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Petition
For Disqualifying a Judge for Ignoring
Constitutional Law |
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TO
THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: |
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COMES
NOW THE PETITIONER, YOUR NAME in this
matter, TO EXERCISE HIS/HER RIGHT, to
disqualification of a Judge. |
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A voidable order Potenz
Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill. App.
3d 617, 525 N.E. 2d 173, 175
(1988). In instances herein, the law
has stated that the orders are void
ab initio and not voidable because
they are already void. Due to the
violation of CONSTITUTIONAL rights
by Judge |
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Dated:_________________
SEQ CHAPTER
\h \r 1INTRODUCTION
1)
Article III Section 1. The judicial
power of the United States, shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.
The judges, both of the supreme and
inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good behavior, and
shall, at stated times, receive for
their services, a compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
Section 2. The judicial power shall
extend to all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under
their authority;--to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies
to which the United States shall be
a party;--to controversies between
two or more states;--between a state
and citizens of another state;--between
citizens of different states;--between
citizens of the same state claiming
lands under grants of different states,
and between a state, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign states, citizens
or subjects. In all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a
state shall be party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction.
In all the other cases before mentioned,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact,
with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall
make.
The trial of all crimes, except in
cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury; and such trial shall be held
in the state where the said crimes
shall have been committed; but when
not committed within any state, the
trial shall be at such place or places
as the Congress may by law have directed.
2)
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND
THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES
A. A judge should respect and comply
with the law and should act at all
times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow family,
social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment.
A judge should not lend the prestige
of the judicial office to advance
the private interests of others; nor
convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the
judge. A judge should not testify
voluntarily as a character witness.
C. A judge should not hold membership
in any organization that practices
invidious discrimination on the basis
of race, sex, religion, or national
origin.
3)
TITLE 28 > PART I > CHAPTER
16 > § 351 § 351. Complaints; judge
defined
Release date: 2005-09-29
(a) Filing of Complaint by Any Person.—
Any person alleging that a judge has
engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration
of the business of the courts, or
alleging that such judge is unable
to discharge all the duties of office
by reason of mental or physical disability,
may file with the clerk of the court
of appeals for the circuit a written
complaint containing a brief statement
of the facts constituting such conduct.
(b) Identifying Complaint by Chief
Judge.— In the interests of the effective
and expeditious administration of
the business of the courts and on
the basis of information available
to the chief judge of the circuit,
the chief judge may, by written order
stating reasons therefor, identify
a complaint for purposes of this chapter
and thereby dispense with filing of
a written complaint. (c) Transmittal
of Complaint.— Upon receipt of a complaint
filed under subsection (a), the clerk
shall promptly transmit the complaint
to the chief judge of the circuit,
or, if the conduct complained of is
that of the chief judge, to that circuit
judge in regular active service next
senior in date of commission (hereafter,
for purposes of this chapter only,
included in the term "chief judge").
The clerk shall simultaneously transmit
a copy of the complaint to the judge
whose conduct is the subject of the
complaint. The clerk shall also transmit
a copy of any complaint identified
under subsection (b) to the judge
whose conduct is the subject of the
complaint.
(d) Definitions.— In this chapter—
(1) the term "judge" means
a circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy
judge, or magistrate judge; and
(2) the term "complainant"
means the person filing a complaint
under subsection (a) of this section.: |
I
am in Propria Persona, Sui Juris,
and am acting as my own counsel.
NOTE: I am not
PRO SE and any labeling as such is
a direct damage to me, as this court
and all its judicial officers has
knowledge of the law and come under
strict construction of the law, while
I as a
3)
SEQ CHAPTER
\h \r 1The Supremacy
Clause appears in Article VI of the
United States Constitution.
It establishes the Constitution, Federal
Statutes, and U.S. treaties as "the
supreme law of the land." The
Constitution is the highest form of
law in the
American legal system.
State judges are required to uphold
it, even if state laws or Constitutions
conflict with it.
[4] Government officials enjoy
qualified immunity from civil damages
unless their conduct violates "clearly
established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982);
see also Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306
(describing Harlow's standard as one
of "objective legal reasonableness").
"A public official is not entitled
to qualified immunity when the contours
of the allegedly violated right were
sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what
he [was] doing
violate[d] that right."
Osolinski
v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir.
1996) (alterations in original) (citation
and internal quotations omitted).
Determining whether a public official
is entitled to qualified immunity
"requires a two-part inquiry:
(A)
Was the law governing the state official's
conduct clearly established?
(B)
Under that law could a reasonable
state official have believed his conduct
was lawful?"
Browning
v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir.
1995) (citing Portland v. Bagley,
988
F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993)).
This
standard " `gives ample room
for mistaken judgments' by protecting
`all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.'
" Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 229 (1991) (per curiam) (quoting
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343
(1986)).
