that only a judge may declare an order void, but this is not the law: (1) there is no statute nor case law that supports this position, and (2) should there be any case law that allegedly supported this argument, that case would be directly contrary to the law established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920) as well as other state courts, e.g. by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Miller. Supra. A party may have a court vacate a void order, but the void order is still void ab initio, whether vacated or not; a piece of paper does not determine whether an order is void, it just memorializes it, makes it legally binding and voids out all previous orders returning the case to the date prior to action leading to void ab initio.

11)  This principle of law was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as "Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply VOID, AND THIS IS EVEN PRIOR TO REVERSAL." [Emphasis added]. Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920). See also Old Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L. Ed, 1170, 1189, (1850); Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617 (1808).

12)  Pursuant to the Vallely court decision, a void order does not have to be reversed by any court to be a void order. Courts have also held that, since a void order is not a final order, but is in effect no order at all, it cannot even be appealed. Courts have held that a void decision is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final. Consistent with this holding, in 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that, "Since such jurisdictional defect deprives not only the initial court but also the appellate court of its power over the case or controversy, to permit the appellate court to ignore it. …[Would be an] unlawful action by the appellate court itself." Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Miller, supra. Following the same principle, it would be an unlawful action for a court to rely on an order issued by a judge who did not have subject-matter jurisdiction and therefore the order he issued was Void ab initio.

13)  A void order may be challenged in any court, at any time, and even by third parties. A void order has no legal force or effect. As one court stated, a void order is equivalent to a blank piece of paper.

14)  VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

While a Judge may issue orders to control his court, he has no lawful authority to issue any order which violates the Supreme Law of the Land. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that all entities have the mandatory right of an adequate, complete, effective, fair, full meaningful and timely access to the court. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the interest of parents in the care, custody and control of their children, is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the court, Troxel V. Granville, USC, (2000). "Parents have a liberty interest of the custody of their children, hence, any deprivation of that interest by the state must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requirements of due process." Hooks v Hooks, United States Court of Appeals (1985). Indeed, the right to rear one’s children is so firmly rooted in our culture that the Unites States Supreme Court has held it to be a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hawk v. Hawk, Tennessee Supreme Court, (1993). The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees Due Process and Equal Protection to all. "No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." United States Constitutional Amendment XIV and adopted by State of Indiana Constitution.

"Choices about marriage, family life, upbringing of children are among associational rights ranked as of basic importance in our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. U.S.C.A. Constitutional Amendment 14.

It seems that in this case, Sanjari v Gratzol (previously Sanjari), the court made an issue of clear and convincing bias by repeatedly delaying, and eventually canceling (effectively reversing its own decision on) the full custody hearing set for February 10, March 22, & June 22 2004, effectively deciding in favor of the Petitioner/Mother who had been seeking some of those delays. It also made the unethical and illegal decision to reverse its own order (of hearing set for December 23, 2003) by allowing her to have a TRO, January 2004, which canceled any contact I have with my son.  This reversal by the Court was prompted by its illegal and unethical conduct in protecting, and covering up for, its own misconducts and violations and that of another judge.  The Court tried to muzzle the Respondent/Father by issuing an illegal (by IN & US laws—see previous filings) Mediation and Counseling Order to prevent a public hearing of the custody case which the Court and their "brethren" judges would have found embarrassing. The Court further denied the Respondent/Father the opportunity, as required by the U.S. Constitution, to examine and challenge the underlying reasons for its decision, hence violating the US Constitution with the result that that decision is VOID (see above).
The Court, moreover, denied the due process rights of the minor children by canceling the custody hearing, and endangered their safety and well-being. Again, in violation of the US Constitution and IN and US laws.

Similarly, any other Court or entity insisting to uphold such an illegal order would be in violation of the US Constitution.

FAMILY LIFE VIOLATIONS

15)       The construction of a constitutional theory which will protect various aspects of family life under Section 1983 rightly continues to command a good deal of judicial interest.