5)
SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1ADVANCE
\d 4That the United States Supreme
Court has clearly, and repeatedly,
held that any judge who acts without
jurisdiction is engaged in an act
of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S.
200, 216, 101, S. Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.
2d 392, 406 (1980): Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed
257 (1821).
6)
That The United States Supreme Court,
in Twining v. New
Jersery, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct.
14, 24, (1908), stated that "Due
Process requires that the court which
assumes to determine the rights of
parties shall have jurisdiction.";
citing Old Wayne Mut. Life Assoc.
V. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct.
236 (1907); Scott v McNeal, 154 U.S.
34, 14, S. Ct. 1108 (1894); Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
7)
Due Process is a requirement of the
U.S. Constitution. Violation of the
United States Constitution by a judge
deprives that person from acting as
a judge under the law. He/She is acting
as a private person, and not in the
capacity of being a judge (and, therefore,
has no jurisdiction).
8)
The state Supreme Courts have held
that those who aid, abet, advise,
act upon and execute the order of
a judge who acts without jurisdiction
are equally guilty. They are equally
guilty of a crime against the U.S.
Government.
VOIDABLE V. VOID ORDERS
9)
A voidable order is an order that
must be declared void by a judge to
be void; a void order is an order
issued without jurisdiction by a judge
and is void ab initio and does not
have to be declared void by a judge
to be void. Only an inspection of
the record of the case showing that
the judge was without jurisdiction
or violated a person’s due process
rights, or where fraud was involved
in the attempted procurement of jurisdiction,
is sufficient for an order to be void.
Potenz Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill.
App. 3d 617, 525 N.E. 2d 173, 175
(1988). In instances herein, the law
has stated that the orders are void
ab initio and not voidable because
they are already void.
10)
There is a misconception by some attorneys
and judges that only a judge may declare
an order void, but this is not the
law: (1) there is no statute nor case
law that supports this position, and
(2) should there be any case law that
allegedly supported this argument,
that case would be directly contrary
to the law established by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Valley v. Northern
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S.
348, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920) as well
as other state courts, e.g. by the
Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Miller. Supra. A party may have a
court vacate a void order, but the
void order is still void ab initio,
whether vacated or not; a piece of
paper does not determine whether an
order is void, it just memorializes
it, makes it legally binding and voids
out all previous orders returning
the case to the date prior to action
leading to void ab initio.
11)
This principle of law was stated
by the U.S. Supreme Court as "Courts
are constituted by authority and they
cannot go beyond that power delegated
to them. If they act beyond that authority,
and certainly in contravention of
it, their judgments and orders are
regarded as nullities. They are not
voidable, but simply VOID, AND THIS
IS EVEN PRIOR TO REVERSAL." [Emphasis
added]. Vallely v. Northern Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41
S. Ct. 116 (1920). See also Old Wayne
Mut. I. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U.S.
8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Williamson
v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L. Ed,
1170, 1189, (1850); Rose v. Himely,
4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617
(1808).
12)
Pursuant to the Vallely court
decision, a void order does not have
to be reversed by any court to be
a void order. Courts have also held
that, since a void order is not a
final order, but is in effect no order
at all, it cannot even be appealed.
Courts have held that a void decision
is not in essence a decision at all,
and never becomes final. Consistent
with this holding, in 1991, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that, "Since
such jurisdictional defect deprives
not only the initial court but also
the appellate court of its power over
the case or controversy, to permit
the appellate court to ignore it.
…[Would be an] unlawful action by
the appellate court itself."
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S.
868 (1991); Miller, supra. Following
the same principle, it would be an
unlawful action for a court to rely
on an order issued by a judge who
did not have subject-matter jurisdiction
and therefore the order he issued
was Void ab initio.
13)
A void order may be challenged
in any court, at any time, and even
by third parties. A void order has
no legal force or effect. As one court
stated, a void order is equivalent
to a blank piece of paper.
14)
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
While a Judge may issue orders
to control his court, he has no lawful
authority to issue any order which
violates the Supreme Law of the Land.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
states that all entities have the
mandatory right of an adequate, complete,
effective, fair, full meaningful and
timely access to the court. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides that the interest of parents
in the care, custody and control of
their children, is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by the court, Troxel V.
Granville, USC, (2000). "Parents
have a liberty interest of the custody
of their children, hence, any deprivation
of that interest by the state must
be accomplished by procedures meeting
the requirements of due process."
Hooks v Hooks, United States Court
of Appeals (1985). Indeed, the right
to rear one’s children is so firmly
rooted in our culture that the Unites
States Supreme Court has held it to
be a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
Hawk v. Hawk, Tennessee Supreme Court,
(1993). The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees Due Process and Equal Protection
to all. "No state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
United States Constitutional Amendment
XIV and adopted by State of Indiana
Constitution.
"Choices about marriage,
family life, upbringing of children
are among associational rights ranked
as of basic importance in our society,
rights sheltered by the Fourteenth
Amendment against State’s unwarranted
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.
U.S.C.A. Constitutional Amendment
14.
It seems that in this case,
Sanjari v Gratzol (previously Sanjari),
the court made an issue of clear and
convincing bias by repeatedly delaying,
and eventually canceling (effectively
reversing its own decision on) the
full custody hearing set for February
10, March 22, & June 22 2004,
effectively deciding in favor of the
Petitioner/Mother who had been seeking
some of those delays. It also made
the unethical and illegal decision
to reverse its own order (of hearing
set for December 23, 2003) by allowing
her to have a TRO, January 2004, which
canceled any contact I have with my
son. This reversal by the Court
was prompted by its illegal and unethical
conduct in protecting, and covering
up for, its own misconducts and violations
and that of another judge. The
Court tried to muzzle the Respondent/Father
by issuing an illegal (by IN &
US laws—see previous filings) Mediation
and Counseling Order to prevent a
public hearing of the custody case
which the Court and their "brethren"
judges would have found embarrassing.
The Court further denied the Respondent/Father
the opportunity, as required by the
U.S. Constitution, to examine and
challenge the underlying reasons for
its decision, hence violating the
US Constitution with the result that
that decision is VOID (see above).
The Court, moreover, denied the due
process rights of the minor children
by canceling the custody hearing,
and endangered their safety and well-being.
Again, in violation of the US Constitution
and IN and US laws.
Similarly, any other Court
or entity insisting to uphold such
an illegal order would be in violation
of the US Constitution.
FAMILY LIFE VIOLATIONS
15)
The construction of a constitutional
theory which will protect various
aspects of family life under Section
1983 rightly continues to command
a good deal of judicial interest.
The right of a parent to raise
his children has long been recognized
as a fundamental constitutional right,
"far more precious than property
rights." Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), quoting
May v. Anderson, 345, U.S. 528, 533
(1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541, (1942); Meyer v Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), See, e.q.
Castigno v Wholean, 239 Conn. 336
(1996); In re Alexander V., 223 Conn.
557 (1992). In Re: May V Anderson
(1953) 345 US 528, 533, 73 S. Ct.
840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221, 1226, This
case involved a mother stripped of
her rights without the right to utter
a single word in her defense. The
order was originally granted for 6
months in which the court allowed
the mother to "fight" for
her rights back, but kept getting
delayed so that the child would incur
more time with the father. This case
was reversed upon appeal, and also
gave rise to the statute citing that,
Presumption (750 ILCS 5/603) "A
court may consider the period of time
that a child has spent with a parent
by virtue of a temporary custody order
but there is no presumption in favor
of the existing custodian under 750
ILCS 5/602 as there is in modification
cases under 750 ILCS 5/610. In Re
Hefer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 73, 217 Ill.
Dec 701, 667 N.E. 2nd 1094 (4 Dist.
1996). Obviously, the argument is
that one parent may manipulate the
system to prolong proceedings that
he/she may think there is an automatic
award of custody. The 602 standards
still are mandated to be applied,
one of them including the wishes of
the children as well as other issues
such as safety and well-being of the
children (11 seizures in the mothers
care and constant abductions and interference
in the child’s educations, health
and welfare. In this case due to psychological
and/or other abuse in the Petitioner/Mother’s
residence).
STATEMENT OF BIAS.
SEQ CHAPTER
\h \r 116)
I am a proper party to this matter,
and have been witness thereto of the
egregious acts and/or omissions, bias,
overt prejudice and proactive practice
from the bench, Judge NAME of
JUDGE on December 23, 2003, January
4, 2004 January 10, 2004, March 23,
2004 and June 22, 2004 in the above
mentioned tribunal.
17)
My status is that of an adult,
minister, independent reporter, male
of the age of majority, who is not
an incompetent, nor any fiction or
corporation. I am a person with
epilepsy, as a disabled person, I
have the same rights to have and raise
children, as a non-disabled person.
18)
I am in fact, a
human being, a free man about the
land, beholden to nobody; a United
State Citizen, not a member of nor
embarrassed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution for the United
States. See Plessy v. Ferguson..
19) I claim all rights inherent
to me, and give proper judicial notice
and place on the record, that any
Judge in this matter be held to strict
construction of their own law, and
be held to the highest standards thereto
in accordance with the concise rule
of law.
“If a Judge is disqualified
as a matter of law, every order entered
by him is as equally void under the
new law as it was under the old, and
no reason appears why the parties
should be forced to trial before a
disqualified commissioner, only to
have the judgment set aside when it
later appears that as a matter of
law the commissioner was disqualified.”
Briggs v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County, 215 Cal. 336, 10 P.2d
1003 (Cal. 03/31/1932)
Or upon the sufficiency in law,
fact, or otherwise, of the statement
of the disqualification filed by a
party.
In every such case, the question of
the disqualification shall be a hearing
and determined by a duly elected judge
agreed upon by all the parties.”