The right of a parent to raise his children has long been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right, "far more precious than property rights." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), quoting May v. Anderson, 345, U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), See, e.q. Castigno v Wholean, 239 Conn. 336 (1996); In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557 (1992). In Re: May V Anderson (1953) 345 US 528, 533, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221, 1226, This case involved a mother stripped of her rights without the right to utter a single word in her defense. The order was originally granted for 6 months in which the court allowed the mother to "fight" for her rights back, but kept getting delayed so that the child would incur more time with the father. This case was reversed upon appeal, and also gave rise to the statute citing that, Presumption (750 ILCS 5/603) "A court may consider the period of time that a child has spent with a parent by virtue of a temporary custody order but there is no presumption in favor of the existing custodian under 750 ILCS 5/602 as there is in modification cases under 750 ILCS 5/610. In Re Hefer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 73, 217 Ill. Dec 701, 667 N.E. 2nd 1094 (4 Dist. 1996). Obviously, the argument is that one parent may manipulate the system to prolong proceedings that he/she may think there is an automatic award of custody. The 602 standards still are mandated to be applied, one of them including the wishes of the children as well as other issues such as safety and well-being of the children (11 seizures in the mothers care and constant abductions and interference in the child’s educations, health and welfare. In this case due to psychological and/or other abuse in the Petitioner/Mother’s residence).

STATEMENT OF BIAS.

 SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 116)       I am a proper party to this matter, and have been witness thereto of the egregious acts and/or omissions, bias, overt prejudice and proactive practice from the bench,  Judge NAME of JUDGE on December 23, 2003, January 4, 2004 January 10, 2004, March 23, 2004 and June 22, 2004 in the above mentioned tribunal.

17)  My status is that of an adult, minister, independent reporter, male of the age of majority, who is not an incompetent, nor any fiction or corporation.  I am a person with epilepsy, as a disabled person, I have the same rights to have and raise children, as a non-disabled person.

18)    I am in fact, a human being, a free man about the land, beholden to nobody; a United State Citizen, not a member of nor embarrassed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States.  See Plessy v. Ferguson..

      19)  I claim all rights inherent to me, and give proper judicial notice and place on the record, that any Judge in this matter be held to strict construction of their own law, and be held to the highest standards thereto in accordance with the concise rule of law.

“If a Judge is disqualified as a matter of law, every order entered by him is as equally void under the new law as it was under the old, and no reason appears why the parties should be forced to trial before a disqualified commissioner, only to have the judgment set aside when it later appears that as a matter of law the commissioner was disqualified.”

Briggs v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 215 Cal. 336, 10 P.2d 1003 (Cal. 03/31/1932)

               Or upon the sufficiency in law, fact, or otherwise, of the statement of the disqualification filed by a party.

            In every such case, the question of the disqualification shall be a hearing and determined by a duly elected judge agreed upon by all the parties.”

20)        His own rights are in question he has no authority to determine the cause; so well is the principle understood that in every court consisting of more commissioners than one, the commissioner who is a party in a suit takes no part in the proceedings or decision of the cause."  Washington Ins. Co. v. Price (1823) 1 Hopk. 1.

"The state is bound to furnish every litigant not only an impartial commissioner, but one who has not, by any act of his, justified a doubt of his impartiality."  Moers v. Gilbert, (1941) 175 Misc. 733, 25 N.Y.S.2d 114, affirmed 261 App.Div. 957, 27 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426, Appeal den. 261 pp.Div.1074,27N.Y.S.2d783.

              Also note that no commissioner can be a party or lawyer to any other party actions in court:

"That no one can, even by consent, be the attorney of both the litigating parties in the same controversy.

"  Farressly 7 47..169, 112 N.W. 386 (1907)

This fact is also stated within the CCP § 170.4(c)(1):  “The issue of disqualification shall be referred to a duly elected judge for decision as provided in subdivision

(a) of Section 170.3 and if it is determined that the commissioner is disqualified, all orders and rulings of the commissioner found to be disqualified made after the filing of the statement shall be vacated.”

[SEE ALSO CCP 170.6 et seq.]."Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. We cannot condone this shocking conduct... If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately

" U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F2d 297, had no jurisdiction in this matter, and knew as such, and thereby—he had no lawful authority, and all acts and/or omissions committed against me were done under color of law4, and under color of authority, as without jurisdiction he does in fact, have no claims to immunity nor any future redress at law upon any future claim asserted by me." At English Common Law proceedings in court without jurisdiction were deemed corum non judice--"Before one not a commissioner" SEE:  "Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments”, 87 Yale L.J. 164, 165 (1977)

21)       In its order granting the Appellees' motion for summary judgment, the district court began its analysis by setting forth the elements of a § 1983 claim against an individual state actor as follows:

(1) [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived;

(2) the acts or omissions of the defendant were intentional;

(3) the defendant acted under color of law; and

(4) the acts or omissions of the defendant caused the constitutional deprivation.

Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F. Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The court also stated that, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that

(1) [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived;

(2) the municipality had a policy or custom;

(3) this policy or custom amounts to deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff's] constitutional right; and

(4) the policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

PART IX tc "PART IX " \l 4

ALLEGATIONS OF LAW tc "ALLEGATIONS OF LAW " \l 5

22)   It is a fact that Judge NAME of JUDGE, fail to review the        evidence set forth in this case. 

             CALIFORNIA CODES EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 454. (a) In determining the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter, or the tenor thereof:

   (1) Any source of pertinent information, including the advice of persons learned in the subject matter, may be consulted or used, whether or not furnished by a party.

   (2) Exclusionary rules of evidence do not apply except for Section 352 and the rules of privilege.

   (b)     Where the subject of judicial notice is the law of an organization of nations, a foreign nation, or a public entity in a foreign nation and the court resorts to the advice of persons learned

            in the subject matter, such advice, if not received in open court, shall be in writing.

23)       Amendment V was violated repeatedly by Judge NAME of JUDGE. I was not allowed to cross examine, the witnesses before me, nor was I allowed to examine the documents prior to the hearing.  My life was placed into danger as well as my son’s.  I was twice charged with the same infamous crime, and I was forced to appear before the courts without counsel.

24)       Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact, neither hold his own officer of the courts up to strict construction of the law, or himself up to same; and has failed to give me liberal or broad

            construction of the law, under the "Spirit of the Law" and by allowing himself and petitioner to perjure themselves and violate the law in open court is in fact, enjoining with a willful plan to disenfranchise me of my rights as a father, using color of law, under color of authority.

25) These laws of bias and prejudice exist because bias does exist this is proof in it self

A)   Judge NAME of JUDGE is of improper oath  see California constitution article 20 sec.3

B)   Judge NAME of JUDGE is of improper authority  see California constitution article VI sec.

C)   Judge NAME of JUDGE  is not bonded in accordance with the law  see California constitution

D)        Judge NAME of JUDGE violated the Petitioner rights under the ADA laws and CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SEC. 24.

            DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  Office of the Attorney General  28 CFR PART 35

            [Order No. ]  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government

            Services  AGENCY: Department of Justice.

            ACTION: Final rule.

            SUMMARY: This rule implements subtitle A of title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,

            Pub. L. 101-336, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities.

            Subtitle A protects qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination on the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of all State and local governments.

            CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SEC. 24. Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this

            State in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States. This declaration of rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.

            See California constitution article 1 sec. 1

            U.S.C. title 42 section 1983 depravation of rights

26)       A notice to set aside was filed January 4, 2004, based on PROOF of PERJURY BY THE DEFENDANT.  tc "F) A notice to set aside was filed January 4, 2004, based on PROOF of PERJURY BY THE DEFENDANT.  " \l 5On January 10, 2004 and March 22, 2004 subsequently Judge NAME of JUDGE violated the plaintiff rights’ guaranteed by the constitution of the United states by ordering the plaintiff have “supervised visitation.” And by ordering a “Sole Legal and Sole Physical” Without proof of actual abuse, where the whole case was based on subjection and perjury.  This is a violation of the fourteenth amendment Also U.S.C. 28 section 1443

27) No Reasonable efforts where provided to plaintiff.  There was no due process or was there allowed to be a cross examination of either Pamela Berlanga, Doris Sammi and/or Charles Silverstein.