20)
His own rights are in question he
has no authority to determine the
cause; so well is the principle understood
that in every court consisting of
more commissioners than one, the commissioner
who is a party in a suit takes no
part in the proceedings or decision
of the cause." Washington
Ins. Co. v. Price (1823) 1 Hopk. 1.
"The state is bound to
furnish every litigant not only an
impartial commissioner, but one who
has not, by any act of his, justified
a doubt of his impartiality."
Moers v. Gilbert, (1941) 175 Misc.
733, 25 N.Y.S.2d 114, affirmed 261
App.Div. 957, 27 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426,
Appeal den. 261 pp.Div.1074,27N.Y.S.2d783.
Also note that no commissioner can
be a party or lawyer to any other
party actions in court:
"That no one can, even
by consent, be the attorney of both
the litigating parties in the same
controversy.
" Farressly 7 47..169,
112 N.W. 386 (1907)
This fact is also stated within
the CCP § 170.4(c)(1): “The
issue of disqualification shall be
referred to a duly elected judge for
decision as provided in subdivision
(a) of Section 170.3 and if
it is determined that the commissioner
is disqualified, all orders and rulings
of the commissioner found to be disqualified
made after the filing of the statement
shall be vacated.”
[SEE ALSO CCP 170.6 et seq.]."Silence
can only be equated with fraud when
there is a legal or moral duty to
speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered
would be intentionally misleading.
We cannot condone this shocking conduct...
If that is the case we hope our message
is clear. This sort of deception will
not be tolerated and if this is routine
it should be corrected immediately
" U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F2d
297, had no jurisdiction in this matter,
and knew as such, and thereby—he had
no lawful authority, and all acts
and/or omissions committed against
me were done under color of law,
and under color of authority, as without
jurisdiction he does in fact, have
no claims to immunity nor any future
redress at law upon any future claim
asserted by me." At English Common
Law proceedings in court without jurisdiction
were deemed corum non judice--"Before
one not a commissioner" SEE:
"Filling the Void: Judicial Power
and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments”,
87 Yale L.J. 164, 165 (1977)
21)
In its order granting the Appellees'
motion for summary judgment, the district
court began its analysis by setting
forth the elements of a § 1983 claim
against an individual state actor
as follows:
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed
a constitutional right of which she
was deprived;
(2) the acts or omissions of
the defendant were intentional;
(3) the defendant acted under
color of law; and
(4) the acts or omissions of
the defendant caused the constitutional
deprivation.
Estate of Macias v. Lopez,
42 F. Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal.
1999). The court also stated that,
to establish municipal liability,
a plaintiff must show that
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed
a constitutional right of which she
was deprived;
(2) the municipality had a
policy or custom;
(3) this policy or custom amounts
to deliberate indifference to [the
plaintiff's] constitutional right;
and
(4)
the policy or custom caused the constitutional
deprivation.
PART
IX tc "PART IX " \l 4
ALLEGATIONS
OF LAW tc "ALLEGATIONS OF LAW
" \l 5
22) It is a fact
that Judge NAME of JUDGE, fail to
review the
evidence set forth in this case.
CALIFORNIA CODES EVIDENCE CODE SECTION
454. (a) In determining the propriety
of taking judicial notice of a matter,
or the tenor thereof:
(1) Any source
of pertinent information, including
the advice of persons learned in the
subject matter, may be consulted or
used, whether or not furnished by
a party.
(2) Exclusionary
rules of evidence do not apply except
for Section 352 and the rules of privilege.
(b)
Where the subject of judicial notice
is the law of an organization of nations,
a foreign nation, or a public entity
in a foreign nation and the court
resorts to the advice of persons learned
in the subject matter, such advice,
if not received in open court, shall
be in writing.
23)
Amendment V was violated repeatedly
by Judge NAME of JUDGE. I was not
allowed to cross examine, the witnesses
before me, nor was I allowed to examine
the documents prior to the hearing.
My life was placed into danger as
well as my son’s. I was twice
charged with the same infamous crime,
and I was forced to appear before
the courts without counsel.
24)
Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact, neither
hold his own officer of the courts
up to strict construction of the law,
or himself up to same; and has failed
to give me liberal or broad
construction of the law, under the
"Spirit of the Law" and
by allowing himself and petitioner
to perjure themselves and violate
the law in open court is in fact,
enjoining with a willful plan to disenfranchise
me of my rights as a father, using
color of law, under color of authority.
|
CALIFORNIA CODES
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 600.
(a) A presumption is an assumption
of fact that the law requires to be
made from another fact or group of
facts found or otherwise established
in the action. A presumption
is not evidence.
(b) An inference is a
deduction of fact that may logically
and reasonably be drawn from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise
established in the action.