            Some states operate on a "state model" in which local agency employees are state employees; other states operate on a "county model" in which local agency employees are municipal or county employees. For purposes of federal law, the state agency is ultimately          responsible for statutory mandates. However, many of the recommendations in these guidelines that are stated in terms of "the agency" or "the state agency" apply equally to county or municipal agencies that have immediate responsibility for carrying out the reasonable efforts mandate.

28) A notice to set aside was filed January 4, 2004.

     On 1-4-04, 1-10-04 and 3-22-04  Judge NAME of JUDGE violated the Respondents rights guaranteed by the constitution of the United states by ordering the mother shall have sole legal and physical custody of the minor children, this is in violation of federal law "no due process" :see court cases attached, this also a violation of federal law.

            O'NEIL v. VERMONT, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); TWINING v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); U.S. v. DARBY, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399;Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 82; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882; MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). GARNER v. TEAMSTERS UNION, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), "(c) When federal power constitutionally is exerted for the protection of public or private interests, or both, it becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented or extended by a state procedure merely because such procedure will apply some doctrine of private right. Pp. 492-501. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental relationship with their children absent a finding that they are unfit as parents." ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. DOUGHTON, 262 U.S. 413 (1923) 262 U.S. 41, " an arbitrary classification is obnoxious to the equal protection clause, Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 , 30 Sup. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247." ARBITRARY Defined: adj. Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle. Based on or subject to individual judgment or preference. Established by a court or judge rather than by a specific law or statute. Not limited by law; despotic.

29) A notice to set aside was filed January 4^th 2004.

     On 11-06-03 Judge NAME of JUDGE violated the respondents rights guaranteed by the

     constitution of the United states "lack of due process and equal treatment" by ordering

     the respondent to enroll in a parenting classes.  A emergency protective order was granted for 2 reasons,

30)       1-4-04 contempt of a court order by the mother to not interfere with the custody of the child, and by Judge NAME of JUDGE failure to adhere to said court order and to show bias because of the father gender and disability it makes all order voidable.

            A. By excluding the father from getting the child’s medications.  Which jeopardized the child’s health and welfare, and wholly interfered in the best interest of the child.  Then by making a false claim with CPS that the doctor had written that the “mother” could only pick up the medications which was PROVEN TO BE A LIE BY A LETTER FROM THE DOCTOR!

31)       By the mother making false accusations against a child in my household which is not a “actual abuse of a child.”  By forbidding the father from any of the child’s counseling in direct violation of court orders. A Constitutional Violation accrued when Judge NAME of JUDGE did refuse to allow me to have witnesses in my behalf.

     Judge NAME of JUDGE did show gender bias, and discrimination against a disabled parent. Judges can not due whatever they want see court cases attached

32) A notice to set aside was filed January 4^th 2004

     On 1-4-04, 1-10-04, 3-22-04 and 6-22-04 Judge NAME of JUDGE violated the respondents rights guaranteed by the constitution of the United states by ordering the respondent to have supervised visits base wholly on perjury without proof in violation of Family Codes: 3027.1.  (a) If a court determines, based on the investigation described in Section 3027 or other evidence presented to it, that an accusation of child abuse or neglect made during a child custody proceeding is false and the person making the accusation knew it to be false at the time the accusation was made, the court may impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed all costs incurred by the party accused as a direct result of defending the accusation, and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in recovering the sanctions, against the person making the accusation.  For the purposes of this section, "person" includes a witness, a party, or a party's attorney.

            :see court cases attached

34)   SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1Amendment V

compensation.

SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 135)      That I be allowed to agree on a " Duly Elected Judge' Under Oath, to hear this matter, who

            is an competent in Americans with Disability Rights, Federal Hate Crimes,  U.S.C. Codes Including but not limited to RICO and Constitutional law, who will rule unbiasedly in accordance with the law, and be of the following reasonable lawful requisites:

A)   That he be of proper oath and affirmation.

B)   That he be bonded in accordance with the law.

C)   That he be duly elected as required by law.  (See Cal. Const. Art. VI et seq.)

D)   That he be in the Judicial Department as required by Article III of the Constitution of the State of California (1849).

E)   That the Judge in fact, be of good behavior.

F)   That the Judge pay does not diminish.

G)   That the Judge be unbiased and just.