601. A presumption is either
conclusive or rebuttable. Every
rebuttable presumption is either (a)
a presumption affecting the burden
of producing evidence or (b) a presumption
affecting the burden
of proof.
|
|
PART
X |
ALLEGATION
OF FACTS |
VIOLATION
OF RIGHTS, AUTHORITY AND DUE PROCESS |
|
25)
These laws of bias and prejudice exist
because bias does exist this is proof
in it self
A) Judge NAME of
JUDGE is of improper oath see
California constitution article 20
sec.3
B) Judge NAME of
JUDGE is of improper authority
see California constitution article
VI sec.
C) Judge NAME of
JUDGE is not bonded in accordance
with the law see California
constitution
D)
Judge NAME of JUDGE violated the Petitioner
rights under the ADA laws and CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS SEC. 24.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office
of the Attorney General 28 CFR
PART 35
[Order No. ] Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Disability in State
and Local Government
Services AGENCY: Department
of Justice.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: This rule implements subtitle
A of title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act,
Pub. L. 101-336, which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability by public
entities.
Subtitle A protects qualified individuals
with disabilities from discrimination
on the basis of disability in the
services, programs, or activities
of all State and local governments.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SEC. 24. Rights
guaranteed by this Constitution are
not dependent on those guaranteed
by the United States Constitution.
In criminal cases the rights of a
defendant to equal protection of the
laws, to due process of law, to the
assistance of counsel, to be personally
present with counsel, to a speedy
and public trial, to compel the attendance
of witnesses, to confront the witnesses
against him or her, to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures,
to privacy, to not be compelled to
be a witness against himself or herself,
to not be placed twice in jeopardy
for the same offense, and to not suffer
the imposition of cruel or unusual
punishment, shall be construed by
the courts of this
State in a manner consistent with
the Constitution of the United States.
This Constitution shall not be construed
by the courts to afford greater rights
to criminal defendants than those
afforded by the Constitution of the
United States, nor shall it be construed
to afford greater rights to minors
in juvenile proceedings on criminal
causes than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States.
This declaration of rights may not
be construed to impair or deny others
retained by the people.
See California constitution article
1 sec. 1
U.S.C. title 42 section 1983 depravation
of rights
26)
A notice to set aside was filed January
4, 2004, based on PROOF of PERJURY
BY THE DEFENDANT. tc "F)
A notice to set aside was filed January
4, 2004, based on PROOF of PERJURY
BY THE DEFENDANT. " \l
5On January 10, 2004 and March 22,
2004 subsequently Judge NAME of JUDGE
violated the plaintiff rights’ guaranteed
by the constitution of the United
states by ordering the plaintiff have
“supervised visitation.” And by ordering
a “Sole Legal and Sole Physical” Without
proof of actual abuse, where the whole
case was based on subjection and perjury.
This is a violation of the fourteenth
amendment Also U.S.C. 28 section 1443
27) No Reasonable efforts where
provided to plaintiff. There
was no due process or was there allowed
to be a cross examination of either
Pamela Berlanga, Doris Sammi and/or
Charles Silverstein.
Some states operate on a "state
model" in which local agency
employees are state employees; other
states operate on a "county model"
in which local agency employees are
municipal or county employees. For
purposes of federal law, the state
agency is ultimately
responsible for statutory mandates.
However, many of the recommendations
in these guidelines that are stated
in terms of "the agency"
or "the state agency" apply
equally to county or municipal agencies
that have immediate responsibility
for carrying out the reasonable efforts
mandate.
28) A notice to set aside was
filed January 4, 2004.
On
1-4-04, 1-10-04 and 3-22-04
Judge NAME of JUDGE violated the Respondents
rights guaranteed by the constitution
of the United states by ordering the
mother shall have sole legal and physical
custody of the minor children, this
is in violation of federal law "no
due process" :see court cases
attached, this also a violation of
federal law.
O'NEIL v. VERMONT, 144 U.S. 323 (1892);
TWINING v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 211
U.S. 78 (1908); U.S. v. DARBY, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); Calder v. Bull, 3
Dall. 386, 399;Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S.105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R.
82; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882; MEYER v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
GARNER v. TEAMSTERS UNION, 346 U.S.
485 (1953), "(c) When federal
power constitutionally is exerted
for the protection of public or private
interests, or both, it becomes the
supreme law of the land and cannot
be curtailed, circumvented or extended
by a state procedure merely because
such procedure will apply some doctrine
of private right. Pp. 492-501. Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized
the due process right of natural fathers
to maintain a parental relationship
with their children absent a finding
that they are unfit as parents."
ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. DOUGHTON,
262 U.S. 413 (1923) 262 U.S. 41, "
an arbitrary classification is obnoxious
to the equal protection clause, Southern
Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 ,
30 Sup. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247."
ARBITRARY Defined: adj. Determined
by chance, whim, or impulse, and not
by necessity, reason, or principle.
Based on or subject to individual
judgment or preference. Established
by a court or judge rather than by
a specific law or statute. Not limited
by law; despotic.