H) That the Judge be familiar with California Codes and Constitution.

I) That the Judge be familiar with Americans with Disability Rights.

J) That the Judge be familiar with Federal Hate Crimes.

K) That the Judge be familiar with U.S.C Codes.

L) That the Judge be familiar with RICO laws.

M) That the Judge be familiar with Constitutional Laws.

36)       That any and all hearings be expunged as set for this disqualification, in accordance with law. That any other legal findings; and/or decisions adjudicated my Judge NAME of JUDGE be vacated, and/or expunged from the record in ab intio.      

37)       That this court remit to me any other just or compensation or reparation this court deem just and proper in this matter.   Respectfully submitted,

Dated: _______________

SEAL:                                           _____________________________________

YOUR NAME

In Propria Persona Sui Juris

Address

City, STATE, Zip

"Telephone Appearance"

Telephone Number

SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1COMES NOW THE AGGRIEVED AND DAMAGED PARTY IN THIS MATTER, BY THESE PRESENTS:

The competent adult, YOUR NAME, who having personal knowledge of these matters, and knowing the penalties for the crime of perjury, hereby truthfully states for the record and deposes and says:

38)       My name is YOUR NAME.

39)      My name and spelling is only exactly as: YOUR NAME. I do in fact, do not use any other, nor do I allow   Respondent in the above mentioned NOTICE OF DISQUALIFICATION.

40)       I have personal knowledge of the facts in this matter.

41)       I am acting as my own counsel in my own proper person: In Propria Persona Sui Juris; and,

42)      That I am NOT PRO SE.  Any such assertion is an overt lie, as people making such claim have knowledge of the law and are making claims for other malicious designs in which to disenfranchise and/or enslave me to them and/or their system which grants them remuneration.

43)      I am in fact, the lawful father, and have superior title and claim and am holder in due course of my child.

44)      That on or about DATED:1-4-04, 2 in the above mentioned tribunal, I did witness one Judge NAME of JUDGE commit crimes, biases, prejudices, and overt collusions against me in direct violation of law, using color of law, and color of authority to disenfranchise me as a fraud using the court system of the County of _________ in the State of ___________.

            "[Judge must] perform their duties in an impartial manner, free from bias caused by their own financial interest or the financial interests or person who have supported them."  ($81001, subd. (b).) 207 Cal.App.3d 852

            “The statist notion that government may supercede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions.  Commissioners and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests".  Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. 1990), citing, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 623-29, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93 (1982).   852

"The statist notion that government may supercede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions.  Commissioners and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests".  Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. 1990), citing, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 623-29, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93 (1982).

45)      That in fact, in overt violation of law, the state cannot disenfranchise me without a compelling showing of unfitness.   Being a person with epilepsy, a condition not a disease, does not disqualify me, nor does it qualify for reasonable efforts since I have shown my son had no seizures in my care, and I also was very well versed in his nutritional needs. 

46)      I have done no crime or act or omission in this matter, and in fact do have clean hands in this matter.

47)      I have not been found guilty of any crime, in any court of law.

48)      I have in fact, maintained my substantive rights, and said court in the embodiment of Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact, overtly work to overthrow and disenfranchise me using color of law, and under color of authority.

49)      That Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact, enjoin in the commissions of crime6 against me using court and color of law under color of authority.

50)       Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact, do this without either reasonable cause or probable cause nor any disrespect or contempt committed in the court.

51)      Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact disenfranchise me as a father and to enslave me in overt violation of law, which I did in fact, default them on, as he had knowledge of the law and directly knew.

52)       That in order to do so, he did in fact, completely with great bias and prejudice, violate my rights, my secured liberties and substantive due process of law, in direct violation to his oath of office7 and the concise rule of law.

It is an impossibility as has been shown by this formal disqualification, that he could ever be fair or impartial as he has in fact, committed criminal and unlawful acts and/or omissions against me in this matter.