29) A notice to set aside was
filed January 4th 2004.
On
11-06-03 Judge NAME of JUDGE violated
the respondents rights guaranteed
by the
constitution
of the United states "lack of
due process and equal treatment"
by ordering
the
respondent to enroll in a parenting
classes. A emergency protective
order was granted for 2 reasons,
30)
1-4-04 contempt of a court order by
the mother to not interfere with the
custody of the child, and by Judge
NAME of JUDGE failure to adhere to
said court order and to show bias
because of the father gender and disability
it makes all order voidable.
A. By excluding the father from getting
the child’s medications. Which
jeopardized the child’s health and
welfare, and wholly interfered in
the best interest of the child.
Then by making a false claim with
CPS that the doctor had written that
the “mother” could only pick up the
medications which was PROVEN TO BE
A LIE BY A LETTER FROM THE DOCTOR!
31)
By the mother making false accusations
against a child in my household which
is not a “actual abuse of a child.”
By forbidding the father from any
of the child’s counseling in direct
violation of court orders. A Constitutional
Violation accrued when Judge NAME
of JUDGE did refuse to allow me to
have witnesses in my behalf.
Judge
NAME of JUDGE did show gender bias,
and discrimination against a disabled
parent. Judges can not due whatever
they want see court cases attached
32) A notice to set aside was
filed January 4th 2004
On
1-4-04, 1-10-04, 3-22-04 and 6-22-04
Judge NAME of JUDGE violated the respondents
rights guaranteed by the constitution
of the United states by ordering the
respondent to have supervised visits
base wholly on perjury without proof
in violation of Family Codes: 3027.1.
(a) If a court determines, based on
the investigation described in Section
3027 or other evidence presented to
it, that an accusation of child abuse
or neglect made during a child custody
proceeding is false and the person
making the accusation knew it to be
false at the time the accusation was
made, the court may impose reasonable
money sanctions, not to exceed all
costs incurred by the party accused
as a direct result of defending the
accusation, and reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in recovering the sanctions,
against the person making the accusation.
For the purposes of this section,
"person" includes a witness,
a party, or a party's attorney.
:see court cases attached |
|
REMEDY OF LAW |
|
34)
SEQ CHAPTER \h
\r 1Amendment V
No person shall
be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, orin the Militia,
when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled inany
criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use,
without just
compensation.
My children where
taken to fund a PRIVATE institution
known as Child Support, I was deprived
my family without due process of the
law. I was accused of a infamous crime,
where I was not given a chance to
defend myself, but rather charged,
fined and my family kidnapped. |
SEQ
CHAPTER \h \r 135)
That I be allowed to agree on a "
Duly Elected Judge' Under Oath, to
hear this matter, who
is an competent in Americans with
Disability Rights, Federal Hate Crimes,
U.S.C. Codes Including but not limited
to RICO and Constitutional law, who
will rule unbiasedly in accordance
with the law, and be of the following
reasonable lawful requisites:
A)
That he be of proper oath and affirmation.
B)
That he be bonded in accordance with
the law.
C)
That he be duly elected as required
by law. (See Cal. Const. Art.
VI et seq.)
D)
That he be in the Judicial Department
as required by Article III of the
Constitution of the State of California
(1849).
E)
That the Judge in fact, be of good
behavior.
F)
That the Judge pay does not diminish.
G)
That the Judge be unbiased and just.
H) That
the Judge be familiar with California
Codes and Constitution.
I) That
the Judge be familiar with Americans
with Disability Rights.
J) That
the Judge be familiar with Federal
Hate Crimes.
K) That
the Judge be familiar with U.S.C Codes.
L)
That the Judge be familiar with RICO
laws.
M) That
the Judge be familiar with Constitutional
Laws.
36)
That any and all hearings be expunged
as set for this disqualification,
in accordance with law. That any other
legal findings; and/or decisions adjudicated
my Judge NAME of JUDGE be vacated,
and/or expunged from the record in
ab intio.
37)
That this court remit to me any other
just or compensation or reparation
this court deem just and proper in
this matter. Respectfully
submitted, |
|
Dated:
_______________
SEAL:
_____________________________________
YOUR NAME
In Propria
Persona Sui Juris
Address
City, STATE, Zip
"Telephone
Appearance"
Telephone Number |
|
The Superior Court,
State of ________, in and for the County
of ________,
__________
TERM |
|
THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF _________
YOUR NAME
Petitioner/Contemnor’s
Vs.
NAME OF ACCUSED
Respondent. |
CASE No.
STATEMENT OF
DISQUALIFICATION
28 U.S.C. 455
Against Judge NAME of JUDGE
|
|
|
SEQ
CHAPTER \h \r 1COMES
NOW THE AGGRIEVED AND DAMAGED PARTY
IN THIS MATTER, BY THESE PRESENTS:
The competent adult, YOUR NAME,
who having personal knowledge of these
matters, and knowing the penalties
for the crime of perjury, hereby truthfully
states for the record and deposes
and says:
38)
My name is YOUR NAME.