53)             Said Judge NAME of JUDGE is in fact, the surrogate lawyer to the ________ County district attorney, and is attempting to force an overt fraud against me to obtain Title 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 661-669 Title IV-D remunerations. "In the case of In re Moon, 201 B.R. 79, 87-88 (Bktrcy. S.D.N.Y. 1996) a former wife sought to have her debtor husband imprisoned until the debtor's father or the Reunification Church paid his support arrears.  The court held that: "Far more horrific is the notion that a debtor may be incarcerated in order to extract payment of the debtor's liability from third parties who have no obligation to do so.  It simply cannot be supposed that Congress contemplated that the exception in section 362(b)(2)(b) would be implemented by the courts in a manner analogous to medieval practices of debtor's prison and ransom." The horrifying aptness of the analogy of medieval debtor's prison set forth by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the above case as to the practice of shaking down relatives and friends is even more apparent when many of the people going to jail for civil matters (where there is no probable cause) are subjected to assault, rape, sexually transmitted diseases, AIDS, tuberculosis and poor jail conditions that are "unfit" for human beings."

54)      WHEREAS, it has become an impossibility where Judge NAME of JUDGE can be either fair or impartial, or just, or either uphold his oath of office, or the laws of the State of _______, and/or of the United States which by and from his own unlawful acts and/or omissions in this matter.  It has become blatantly apparent that he has proactively become a lawyer in this matter, by actively changing the terms of the documents already res adjudicata by Respondent willful omission, and it is apparent, that I am aware of the facts can ascertain that Judge NAME of JUDGE is no longer impartial, and is biased and overtly prejudiced against me and in the interests of justice that he be formally disqualified from this matter.  Judge NAME of JUDGE did practice law from the bench by siding in favor or the defendant despite clear and convincing evidence of perjury, intent to injure and kidnapping. 

SEAL:                     _____________________________________

                              In Propria Persona, Sui JurisAddress          

City, State, Zip

Telephone Appearance”

Telephone

XIV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I.

Declaration of Rights.

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SEC. 3.

(a) The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good. (b)

(1) The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.

(2) A statute, court rule, or other authority, including those in effect on the effective date of this subdivision, shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access. A statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date of this subdivision that limits the right of access shall be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.

(3) Nothing in this subdivision supersedes or modifies the right of privacy guaranteed by Section 1 or affects the construction of any statute, court rule, or other authority to the extent that it protects that right to privacy, including any statutory procedures governing discovery or disclosure of information concerning the official performance or professional qualifications of a peace officer.

(4) Nothing in this subdivision supersedes or modifies any provision of this Constitution, including the guarantees that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denied equal protection of the laws, as provided in Section 7.

(5) This subdivision does not repeal or nullify, expressly or by implication, any constitutional or statutory exception to the right of access to public records or meetings of public bodies that is in effect on the effective date of this subdivision, including, but not limited to, any statute protecting the confidentiality of law enforcement and prosecution records.

(6) Nothing in this subdivision repeals, nullifies, supersedes, or modifies protections for the confidentiality of proceedings and records of the Legislature, the Members of the Legislature, and its employees, committees, and caucuses provided by Section 7 of Article IV, state law, or legislative rules adopted in furtherance of those provisions; nor does it affect the scope of permitted discovery in judicial or administrative proceedings regarding deliberations of the Legislature, the Members of the Legislature, and its employees, committees, and caucuses.

TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PART I—

CRIMES CHAPTER 47--FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS Sec. 1034.

Civil penalties and injunctions for violations of section 1033 (a) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate United States district court against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under section 1033 and, upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, whichever amount is greater. If the offense has contributed to the decision of a court of appropriate jurisdiction to issue an order directing the conservation, rehabilitation, or liquidation of an insurer, such penalty shall be remitted to the appropriate regulatory official for the benefit of the policyholders, claimants, and creditors of such insurer. The imposition of a civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any other criminal or civil statutory, common law, or administrative remedy, which is available by law to the United States or any other person. (b) If the Attorney General has reason to believe that a person is engaged in conduct constituting an offense under section 1033, the Attorney General may petition an appropriate United States district court for an order prohibiting that person from engaging in such conduct. The court may issue an order prohibiting that person from engaging in such conduct if the court finds that the conduct constitutes such an offense. The filing of a petition under this section does not preclude any other remedy which is available by law to the United States or any other person.