39)
My name and spelling is only exactly
as: YOUR NAME. I do in fact, do not
use any other, nor do I allow
Respondent in the above mentioned
NOTICE OF DISQUALIFICATION.
40)
I have personal knowledge of the facts
in this matter.
41)
I am acting as my own counsel in my
own proper person: In Propria Persona
Sui Juris; and,
42)
That I am NOT PRO SE. Any such
assertion is an overt lie, as people
making such claim have knowledge of
the law and are making claims for
other malicious designs in which to
disenfranchise and/or enslave me to
them and/or their system which grants
them remuneration.
43)
I am in fact, the lawful father, and
have superior title and claim and
am holder in due course of my child.
44)
That on or about DATED:1-4-04, 2 in
the above mentioned tribunal, I did
witness one Judge NAME of JUDGE commit
crimes, biases, prejudices, and overt
collusions against me in direct violation
of law, using color of law, and color
of authority to disenfranchise me
as a fraud using the court system
of the County of _________ in the
State of ___________.
"[Judge must] perform their duties
in an impartial manner, free from
bias caused by their own financial
interest or the financial interests
or person who have supported them."
($81001, subd. (b).) 207 Cal.App.3d
852
“The statist notion that government
may supercede parental authority in
order to ensure bureaucratically or
judicially determined "best interests"
of children has been rejected as repugnant
to American traditions. Commissioners
and state officials are ill-equipped
to second guess parents and are precluded
from intervening in absence of powerful
countervailing interests".
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138
(Pa. 1990), citing, Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 77 L.Ed.2d 614,
623-29, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93 (1982).
852
"The statist notion that
government may supercede parental
authority in order to ensure bureaucratically
or judicially determined "best
interests" of children has been
rejected as repugnant to American
traditions. Commissioners and
state officials are ill-equipped to
second guess parents and are precluded
from intervening in absence of powerful
countervailing interests".
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138
(Pa. 1990), citing, Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 77 L.Ed.2d 614,
623-29, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93 (1982).
45)
That in fact, in overt violation of
law, the state cannot disenfranchise
me without a compelling showing of
unfitness. Being a person
with epilepsy, a condition not a disease,
does not disqualify me, nor does it
qualify for reasonable efforts since
I have shown my son had no seizures
in my care, and I also was very well
versed in his nutritional needs.
46)
I have done no crime or act or omission
in this matter, and in fact do have
clean hands in this matter.
47)
I have not been found guilty of any
crime, in any court of law.
48)
I have in fact, maintained my substantive
rights, and said court in the embodiment
of Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact,
overtly work to overthrow and disenfranchise
me using color of law, and under color
of authority.
49)
That Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact,
enjoin in the commissions of crime
against me using court and color of
law under color of authority.
50)
Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact, do
this without either reasonable cause
or probable cause nor any disrespect
or contempt committed in the court.
51)
Judge NAME of JUDGE did in fact disenfranchise
me as a father and to enslave me in
overt violation of law, which I did
in fact, default them on, as he had
knowledge of the law and directly
knew.
52)
That in order to do so, he did in
fact, completely with great bias and
prejudice, violate my rights, my secured
liberties and substantive due process
of law, in direct violation to his
oath of office
and the concise rule of law.
It is an impossibility as has
been shown by this formal disqualification,
that he could ever be fair or impartial
as he has in fact, committed criminal
and unlawful acts and/or omissions
against me in this matter.
53)
Said Judge NAME of JUDGE is in fact,
the surrogate lawyer to the ________
County district attorney, and is attempting
to force an overt fraud against me
to obtain Title 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 661-669
Title IV-D remunerations. "In
the case of In re Moon, 201 B.R. 79,
87-88 (Bktrcy. S.D.N.Y. 1996) a former
wife sought to have her debtor husband
imprisoned until the debtor's father
or the Reunification Church paid his
support arrears. The court held
that: "Far more horrific is the
notion that a debtor may be incarcerated
in order to extract payment of the
debtor's liability from third parties
who have no obligation to do so.
It simply cannot be supposed that
Congress contemplated that the exception
in section 362(b)(2)(b) would be implemented
by the courts in a manner analogous
to medieval practices of debtor's
prison and ransom." The horrifying
aptness of the analogy of medieval
debtor's prison set forth by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court in the above case
as to the practice of shaking down
relatives and friends is even more
apparent when many of the people going
to jail for civil matters (where there
is no probable cause) are subjected
to assault, rape, sexually transmitted
diseases, AIDS, tuberculosis and poor
jail conditions that are "unfit"
for human beings."
54)
WHEREAS, it has become an impossibility
where Judge NAME of JUDGE can be either
fair or impartial, or just, or either
uphold his oath of office, or the
laws of the State of _______, and/or
of the United States which by and
from his own unlawful acts and/or
omissions in this matter. It
has become blatantly apparent that
he has proactively become a lawyer
in this matter, by actively changing
the terms of the documents already
res adjudicata by Respondent willful
omission, and it is apparent, that
I am aware of the facts can ascertain
that Judge NAME of JUDGE is no longer
impartial, and is biased and overtly
prejudiced against me and in the interests
of justice that he be formally disqualified
from this matter. Judge NAME
of JUDGE did practice law from the
bench by siding in favor or the defendant
despite clear and convincing evidence
of perjury, intent to injure and kidnapping.
|
|
DATED: ______________
SEAL:
_____________________________________
YOUR NAME –AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui JurisAddress
City,
State, Zip
Telephone Appearance”
Telephone
|
XIV
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION |
|
CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
[1849*]
|
|
ARTICLE
I.
Declaration
of Rights. |
|
Sec. 18. Neither slavery,
nor involuntary servitude, unless for
the punishment of crimes, shall ever be
tolerated in this State. |
|
CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1
DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS SEC. 3. |
|
(a)
The people have the right to instruct
their representatives, petition government
for redress of grievances, and assemble
freely to consult for the common good.
(b)
(1)
The people have the right of access
to information concerning the conduct
of the people's business, and, therefore,
the meetings of public bodies and
the writings of public officials and
agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.
(2)
A statute, court rule, or other authority,
including those in effect on the effective
date of this subdivision, shall be
broadly construed if it furthers the
people's right of access, and narrowly
construed if it limits the right of
access. A statute, court rule, or
other authority adopted after the
effective date of this subdivision
that limits the right of access shall
be adopted with findings demonstrating
the interest protected by the limitation
and the need for protecting that interest.
(3)
Nothing in this subdivision supersedes
or modifies the right of privacy guaranteed
by Section 1 or affects the construction
of any statute, court rule, or other
authority to the extent that it protects
that right to privacy, including any
statutory procedures governing discovery
or disclosure of information concerning
the official performance or professional
qualifications of a peace officer.
(4)
Nothing in this subdivision supersedes
or modifies any provision of this
Constitution, including the guarantees
that a person may not be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or denied equal
protection of the laws, as provided
in Section 7.
(5)
This subdivision does not repeal or
nullify, expressly or by implication,
any constitutional or statutory exception
to the right of access to public records
or meetings of public bodies that
is in effect on the effective date
of this subdivision, including, but
not limited to, any statute protecting
the confidentiality of law enforcement
and prosecution records.
(6)
Nothing in this subdivision repeals,
nullifies, supersedes, or modifies
protections for the confidentiality
of proceedings and records of the
Legislature, the Members of the Legislature,
and its employees, committees, and
caucuses provided by Section 7 of
Article IV, state law, or legislative
rules adopted in furtherance of those
provisions; nor does it affect the
scope of permitted discovery in judicial
or administrative proceedings regarding
deliberations of the Legislature,
the Members of the Legislature, and
its employees, committees, and caucuses.
|
|
TITLE
18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I—
CRIMES
CHAPTER 47--FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS
Sec. 1034. |
|
Civil
penalties and injunctions for violations
of section 1033 (a) The Attorney General
may bring a civil action in the appropriate
United States district court against
any person who engages in conduct
constituting an offense under section
1033 and, upon proof of such conduct
by a preponderance of the evidence,
such person shall be subject to a
civil penalty of not more than $50,000
for each violation or the amount of
compensation which the person received
or offered for the prohibited conduct,
whichever amount is greater. If the
offense has contributed to the decision
of a court of appropriate jurisdiction
to issue an order directing the conservation,
rehabilitation, or liquidation of
an insurer, such penalty shall be
remitted to the appropriate regulatory
official for the benefit of the policyholders,
claimants, and creditors of such insurer.
The imposition of a civil penalty
under this subsection does not preclude
any other criminal or civil statutory,
common law, or administrative remedy,
which is available by law to the United
States or any other person. (b) If
the Attorney General has reason to
believe that a person is engaged in
conduct constituting an offense under
section 1033, the Attorney General
may petition an appropriate United
States district court for an order
prohibiting that person from engaging
in such conduct. The court may issue
an order prohibiting that person from
engaging in such conduct if the court
finds that the conduct constitutes
such an offense. The filing of a petition
under this section does not preclude
any other remedy which is available
by law to the United States or any
other person.
|
I take the following oath or affirmation
before performing the duties of his
office: ``I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I say and have written
the truth, under the Constitution and
laws of the United States. So help me
God.'' Tuesday, October 18, 2005
4 Eighth Amendment— Cruel
and unusual punishment—Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
The Superior Court of the State
of ___________ and for the County
of __________, shall be concurrent
with and equivalent to the County
of _____________ County court in
Term as created in the Constitution
.
7 "Taswell v Smith states
ALL circuit commissioners MUST take
the original Constitutional oath.
| | | |